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The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: The Twin Processes of 
Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
By 
Claude Joel Fortin 
Abstract 
The sharp rise in global demand for biofuels and food has prompted widespread land 
grabbing in the Global South. In the case of Indonesia, it has prompted an 
unprecedented expansion of oil palm plantations that are expected to triple in land area 
over the next decade. The province of West Kalimantan has recently been targeted as the 
site of greatest expansion across the archipelago, giving rise to new social vulnerabilities 
and intensified conflicts over land. In the wake of large-scale enclosures of 'national 
forests' and 'idle land', users of forest land under customary tenure are having to 
confront the pressures of neoliberal globalization and transnational circuits of 
accumulation and production linked to the oil palm sector. Field research conducted in 
Sanggau district has revealed highly uneven access to land and distinct labour regimes 
determined by on-going class differentiation within characteristic patterns of exclusion 
and various forms of inclusion, notably adverse incorporation. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: The Problem, Conceptual and Methodological Discussion 
1.1 Introduction 
A critical theme in contemporary international development is the recent convergence of 
the food, energy, environmental, and financial crises which has placed land at the centre 
stage of development discourse. The term 'global land grab,' first made popular by civil 
society groups and transnational movements, helped draw attention to the controversy 
surrounding land deals involving large tracts of agricultural land in the global South that 
were being leased out or sold in closed-door negotiations and which invited speculation 
as to the scope and nature of these transactions. The current wave of land grabbing, that 
is in part being driven by the biofuel boom that began in 2003, helped precipitate a global 
food crisis in 2008 which forced an additional 100 million people into chronic hunger and 
undernourishment in that year and brought the world total to over 1.03 billion (UN 2009, 
9). As the 'food-versus-fuel battle' (Eide 2009, 12)1 waged throughout rural and urban 
settings in developing countries (and continues to this day), analyses varied regarding the 
effect exerted by the sharp rise in demand for biofuels with World Bank economist 
Donald Mitchell reporting that between 70 and 75 percent of the increase in food 
commodities prices was directly related to biofuels (Mitchell 2008, 16-17). The 
1 This is in reference to the redirection of agricultural products away from food markets and towards the 
production of biofuels, and also refers to land use changes that are oriented toward biofuel feedstocks crops 
instead of food. 
2 A 2008 publication by The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimated biofuels 
contributed to a 30 percent increase in food prices, while in the same year, the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) determined that only a 3 percent rise in prices could be attributed to biofuels. (FAO, 
2008: 101). 
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convergence of these forces has thus revived the strategy to purchase or secure long-term 
leases of agricultural land for purposes of off-shore farming to achieve greater food and 
energy security (Smaller and Mann 2009, 1), and has created new opportunities for 
profitable capitalist investment in land at a time when the global economy finds itself in 
the throes of a severe crisis. 
Since the late 1990s, there has been growing interest in commercially-produced liquid 
biofuels derived from a variety of agricultural crops. Ethanol, which is derived from such 
feedstocks as sugarcane and maize, and biodiesel, which is produced from such oil crops 
as rapeseed and oil palm, are being marketed as new forms of viable 'green energy' 
(OECD 2008). As such, biofuels are currently being promoted as an alternative energy 
source that can, not only lead to greater energy security and help mitigate climate change 
by reducing dependence on fossil fuels, but also help foster agricultural development in a 
sector that has been in a slump for decades (FAO 2008a). Though the positive net gain of 
biofuels on global warming is a subject of on-going debate in light of recent scientific 
studies,3 as is their ability to genuinely lead to sustainable energy security,4 their growth 
in demand has continued to expand with new alliances being formed between emerging 
3 Science published the results of two comprehensive studies: one conducted by Scharlemann and Laurance 
(2008: 44) showed that half of the first-generation biofuels tested generated a greater aggregate 
environmental cost than regular fossil fuel; and the other by Searchinger et al (2008: 1239) that estimated 
that as a result of land use changes due to corn-based ethanol production would lead to a doubling of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the first 30 years and would continue to increase for another 167 years. 
4 According to Edward Boyle (2009), in order for the US and the EU achieve their blending mandates 
targeted for 2022 and 2020 respectively, more than 30 percent of American farmland would need to be 
dedicated to ethanol production, while 70 percent of European agricultural land would need to be set aside 
for biodiesel production (3-4). 
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economies in the South and multinational corporations (Dauvergne and Neville 2010). 
Food and non-food crops are being redirected to biofuel production, current and new 
agricultural lands are being used for food or biomass feedstock cultivation, and forests, 
wetlands, dry lands and areas deemed 'marginal' are increasingly being brought into 
agricultural production in the Global South. Aggressive US (OECD 2008) and EU 
(Reyes 2007) blending mandates5, coupled with extensive government subsidies directed 
to agribusiness giants like Archer-Daniels-Mills (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and others,6 are 
the main drivers behind the current global biofuel boom which is reshaping rural 
landscapes in developing countries. According to the UK's Gallagher Report (Gallagher 
2008), in order to meet the present US and EU blending mandates, a mid-range scenario 
of land use projects that about 500 million more hectares of land would need to be 
brought into active production, an increase of more than one third current area under 
cultivation. The agrarian transformation presently underway in the Global South is in 
large part being orchestrated by a 'biofuel regime' made up of agribusiness allied with 
the oil and automotive industries intent on dominating the process of expansion and 
differentiation (Pye 2010) where the countryside is becoming a site of growing conflict as 
issues of land rights, and rights of access and use are being contested. 
5 The US Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 established 2022 blending targets for 2022 of 
10% for ethanol and 5% for biodiesel (OECD 2008: 31, 17-18). In the same year the European 
Commission unveiled its EU Strategic Energy Review that set 2020 blending targets of 10 % for transport 
fuels (Reyes 2007: 7). 
6 The Geneva-based Global Subsidies Initiatives estimates that between 2006-2012, the US will allocate in 
excess of US$ 92 billion in direct subsidies for corn-based ethanol production (See 'Biofuels - At What 
Cost?). 
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It is against the backdrop of what is being termed an emerging global 'biofuel complex'7, 
that large-scale commercial land deals by private or state, and national or foreign 
investors, are intensifying long-standing debates on issues of access, use, and control over 
land, and the livelihoods of the rural poor that are impacted by changes in land use. For 
the estimated 86 percent of rural people that depend on agriculture for their livelihood, 
and with three out of every four of the world's two billion or more poor living in rural 
areas (WB 2007, 3), 'land grabbing,' and the agricultural 'development' that is expected 
to follow, will invariably introduce dramatic changes across rural landscapes and will 
deeply impact the lives of the poor in ways that are yet to be fully understood or 
manifested. Many investments requiring access to land on a large-scale focus on land 
that is classified as 'empty,' 'marginal,' or 'idle,' and overlook the fact that there are few 
areas that can be genuinely deemed unoccupied or unclaimed. In reality, "virtually no 
large-scale allocations can take place without displacing or affecting local populations," 
and as a result, "the global rush for land has prompted renewed attention at a global scale 
on questions of rights to land and natural resources and their place in efforts to overcome 
hunger and poverty" (ILC 2009, 3 & 7). As foreign governments ally with the private 
sector, the financial investment community, and governments in the South, for the 
purpose of securing access to land for off-shore farming in developing countries, "the 
7 
The 'biofuels complex' is in reference to the recent expansion of industrial biofuels that reflects important 
trends in global political economy, namely: the commodification of local energy supplement and the 
consolidation of corporate power in the energy and agribusiness sectors; the desire to achieve 'energy 
security' in light of the assumed 'energy crisis;' and a new profitability frontier for agribusiness and energy 
sectors. (Borras, McMichael and Scoones 2010: 576). (See also The Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 37, 
no. 4, Special Issue: The Politics of Biofuels, Land and Agrarian Change'). 
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spectre of the 'bad old days' of colonialism and exploitative plantations" (Corula et al. 
2009, 68) necessarily come to the forefront and also draw out competing views as who 
will benefit from the current surge in agricultural investment and how the interests of the 
rural poor can best be protected. 
In the case of Indonesia, the world's largest producer of oil palm, plantations are 
expected to triple in area over the next decade, as the country vows to become the world's 
largest producer of biodiesel (McCarthy 2010, 823-4). With the demand for food and 
non-food products (including biodiesel) made from oil palm increases, land grabbing is 
progressing at a rapid pace through state-led enclosures of forested areas where the state 
is working in tandem with local, regional, and transnational corporate agribusiness to 
develop the industry. In January 2007, 58 energy firms have made a commitment to 
invest US$12.4 billion in biofuel development (Santosa 2008), which the Indonesian 
government describes as being "pro-jobs, pro-growth and pro-poverty-reduction." In 
addition to having committed 6.5 million hectares of land to biofuel development, the 
government has established a national biofuel blending mandate of 10 percent by 2010 
with a projected export target of 12 billion litres by the same year (Guerin 2007). Since 
the late 1960s, the Indonesian state has laid claim to all of its forested areas (the second 
largest in the world), which accounts for over 70 percent of the archipelago's land mass 
(Peluso 1992, 5) and the so-called 'palm oil oligarchy' established under the Suharto 
regime (1966-1998) (Aditjondro 2001) has left a legacy of corruption, cronyism, and 
5 
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incompetence of governance (McCarthy 2006, 8). By 2012, the national government is 
projecting an expansion to nearly 9 million hectares, and by 2020, the total area dedicated 
to oil palm production is expected to reach 24 million hectares (McCarthy 2009). In 
support of plantation expansion policies, the Indonesian Department of Agriculture has 
indicated that approximately 27 million hectares of 'unproductive forestlands' could be 
offered to investors for conversion into plantations (Colchester et al, 2006, 25). The 
terms 'unproductive,' 'idle,' or 'under-utilized,' however, remain highly contested and 
controversial given the ample evidence that such lands play an essential role in the 
livelihoods of the poor (Cotula et al. 2008). In addition, it has long since been 
established that such 'state' or 'public' lands provide livelihoods to millions of cultivators 
and forest dwellers under a variety of tenurial relations, be they individual or collective, 
'customary,' or otherwise (Peluso 1992). 
Given the scale and scope of Indonesia's rapidly expanding oil palm sector, the forested 
upland areas are increasingly becoming sites of contestation (Li 2007), and the province 
of West Kalimantan, in particular, is the site of a major expansion in plantation area. 
Currently, the island of Kalimantan has nearly 30 percent of the country's area dedicated 
to oil palm plantations , and its most western is projected to grow by 5 million more 
hectares over the next decade according to regional development plans (Sirait 2009, 8). 
Such a massive expansion is expected to, not only intensify existing conflicts related to 
8 The island of Sumatra is considered to be the centre of oil palm production in Indonesia and presently has 
more than 70 percent of the area dedicated t plantations (Colchester et al. 2006,24). 
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land disputes, but also create new ones as well given that much of the projected 
expansion is planned in areas not yet covered under laws governing private property 
relations. These forested areas generally fall under the status of 'public' or 'state lands' 
and are controlled by the state under constitutional and forestry laws, though the land 
itself is held under community customary tenure (adat) and provides livelihoods to 
millions of cultivators and forest dwellers (White et al. 2009, 7). In the past, as in the 
present, the process of government-regulated oil palm development has been fraught with 
problems, and plantations remain sites of conflict and confrontation between the various 
actors who are interacting across highly asymmetric power relations involving the state, 
agribusiness, rural elites, and local villagers. At present, there are some 513 sites of 
conflict between communities and oil palm companies across 17 provinces nation-wide 
that are being monitored by Sawit Watch, an Indonesian-based NGO, and West 
Kalimantan is noted as having the second highest level of conflict related to oil palm 
plantations after South Sumatra (Marti 2008, 10). Under the dynamic forces of the oil 
palm boom, agrarian landscapes in West Kalimantan are transforming at an 
unprecedented rate and scale, and processes of rural differentiation are leading to 
'cumulation of advantages and disadvantages' in which different groups in rural society 
gain access to the products of their own or others' labour (White 1989, 20). 
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1.2 The Problematic, Research Questions, Framework and Methodology 
The mainstream neoliberal development paradigm places biofuels and land grabbing 
within a framework of "prospects, risks, and opportunities." Biofuel advocates point out 
that the use of agro-feedstocks for energy production offers an opportunity for rural 
development in that their demand "could reverse the declining trend in real commodity 
prices that has depressed agricultural growth in much of the developing world over recent 
decades" (FAO 2008a, 5). The International Federation of Agricultural Producers 
(TFAP), which represents commercially oriented farmers in 80 countries, notes that 
bioenergy "represents a good opportunity to boost rural economies and reduce poverty," 
and that sustainable biofuel production by family farms "is an opportunity to achieve 
profitability and to revive rural communities" (FAO 2008a, 97). This position is in-step 
with the World Bank's 'new agriculture' agenda outlined in the 2008 World 
Development Report that trumpets how 'a strong link between agribusiness and 
smallholders can reduce rural poverty,' and how agricultural growth can be spurred on by 
a 'dynamic and efficient agribusiness' (World Bank 2007, 135-7). Regarding the 
potential risks associated with an increase in investment in agriculture leading to land 
grabbing, advocates of a corporate-led model of development point to an international 
'Code of Conduct' (CoC) that will effectively govern transnational land transactions in 
such a way that risks can be adequately managed to ensure a 'win-win' situation both for 
investors and the rural poor (IFPRI 2009). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the large-
scale acquisition of land, it is argued, will foster important national capitalist economic 
8 
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development and thus remains the most promising solution to poverty reduction despite 
the potential threats to rural livelihoods associated with land grabbing. The World 
Bank's more recent report produced jointly with the FAO, IF AD, and UNCTAD (World 
Bank et al. 2010) echoes its support for an international code of conduct founded on key 
principles that will, in its view, result in 'responsible agricultural investments' (RAI) in 
land. A critical dimension of RAI and a code of conduct within this approach to 
agricultural development is the establishment of clear and well-defined individual 
property rights which essentially translate into the privatisation of state or communal land 
as a means of achieving growth and reducing poverty. 
In contrast, critics of the neoliberal approach to biofuel development and land grabbing 
draw attention to issues of dispossession, food insecurity, and the loss of livelihoods, to 
name a few. Via Campesina, an international movement representing poor peasants and 
small farmers from the global South and North countries argues that the "social and 
ecological impacts of agrofuel development will be devastating" leading to the 
dispossession of millions of farmers from their land, the destruction of subsistence farmer 
livelihoods, and the undermining of food sovereignty9 (Via Campesina 2008, 1). Critics 
also highlight that biofuels and large-scale investments in agricultural land will only 
further entrench agribusiness and industrial farming practices, ultimately reinforcing 'the 
9 
Food sovereignty as defined by FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN) is the right of people 
to define their own food and agriculture, and to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and 
trade in order to achieve sustainable development objectives (Rosset 2006:125-26). 
9 
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path dependence of an exclusionary corporate agriculture' (McMichael 2009c, 243). In 
addition, opponents point out that the emerging biofuel alliances are only reinforcing 
processes and structures that "further wrest control of resources from subsistence farmers, 
indigenous peoples, and people with insecure land rights" (Dauvergne and Neville 2010, 
631). In this context, as capital-intensive investment increases through the promotion of 
biofuels and the buying or leasing of large parcels of agricultural land, new social 
vulnerabilities will emerge as the competition for land and resources is intensified. In 
response to the RAI framework and the 'win-win' scenario held within the model 
advanced by the World Bank and others, the UN Rapporteur for the Right to Food, 
Olivier de Schutter, was also highly critical and stated that such an approach to 
agriculture was neither socially or environmentally sustainable and was, in essence, 
'accelerating the destruction of the global peasantry' (De Schutter 2010). Finally, with 
respect to the 'Code of Conduct' that is being promoted by mainstream development 
agencies, Borras and Franco (2010b, 516 ) argue, among other points, that used in tandem 
with the notion of 'reserve agricultural land,' it could serve to transform so-called 
'marginal land' into economically productive spaces thus leading to more dispossession. 
Moreover, the authors add that the assumption that formal property rights to land are 
adequate protection against dispossession is deeply flawed in that there is much evidence 
to demonstrate that in many cases, such rights are on the leading edge of dispossession 
(517). 
10 
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Through my field work and research, I will seek to critically engage both sides of this 
debate with the intent of bringing further understanding to the contemporary biofuel and 
land-grabbing phenomena. I will thus be examining the social relations of property and 
land, as well as the social division of labour, in part guided by the classic questions of 
political economy that address class relations of production and reproduction as outlined 
by Henry Bernstein (2010), namely: who owns what?; who does what?; who gets what?; 
and what do they do with it and how?. The key problem I am researching is how and to 
what extent are the oil palm expansion and land-grabbing affecting livelihoods and levels 
of poverty in rural Indonesia? Specifically, my research is guided by three key inter-
related questions: how, to what extent, and under what terms is peasant dispossession 
taking place?; how, to what extent, and under what terms is the incorporation of peasants 
into the oil palm sector taking place?; and what are the implications of peasant 
dispossession and incorporation for rural social differentiation in particular, and for 
development more generally? Though it is recognized that dispossession is occurring 
against the backdrop of diverse socio-economic conditions at the local level, the 
processes, mechanisms, and outcomes related to dispossession remain at times unclear. 
The oil palm boom is also concurrently creating opportunities for the incorporation of 
smallholders and rural workers into various contract farming schemes along patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion that also invite further research and study. I will therefore be 
examining the social relations through which rural people gain access to, or are excluded 
from, the benefits of the oil palm industry in West Kalimantan. These relations will be 
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viewed within the larger processes of adverse incorporation10 in an attempt to better 
understand "the underlying causal processes that produce and reproduce poverty over 
time [and]...trap people in poverty" (Hickey and du Toit 2007, 1). Typically, the twin 
processes of dispossession and incorporation are examined and analyzed separately from 
one another. However, I will argue that the issue of peasant dispossession cannot be fully 
understood without also considering the nature of peasant incorporation in the oil palm 
sector, and how wealth and poverty are simultaneously being created through agricultural 
'development' initiatives that lay claim to being 'pro-poor.' 
My research project will also involve examining the dynamics of resistance at the local 
level, as well as the nature of the alliances that are forged at the local, national, and 
transnational levels among various agrarian social movements and organisations. It will 
include looking at how strategic overt and covert forms of resistance come into play in 
response to state sanctioned 'development' initiatives that undermine livelihoods and 
deny individuals, or groups, access to resources necessary to secure their social 
reproduction. It will also entail looking at the politics and policies that are associated 
with different activist movements and civil society organisations and include 
understanding how the issues of representation, intermediation and mobilization come 
into play in the forging of alliances and the dynamics that can set movements apart or 
10 Adverse incorporation has come into use in an attempt to reframe the phenomena elsewhere described as 
the more 'residualist' notion of social exclusion and "to make space for a more explicit focus on power 
relations, history, social dynamics, and political economy" (Hickey and du Toit 2007:1). 
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bring them together. In Indonesia, key agrarian conflicts have generated very different 
kinds of coalitions, helped produce new political opportunities in subsequent periods, and 
invariably led to shifting coalitions across environmental, agrarian, and indigenous 
organisations (Peluso, Affif, and Rachman 2008, 209). More specifically, the impact of 
palm oil activism in Indonesia can be seen as having been shaped to a large extent by 
local environmental and agrarian justice movements linked with more radical social 
movements in Europe and interconnected by transnational activists (Pye 2010, 851). 
Understanding the characteristics of various resistance movements in Indonesia, the 
dynamic nature of the ties that unite or separate them, and the role played by 
transnational agrarian movements (TAMs) in shaping strategies, objectives, and 
outcomes will be an important aspect of my study of dispossession and incorporation 
related to the oil palm sector in West Kalimantan. 
My hypothesis is as follows: the oil palm boom is leading to highly uneven outcomes in 
rural Indonesia ~ alongside the wealth that is created, a significant number of peasants 
and indigenous people are subjected to dispossession and are being adversely 
incorporated into the industry, both of which are undermining rural livelihoods and are 
leading to greater incidences of poverty, in particular within marginalised segments of 
rural society. From the perspective of smallholder farmers, rural landless workers, and 
the indigenous people who depend on the forests for their livelihoods, the biofuel-driven 
oil palm boom brings with it dispossession for some and adverse incorporation for others. 
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Understanding these processes is essential from a critical theory standpoint if in fact the 
purpose of developing new knowledge is "to counteract irrational and repressive social 
structures and processes" (Alvesson and Skjoldberg 1994, cf Mikkelsen, 2005, 136) that 
are at the root of poverty. Ultimately, the overall research objective is to gain a better 
understanding of social processes, mechanisms, and structures are deepening rural social 
differentiation in the context of the expanding oil palm industry creating wealth for some 
and poverty for others leading to dispossession on the one hand, and adverse 
incorporation on the other, leading to uneven rural differentiation as a result of unequal 
distributions of power inherent within class relations. 
For the purposes of this thesis, development is broadly defined as improving the well-
being, living standards, and opportunities of the poor with the understanding that, as an 
idea, an objective and an activity its "character and results are determined by relations of 
power, not by rhetoric of fashionable populist labels such as 'participation', 
'empowerment', 'civil society', or 'poverty reduction' (Kothari and Minogue 2002, 12-
13). It can be said that "development" is an unstable term (Esteva 1992; Crush 1995) 
though, in that it can represent an ideal of an imagined future toward which institutions 
and individuals strive, a historical process of commodification, industrialisation, and 
modernisation (Edelman and Haugerud 2005, 1), or a destructive myth which has 
culminated in an insidious, failed chapter in the history of Western modernity (Escobar 
1995). With inequality, poverty and hunger having grown significantly over this past 
14 
The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
decade (UN 2009), in spite of wide array of resources injected by development agencies, 
multilateral organisations, NGOs, and governments North and South that are, at least 
rhetorically, committed to the elimination of poverty and disparity in their most abject 
forms, it is clear that a rethinking of 'development' theory and practice is needed if 
indeed "the point is to change world" as Marx once noted. Given that social life is 
grounded in the practical and development is "a matter of life and death...[and]...an 
urgent global matter" (Edelman and Haugerud 2005,1), then understanding the processes 
and mechanisms through which wealth and poverty are simultaneously created through 
capitalist development becomes an essential first step in critically addressing the root 
causes of poverty and the entrenched social structures that make poverty chronic and 
intransigent for millions of rural and urban poor. Only then is it possible to articulate 
'development' initiatives centered on principles of social and distributional justice that 
will genuinely address the problem of global poverty, instead of being myopically 
focused on economic growth and the generation of wealth or on mitigation strategies that 
only superficially address to the symptoms of poverty without ever tackling its root 
causes. It is hoped that by examining the twin processes of dispossession and adverse 
incorporation related to the oil palm industry in Indonesia from an Agrarian Political 
Economy point of view, a clearer understanding will emerge as to the root causes of how 
inequalities and disparities are created in the context of a 'new agriculture' as promoted 
by the World Bank and other mainstream development institutions. 
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Methodological Issues 
The use of case studies has been identified as the most suitable method for the field 
research that will be undertaken in West Kalimantan. According to Robert K. Yin 
(2009), when 'how' and 'why' questions are the focus of a study involving the 
examination of contemporary events, the preferred method is the case study. He notes 
that the method relies on two important sources of evidence, namely "direct observations 
of the events being studies and interviews of the persons involved in the events," and he 
adds that "the case study's unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of 
evidence - documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations - beyond what might be 
available in a conventional study" (Ibid, 11). In this regard, the case study allows for a 
detailed and comprehensive look at the causes and effects related to localised phenomena 
in a particular setting in a given time, which can then help to understand similar events 
occurring in areas that share commonalities with the research area. It is important to note 
that the findings of these case studies are not intended to be extrapolated and made 
universally applicable to a broad spectrum of rural settings, but rather are considered to 
be representative in a general sense in contexts that share historical, political, social, and 
economic commonalities with the research sites being studied. A case study then can be 
defined as an intensive examination of a single case of a particular phenomenon (Orum 
2001) and can be expanded to include the analysis of single cases and comparisons 
between or among a small number of cases (Bennett 2001). Given that the field research 
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undertaken in West Kalimantan involved rural communities that are engaged in oil palm 
production across a wide spectrum ranging from complete, partial, and minimal 
absorption into the sector, the comparative aspect of case studies are particularly useful in 
helping understand the impact of the booming industry in a variety of settings. 
A key method of data collection during the research period will be participant observation 
which will also include informal and formal interviews with local villagers in the Meliau 
subdistrict. Participant observation can be described as "a method in which a researcher 
takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as 
one of the means of learning the explicit and tact aspects of their life routines and their 
culture" (Dewalt and Dewalt 2002, l).11 This research project will involve living with a 
family engaged in smallholder oil palm production in Kuala Buayan for a duration of one 
month, and participant observation offers an ideal method for "gaining understanding of 
the most fundamental processes of social life" (Ibid, 2), in addition to building an open 
and trusting rapport with the residents of the local community. Although the researcher 
cannot escape the fact that he or she will always remain an outsider that is 'non-local', 
participant observation helps create an important bridge of understanding that facilitates 
the sharing of ideas, opinions, and experiences that would otherwise not be possible in a 
formally-constructed research model. In this context, participant observations are usually 
11 The explicit aspects of culture refers to what people communitcate about with relative ease, while the 
tacits aspects remain largely outside of conscious awareness such as in the case of cultural norms that 
define social behaviour related to touch, eye contact, and proximity (Dewalt and Dewalt 2002,1). 
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less 'contrived' than formal interviews and "allow for observation of a group interaction 
in a more naturalistic environment" (Short 2006, 108). An important feature of this 
method is that it also provides for a more open ended and exploratory approach to 
qualitative research. As such, this approach does not involve developing a pre-
determined research design but rather moves from a general area of focus and develops 
its categories inductively in the course of the field research (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 
23). Participant observation made it possible then to record and collect information in an 
unobtrusive manner all the while pursuing unanticipated yet highly relevant areas of 
investigation that arose spontaneously in the course of daily village life that would have 
otherwise remained unobserved and overlooked in a more structured approach. 
This research has also drawn upon a variety of secondary data that included published 
and unpublished materials such as books, journal articles, conference papers, government 
documents, publications by bilateral and multilateral organisations, civil society and 
private sector publications, as well as newspaper accounts and multimedia material. The 
information gathered from these and other secondary sources have served to contextualise 
the puzzle raised in the thesis and to frame the analysis that follows with the 
understanding that their inherent strengths and weaknesses will need to be addressed at 
the outset. National accounts on basic economic data, for example, can be deeply 
problematic (Watts 2006, 193), and official statistics related to agrarian structures can, for 
a variety of reasons, be 'polluted' (Barraclough 1973 cf Borras 2007, 15) which are 
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important to note from the outset. Of significance also is that whether the researcher 
likes it or not, the construction of an account is caught up in contexts of power, 
resistance, institutional constraint, and innovation, all of which highlight relevant issues 
pertaining to representation, objectivity, and the construction of accounts based on field 
research (Clifford 1986, 3). With this in mind, and within the parameters and scope of 
this field research, it is expected that the data collected will allow for analytical 
generalisations that can be of relevance to development theory and practice, as well as for 
research methodology and the study of politics at the local, national, and transnational 
levels. 
An important aspect of the field research involved determining through observation and 
interviews with key informants the nature and forms of resistance that are occurring 
within the oil palm plantation production, and also in response to its expansion into land 
held within competing claims. As Watts (1994, 65) stated in relation to labour regimes, 
and in particular concerning contract farming, that "the contract functions simultaneously 
as a means of subordinations and a point of resistance," which in turn can lead to 
'everyday forms of resistance' as noted by Kerkvliet (2005) and Scott (2005). Resistance 
in Indonesia is taking more overt forms as well, (Peluso et al. 2008; Bachriadi 2009) and 
it will be critical to determine the scope of the actions undertaken, the outcomes, in 
addition to the nature of how issues are prioritised and consensus for action is achieved. 
In this context, environmental, agrarian, and indigenous movements converge and 
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diverge along a continuum that reflects respective ideologies, political objectives, and 
identities shaped by class, ethnicity, and kinship among others. How these movements 
interact and are influenced by transnational movements that shape agendas is also an 
important dimension of data gathering in the field. Interviewing key informants within 
various social movements and other civil society organisations, both rural and urban, will 
be essential to constructing an overall picture of how competing agendas get resolved or 
and lead to varying forms of protest and resistance. 
1.3 Introduction to the Case Studies in Sanggau District, West Kalimantan 
Figure 1: Map of Indonesia showing individual provinces. Copyright-free. Reproduced from 
http://en.wikipedia.Org/wiki/File:Indonesia_provinces_english.png Accessed 24 September, 2010. 
In the summer of 2010, I joined a team of students from Indonesian, Canada, and the 
Netherlands to conduct field research under the joint supervision of Dr. Tania Li, from 
the Anthropology Department at the University of Toronto, and Dr. Pujo Semedi, from 
the Anthropology Department at the University of Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta, 
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Indonesia. The project, which was funded under a three-year SSHRC grant, sought to 
examine the social relations through which rural people gain access to, or are excluded 
from, the benefits of high growth agriculture in Indonesia such as oil palm, in the 
province of West Kalimantan. Primary qualitative and quantitative data was collected 
from multiple case studies drawing upon a range of sources and methods for field 
research which included: interviews with key informants such as community leaders, 
local governments, forestry agencies, and NGO staff; interviews with local informants 
such as smallholder farmers, rural workers, and estate owners; and participant 
observations and participation in daily village activities. A non-random sampling method 
was used to identify and select interviewees both within civil society groups and social 
movements, as well as at the village level where semi-closed and open interview 
instruments were used to collect data (see Appendix A for Sample Questions). 
Following a two week orientation period, the research team of which I was a part 
conducted a four-week field investigation in July across 20 sites situated in a total of five 
desas (villages) in the subdistrict of Meliau, Sanggau district, West Kalimantan (see 
Figures 1 & 2). The research area selected by Professor Tanya Li and Dr. Semedi covered 
a wide-range of socio-economic configurations associated with oil palm and provided a 
representative map of the diversity of livelihoods that ranged from complete dependence 
on oil palm, to mixed economies of oil palm and rubber, to economies of rubber and rice 
only in sites located on the outer fringes of the oil palm industry. In addition, the 
21 
The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
research area allowed for comparative data to be gathered on state-run and private 
plantations which included various plasma-estate and transmigration schemes that have 
been implemented throughout different stages of oil palm development in the Sanggau 
district. 
Figure 2: Map of Sanggau District, West Kalimantan. 'Expropriation and Incorporation: Gendered 
Politics of Oil Palm Expansion in a Dayak Hibun Community in West Kalimantan', by Julia with Ben 
White, 2009, p. 4. 
During the field research period, I lived with a smallholder oil palm farmer and his family 
in the neighbourhood of Cempaka (RT 5) located on the eastern edge of Kuala Buayan 
desa on the south shore of the Kapuas River. Kuala Buayan and the neighbouring desas 
were situated within an oil palm concession owned by the private company Bintang 
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Harapan Desa (BHD), while the research sites north of the Kapuas River fell under the 
concessional control of the state-run plantation PTPN XIII. With the exception of the 
more remote research sites further south along the smaller Buayan River and its 
associated tributaries, the research area was completely hemmed in by oil palm either in 
the form of estate plantations (inti) or as two hectare smallholdings (plasma) tied to the 
estates. Over the course of my month-long stay in Cempaka (see Figure 3), I had the 
opportunity to visit a number of other sites within our research area and gained first-hand 
knowledge as to how social relations linked to land and labour were shaping and 
transforming rural livelihoods across a broad spectrum linked to the oil palm industry. I 
have also had access to the data and observations acquired by the pool of researchers 
involved in the project which has greatly enhanced my understanding of the rural 
livelihoods in our area that were directly and indirectly being affected by the oil palm 
sector. 
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Figure 3:: Map of Desa Kuala Buayan and surrounding desas. Courtesy of Kepala Dusun Pak Maharani 
from Kantor Kuala Buayan, 13 July, 2010. 
1.4 Chapters Overview 
In Chapter 2, I will outline and develop the analytical framework relevant to land 
grabbing, dispossession, adverse incorporation and rural resistance. I will begin with an 
overview of competing perspectives, followed by land uses changes and the dynamics of 
land grabbing currently underway in the Global South. The theoretical underpinnings of 
primitive accumulation and capitalism will then be reviewed as defined in Marxist theory, 
which will lead into the concept of accumulation by dispossession as first articulated by 
Rosa Luxemburg and later developed by David Harvey. The first section of this chapter 
will conclude with a review of the theory related to the differentiation of the peasantry, 
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contract farming, and adverse incorporation. The next section will examine global land 
politics under a neoliberal regime that will include neoliberal land policies, debates 
related to a proposed 'Code of Conduct' in land deals, as well as the recently developed 
CLEP model that is being proposed as a pro-poor land policy. An overview of women's 
rights to land in relation to neoliberal land policies will provide gender perspective on 
this topic and complete this section. The final analytical framework segment will 
examine rural resistance and transnational agrarian movements. Specifically, it will 
present the neoliberal regime as a catalyst for protest and resistance, and review the 
typology of rural politics that include local, national, and transnational forces that interact 
dynamically in competing and complementary ways. 
Chapter 3 will examine background information on biofuels in a global context in order 
to situate Indonesia's oil palm industry within a larger framework. After providing an 
onverview of the current development of biofuels and the main drivers behind the 
present-day boom, the role of agribusiness in the industry will be reviewed, in addition to 
the land grabbing that is resulting from the global surge in demand for biofuels. The 
global oil palm industry will be examined next, in order to situate Indonesia's industry 
within the larger global context. The following section in this chapter will provide some 
historical background on Indonesia with specific reference to agrarian issues, rural 
politics, and resistance, which will then lead into a discussion on the country's oil palm 
sector. Beginning with an overview of the changing nature estate-smallholder schemes 
that entailed state-led land grabbing and smallholder incorporation, this section will then 
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proceed with an outline of rural resistance within the sector nation-wide, and conclude 
with gender issues specific to the oil palm industry. 
Chapter 4 provides context for the field research that was undertaken in the sub-district of 
Meliau by first giving some background details on the development of the industry in 
West Kalimantan. I will situate the villages within the research site and identify the main 
features of the area located on either side of the Kapuas River. An overview of the state-
owned plantation PTPN XIII will follow and will include historical context, as well as 
current land and labour issues associated with the oil palm plantation. Discussion will 
then proceed to the privately-held BHD concession on the south side of the river and will 
included the specific issues related to transmigration, plasma development, and 
outstanding issues related to land and labour, which will also address the processing mill 
in Kuala Buayan. The next section will provide a more detailed look at rural life in 
Cempaka and will specifically examine smallholder livelihoods and issues of wealth 
associated with land in the community. This chapter will end with a review of labour 
regimes with specific reference to gender, followed by an overview of the different levels 
of resistance that are actively taking place on the research site. 
In Chapter 5, I provide an analysis of the field data with respect to the analytical 
framework in chapter 2. I begin with a review of the processes and mechanisms of 
agrarian change in Meliau and examine in detail the elements of rural social 
differentiation witnessed in the area. I proceed to an analysis of the differentiation of the 
peasantry in the context of the communities on both sides of the Kapuas River, which 
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leads into a review of adverse incorporation in relation to smallholder oil palm farmers. 
The following section critically analyses neoliberal land policies, followed by a review of 
accumulation by dispossession as it applies to the field research undertaken. An analysis 
of rural politics will then be provided that will include a section on resistance as well. 
This chapter will conclude with an analysis of the opportunities and threats inherent 
within the development of oil palm in Meliau. 
Finally, in Chapter 6,1 will provide an overview of the research project and examine in 
detail each of the research questions that have guided this thesis. I will address the key 
questions of agrarian political economy and follow with a summary of the key findings in 
this research. The last section will include an overview of implications for development 
based on the field research conducted in Meliau that will then be situated within a larger 
development context. I will end this chapter and thesis with a few concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2 - Analytical Framework 
Introduction 
The current biofuel boom and associated land-grabbing presently framed as 
'opportunities and risks' begs the questions what opportunities and risks, and for whom? 
In terms of livelihoods and the persistence of poverty in rural settings, this contemporary 
phenomena centers squarely on the critical importance of access to, control over, and use 
of land, not only in securing rural livelihoods, but in genuinely reducing poverty and 
inequality in the countryside. For the billions of rural poor who are either landless or 
near-landless, or who simply depend on continued access to land in order to sustain then-
livelihoods, the latest biofuel/land-grabbing frenzy may in fact present far greater risks 
than the potential opportunities lauded by advocates in mainstream development circles. 
Competing views emerge as to the nature of such opportunities and risks, which give way 
to various forms of resistance and protest when the outcomes lead to outright 
dispossession of land and/or to incorporation into biofuel production schemes that are 
shaped by elements of deceit, coercion, violence, or the threat of violence. In order to 
better understand the processes involved in dispossession and incorporation, it will first 
be necessary to situate both within the larger theoretical framework of capitalist 
accumulation and social differentiation, to then situate the debate within the competing 
views of the current neoliberal land policy that claims to represent a "pro-poor" approach 
in the guise of individual property rights. Finally, a review of different forms of 
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resistance that plays out in rural settings, and the convergences and divergences that 
occur within local, national, and transnational sites will frame the contestations and 
challenges aimed at the political and economic forces driving the contemporary biofuel 
boom and land-grab. 
An agrarian political economy approach will be used as an analytical lens through which 
to identify and interpret the patterns and processes of rural differentiation with respect to 
land and labour specifically. Political economy will be defined as an "investigation of the 
social relations and dynamics of production and reproduction, property, and power" 
(Bernstein 2007, 1). This particular approach was chosen because within the context of 
development theory and practice, interventions and policy formations that remain class-
blind are likely to not support those most profoundly affected by poverty and may in fact 
undermine those efforts as a result of having overlooked the class relations and power 
imbalances that are operating within a particular setting. If the overarching objective of 
development is to identify the roots of poverty and exclusions so as to bring about 
positive changes that will benefit the lives of the poor, an analysis of social classes is of 
critical importance. In addition to social classes, however, it is important to extend 
beyond conventional frameworks and to also include other identities that are parallel or 
over-lapping with social classes such as gender, race, and ethnicity. 
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In this framework of analysis, the causes of rural poverty are deemed to be relational in 
nature (i.e. stemming from social relations), as opposed to being residual which, in 
contrast, views poverty as a consequence of being 'left out' of the process of 
development (Bernstein 1992, 24). With the understanding that the processes and 
outcomes of agrarian change are more complex than the simple narratives of inclusion 
and exclusion suggest, the concept of adverse incorporation will be applied in an agrarian 
political economy analysis that rejects the neoliberal interpretation of social exclusion 
which overlooks the ways in which the normal operations of markets and economic 
institutions create or worsen poverty. As part of my analysis, I will also be making 
reference to David Harvey's (2006, xvi-xvii) concept of 'accumulation by dispossession' 
that views the exploitation of living labour in production and the appropriation of 
productive assets such as land through either force, fraud, or predation as two aspects of 
social and economic accumulation that have become internalized within neoliberal 
capitalism. Viewed in this light, resistance to neoliberalisation and capitalism will thus 
be seen as exhibiting a dual character: the first involving struggles against dispossession, 
and the second relating to class struggles characteristic of the labour process that have 
long dominated Marxist politics. 
I will be contrasting the principle analytical lens of agrarian political economy with the 
neoliberal framework that underpins much of the development initiatives advanced 
through mainstream institutions that maintain a largely linear narrative of modernization 
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centered on economic growth and free markets as the mechanism that will lead to 
progress, prosperity and the reduction of global poverty. A neoliberal model, as espoused 
by the World Bank, other International Financial Institutions (EFIs), and various 
multilateral and national development organisations, rests on a number of ideological 
concepts that justifies the accumulation of surplus capital generated by a proletarian 
workforce, combined with economic principles based on market liberalization, 
privatization, and deregulation under the guise of 'raising all boats' as the high tide of 
economic growth makes its way around the globe. In the context of agrarian 
transformation strictly along capitalistic lines, neoliberal analysts maintain a residual 
perspective regarding the causes of poverty and notably fail to examine how capitalist 
development systematically and simultaneously produces poverty and wealth. 
2.1 Land Grabbing and Dispossession / The Peasantry and Adverse Incorporation 
2.11 Competing Perspectives: Opportunity or Threat? 
Initial research on the 'global land grabbing' phenomena can be traced back to the radical 
environmental-agrarian activist community, the Foodfirst Information and Action 
Network (FIAN) which drew attention to the growing number of reports of large-scale 
land deals that were underway in a number of developing countries. They were later 
joined by others NGOs that also sounded the alarm on the impact land grabbing and 
biofuels were having on food security and rural livelihoods. In October 2008 the 
Spanish-based NGO GRAIN (Genetic Resources Action International) became the first to 
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publish the results of a detailed study outlining how capital rich countries primarily from 
the Middle East and Asia were in the process of (or had already done so) securing 
purchases or long-term leases of foreign agricultural land for the purposes of off-shore 
farming to produce food and biofuel feedstocks for direct export back to their respective 
home countries (GRAIN 2008a). The organisation listed some 180 current transactions 
that were at different stages of being negotiated and that involved parcels of land ranging 
from less than 500 ha to over a million (GRAIN 2008b). With some reported land 
grabbing deals having since been cancelled12, while a number of others remain 
unsubstantiated given the oftentimes undisclosed nature of such transactions, there is a 
recognition that to date, "little empirical evidence" (Cotula et al. 2009, 15) is available. 
As a result, there is considerable uncertainty and a good deal of speculation as to the 
scope and magnitude of these commercial land deals. In April 2009, for example, The 
International Food Policy Research Institute (EFPRI) estimated that between 15 to 20 
million ha of land involving 57 cases, mostly in Africa and some in Asia, had been 
recently leased, bought up, or were under negotiation (IFPRI 2009). A short time later, 
the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) released its own 
findings on land deals in Africa and noted that approximately 2.4 million hectares of land 
was involved while acknowledging that "data on land acquisitions in Africa is scarce and 
often of limited reliability" (Cotula et al. 2009, 3-4). Such discrepancies and 
12 Probably one of the more notorious of such deals which received extensive media coverage was a 2008 
1.3 million ha deal between the South Korean company Daewoo Logistics and the government of 
Madagascar. The contract was eventually cancelled in the spring of 2009 following a coup that saw a new 
government come to power and overturn the land deal with Daewoo (Cotula et al 2009: 37). 
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uncertainties have served to highlight the need for a clearer understanding of the land 
grabbing that is currently underway, and a growing number of institutions, academics, 
civil society groups, and social movements are providing competing views as to the 
nature of these land deals and their impacts on rural areas. 
Though the term 'land grab' has been largely popularized by mainstream media and has 
been adopted by a broad spectrum of institutions, organisations, and social networks, it is 
a point of debate in some arenas and evokes discussion as to the implications associated 
with the term and the various alternatives in terminology currently being used. The 
International Land Coalition (ILC) refers to 'commercial pressures on land' (ILC 2009), 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development (USD) makes use of 'foreign 
investment in land' (USD 2009), and the United Nation's current Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter, speaks of 'large-scale land acquisitions and leases' 
(de Schutter 2009) instead of using the term 'land grabbing'. One reason given for 
avoiding the use of the latter term is that it suggests "illicit behaviour" when in most 
cases "land allocations do not violate domestic legal systems" (ILC 2009, 7). It is 
recognized, however, that there are clearly illegal land grabs taking place as in the cases 
of Colombia and Uruguay where paramilitary forces are forcibly removing occupants 
from the land (Ziegler 2007, 13-14), for example, or in a large number of documented 
cases where holders of formal rights have been evicted from their land due to the 
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expansion of sugarcane ethanol production in Brazil (Borras and Franco 2009, 24-25) . 
The issues surrounding the 'legality' of land grabs within the context of land rights for 
the rural poor will be developed in subsequent sections; it is likely that for a host of 
diplomatic, political, or ideological reasons that alternative terms in reference to land 
grabbing is preferred. Borras and Franco (2009a, 4) note that the term '"(trans)national 
commercial land transactions or deals' is more appropriate" because it captures the 
transnational and domestic nature of the deals and underscores the commercial aspect of 
the transactions more accurately than the term 'global land grab.' Given the nature of the 
current land grabs, however, the latter term will be preferentially used. 
With the current rise in demand for biofuels acting as one of the key factors behind the 
increased investment in agriculture and large-scale land acquisitions, mainstream 
perspectives point to potential opportunities and threats in the context of rural livelihoods 
and the poor. The FAO notes that biofuels "may reverse the long-term decline in real 
agricultural commodity prices that, for decades, has discouraged public and private 
investment in agriculture and rural areas in many developing countries" (FAO 2008a, 
87). In addition, the agency notes that biofuels could help revitalize the agricultural 
sector and promote access to productive resources for smallholders and marginalized 
groups like women and ethnic minorities, and serve as an engine for growth and poverty 
13 The authors point to land reform beneficiaries in the State of Sao Paolo, Brazil and to peasant holders of 
community land rights in Mozambique who were evicted from their lands as a result of the expanding 
sugarcane ethanol production. 
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reduction (Ibid., 88). The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
echoes similar opportunities: investments in land and biofuel production have the 
potential to stimulate rural economies by developing processing industries, providing 
employment and livelihood diversification, and introducing new technologies that will 
increase productivity and result in higher returns for farmers (2009, 8). A recent joint 
study on Africa by the ITED, the FAO, and IFAD points to potential macro-level benefits 
such as GDP growth and government revenues that could follow increased investment in 
land; however, it also draws important attention to serious direct and indirect impacts on 
the poor. Large-scale land acquisitions, it notes, "can result in local people losing access 
to the resources upon which they depend," and more directly, can result in "dispossession 
of the land they live on" (Cotula et al. 2009, 15). Moreover, local users may find 
themselves pushed from higher-value lands leading to encroachment on marginal lands, 
and the land use concentration could, in the long term, lead to the increased importance of 
export-led agriculture and the role of agri-business in terms of the degree of vertical 
integration in agricultural production, processing, and distribution (Ibid.). For 
smallholders and rural workers associated with the production of agricultural biofuel 
feedstocks such changes present potential threats to their livelihoods, and could 
significantly undermine their access to, use of, and control over land. 
When considering the opportunities and threats posed by the biofuel/land grab scenario, 
as noted earlier, a sharp division exists between perspectives put forward by the world's 
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two most important organisations of farmers, namely Via Campesina and the 
International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP)14. Via Campesina, the largest 
agrarian-based transnational network of over 500 rural social movements and NGOs that 
collectively represents mainly poor peasants and small farmers (Borras 2004), has 
pronounced itself opposed to the development of commercially produced agrofuels for a 
host of reasons. The peasant movement states that the "current massive wave of 
investment in energy production based on cultivating and industrial processing of vegetal 
materials...[will] bring disastrous social and environmental consequences," will "drive 
family farmers, men, and women, off their land," and will contribute to "the massive 
concentration of capital by landowners, large companies and TNCs, provoking a real 
counter land reform throughout the world" (Via Campesina 2009, 35). As an 
organisation centered on the principles of food sovereignty and the right to food, they 
categorically position themselves on the food side of the 'food-versus-fuel' battle. IFAP, 
on the other hand, claiming to represent millions of small, medium, and rich farmers in 
over 80 countries, considers biofuels as an important avenue for agricultural development 
and an effective means of reducing rural poverty. In the eyes of the organisation, 
"biofuels are the best option currently available to bring down greenhouse gas 
emissions," and they "represent an opportunity to achieve profitability and to revive rural 
commumties" (FAO 2008a, 97). For the diverse family farms from the industrialised 
world represented by IFAP, the benefits of biofuels outweighs the risks or potential 
14 For relevant analytical background on both groups, see Borras, Edelman, and Kay (2008) and Borras and 
Franco (2009). 
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threats, while Via Campesina views biofuels as serious threat to rural livelihoods, 
subsistence farming, and food sovereignty. It is important to note, however, that within 
each these large groups, significant divergence of opinion can be found, and in the case of 
ordinary village folk, it is not uncommon to see them express both interest and concern 
about the livelihoods such projects may bring or destroy (Borras and Franco 2009, 5). In 
order to better understand these diverging perspectives, it is essential to first examine 
how land use is changing under the pressures of the biofuel boom alongside the re-
valuation of land that is inciting an unprecedented land grab in the Global South. 
2.12 Land Use Changes and the Dynamics of Land Grabbing 
The present land use changes that are taking place globally in the context of rising 
demand for biofuels and increased interest in land investment involve changes not only in 
the use of land for agricultural production, but also in the nature of crops harvested and 
the intended use and destination of agricultural goods. The most direct and immediate 
changes to land use saw the redirection of food crops such as maize and soybeans to the 
production of bioethanol and biodiesel respectively, which factored prominently in the 
2008 global food crisis that led to increases of over 80 percent in food prices. According 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) biofuels 
utilised 12 percent of global grain and 14 percent of global vegetable oil production 
(OECD 2008, 10). In the case of the U.S. which is the world's top ethanol producer 
accounting for 48 percent of the global production (Ibid., 9), 25 percent of its maize was 
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redirected away from food and feed markets to ethanol production in 2007/2008, in 
addition to the 23 percent expansion of agricultural land newly dedicated to maize crops 
(Mitchell 2008, 7, 10). In the global arena, the changes to land use and agricultural 
production are multiple and complex, and can be broadly grouped into four main 
categories according to an analytical framework devised by Borras and Franco (2009a)15: 
Type A land remains within food production, Type B land shifts from food to biofuel 
production, Type C land, formerly devoted to non-food uses, converts to food production, 
and Type D land, once dedicated to non-food uses, converts to biofuel production (see 
Table 1). 
In Type A, lands continue to be used for food production, though the crops may shift 
from consumption, domestic exchange, and industrial farming of mono-crops to domestic 
exchange, export, or consumption and domestic exchange along poly-culture small-
scale models according to respective categories. Land use category Al, where food is 
originally produced for local consumption, is one of the oldest and most extensive 
types of land use change which often occurs as a result of rising food prices that lead 
an increasing number of peasants to sell their agricultural goods for money on the 
domestic market. Category A2 involves shifting land use for export, a pattern of 
production characteristic of colonial agricultural systems, and more recently of the 
15 The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by Saturnino Borras Jr. and Jennifer Franco 
to make reference to this section of their paper presented at the Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series, Yale 
University, 30 October, 2009. 
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neoliberal export-led imperative whereby producers in developing countries have 
"battled for saturated markets for traditional exports, or have discovered 'comparative 
advantage' in various non-traditional goods" (Moyo and Yeros 2005, 18) such as cut 
flowers and speciality produce. In the context of land grabbing of agricultural land for 
off-shore farming by foreign interests intending to export food crops back to their 
respective home country, the A2 type of land use change has drawn considerable 
protest both locally and internationally. The recent IIED study in Africa revealed that 
nearly 2.4 million hectares of land were formally transacted in large-scale segments 
from 2006 to March 2009, and such rapid changes in rural settings invariably impacts 
local populations where "most, if not all, productive land targeted for potential 
investment is likely to be already claimed by farmers, herders, hunters, or foragers" 
(Cotula et al. 2009, 90). The final A3 category of this group involves converting land 
from export-led monocrop industrial food production to small-scale family farm units 
as in the case of land reform settlements in Brazil or the banana and sugarcane sectors 
in the Philippines. This land use change emphasises subsistence-oriented food 
production units and is considered to be redistributive in nature. 
The Type B land use change attracts considerable protest along the 'food-versus-fuel' 
debate where land is taken out of agricultural food production in order to produce 
biofuel feedstocks and which is largely a corporate-driven shift with some small-scale 
production as well. The Bl land use changes are taking place at a rapid pace though 
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are difficult to accurately pin down given the state of flux surrounding land grabbing 
initiatives where signed contracts between countries are subsequently cancelled due to 
public protest. The South Korean Daewoo contract in Madagascar is an example of 
such as case, as is a similar deal signed between China and the Philippines involving a 
1.2 million hectare project that was later cancelled due to public uproar (von Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick 2009,1-2).16 It is assumed that the socio-political processes associated 
Table 1: Character, Direction, and Orientation of Land Use Change 
Type 
A 



























For consumption, domestic 
exchange 
For export: monocrops, industrial 
farming 
For consumption, domestic 
exchange 
For consumption, domestic 
exchange 




'Marginal' and 'Idle' lands 
'Marginal' and 'Idle' lands 
Forest lands 
Forest lands 
'Marginal' and 'Idle' lands 
'Marginal' and 'Idle' lands 
To 
For domestic exchange 
For export 
For consumption, domestic 
exchange, small-scale, polyculture 
For biofuels export 
For biofuels: local use, domestic 
exchange (corporate controlled) 
For biofuels: local use, domestic 
exchange (non-corporate 
controlled) 
For consumption, local market 
For export 
For consumption, local market 
For export 
For consumption, local market 
For export 
For consumption, local market 
For export 
Note. Adapted from "The Politics of Contemporary (Transnational Commercial Land Deals: 
Competing Views, Strategies and Alternatives'. (Borras and Franco 2009a, 9). 
16 The authors of this IFPRI Policy Brief, Joachim von Braun and Ruth Meinsen-Dick, underline that 
though such highly publicized land deals are currently suspended, it is not to say that they will not be 
revived at a later date. 
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with such land use changes are "marked by promise of a better livelihood, deceit, 
coercion and violence, or threat of coercion and violence" (Borras and Franco 2009a, 12), 
as in the case of Brazilian farmers who have abandoned their land linked to employment 
with sugarcane companies (see Monsalve et al. 2008), or in reference to Colombian 
paramilitary groups who are forcibly evicting people from contested lands slated for palm 
oil expansion.17 Within the B2 category, biofuel production for local consumption can 
either take the shape of corporate-controlled production, as is the case with capital-
intensive ethanol production (sugarcane, maize), or can assume the form of small to 
medium scale non-corporate production (primarily biodiesel) that uses intercropping and 
is intended to help achieve greater local 'energy sovereignty'. It is important to 
remember, however, that biofuel production does not always imply a change in land use: 
Brazil's sugarcane, for one, can be used for the production of sugar for food consumption 
or for ethanol as a biofuel for the transport sector, while Indonesia's oil palm fruit, for 
another, can be used for the production of a number of food and non-food products, as 
well as biodiesel. 
Land use changes of Types C and D, where forest lands and so-called 'marginal' and 
'idle' lands are brought into agricultural use for either food and/or biofuel production, 
pose not only a serious threat to the biodiversity of environmentally sensitive areas, but 
also greatly compromise the livelihoods of those who depend on access and use of such 
17 Vermeulen and Cotula (2010) offers an insightful mapping of the political dynamics of coercion of and 
consent by communities as referenced in Borras and Franco (2010c). 
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lands for their survival. This is evident where large-scale production has been geared 
toward export markets as in, for example, the case of the sugarcane plantations in 
Brazil's Amazonian forests, the current soya expansion in Latin America, or with 
Indonesia's recently ramped up oil palm industry. The World Bank estimates that each 
year 13 million hectares of forests are permanently converted to agriculture and that 
forests contribute to the livelihoods of more than 1.6 billion people (WB 2008, 1-2). 
Under the pressures of the biofuel boom and global land-grabbing, the rate of 
deforestation with its concomitant environmental and livelihood fallouts are expected to 
increase significantly over the years to come. This is applies not only to "villagers who 
have collected forest products or opened up areas for cultivation...[over] years, decades, 
or even centuries of local use," (McCarthy 2006, 3), but also pertains to those who reside 
in areas labelled 'marginal' or 'idle' and now face dispossession under state-led 
'development' initiatives targeting these lands and forcing rural dwellers into 
progressively marginalised areas to pursue their livelihoods. "The concept of 'marginal', 
'idle', and 'waste' lands, however, is highly contested" (Borras and Franco 2009, 15), 
and the state, which relies on operational mechanisms termed by James C. Scott as 'state 
simplifications' that "attempt to make a society legible" and to "simplify the classic state 
functions" (Scott 1998, 2) seek to facilitate land use change though do not always 
succeed. By resorting to such 'simplifications' that overlooks the actual nature, use, and 
larger social function of the land being categorised 'unproductive' or 'idle' places at risk 
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those relying on such lands for their livelihoods and sets the stage for resistance in a 
political, social and economic context marked by sharp imbalances and asymmetries. 
Understanding the dynamics underlying large-scale land grabs and how political and 
economic forces are reshaping landed property relations in alignment with the interests of 
global capital is an essential step in identifying the processes involved. Though it is 
widely recognized that foreign investors, public and private, are the primary land 
grabbers involved in developing countries, local elites are also actively engaged in 
speculative accumulation of land primarily through the privatisation of previously 
commonly-held land which is seen as a key driver behind land alienation from local users 
(ILC 2009, 10). Working with the state, as well as with national and transnational 
corporations, the landed elite is gaining incorporation within a new food and energy agro-
industrial complex that has vertically integrated upstream and downstream processes and 
inputs (McMichael 2009a). This process of integration is leading to a greater 
consolidation of land as smaller farm units get absorbed through the purchase or lease of 
their land (Borras and Franco 2009, 17), and in particular, the current land grabbing 
phenomena has witnessed commercial interests in land turn increasingly to what is 
termed 'non-private' (public and customary lands). Given that up to 90 percent of the 
land in Africa "remains outside existing legal systems" (Deininger 2003, 6) and is held 
under customary tenure, or, in the case of Indonesia, where 70 percent of its land is 
designated as national political forest (Peluso, Afiff, and Rachman 2008, 213) it is 
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possible to see why such 'non-private' and state-held lands are becoming key loci of 
attention and speculation. In the context of the present-day convergence of crises on 
multiple fronts, namely food, energy, finance, and the environment, the large-scale 
enclosures of 'non-private' and state-held land threaten not only the moral economies of 
agrarian societies, but is also resulting in massive dispossession and/or displacement of 
peasants, indigenous peoples, and the rural poor world wide (Borras and Franco 2009, 
18). Such enclosures have historically formed the basis of what Marx identified as 
'primitive accumulation' which have in turn allowed for the emergence of capital and 
hence the capital-labour relationships characterised as being one of exploitation that lies 
at the heart contemporary agrarian transformations under the forces of global capital. 
2.13 Primitive Accumulation, Capitalism, and Accumulation by Dispossession 
In Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (1887, 1954) Karl Marx outlined his theories 
on capitalist development in medieval England in which he elaborated on the notion of 
primitive accumulation and the nature of social transformation from one mode of 
production (feudalism) to another (capitalism) that gave rise to the classes of capital and 
labour (Peet 2006). Marx was critical of the classic political economy of his time 
embodied in the writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo that explained the origin of 
primitive accumulation as an anecdote of the past whereby one sort of people, the 
diligent, intelligent, and frugal elite accumulated wealth, while the other sort, lazy, 
18 James C. Scott (1976:27) notes how the peasant household relies on the moral economy of subsistence 
ethics where "shared values and social controls combine to reinforce mutual assistance." 
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wasteful, and engaged in riotous living had nothing (Eastman 1932, 183). He noted, to 
the contrary, that in "actual history it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, 
murder.. .play the great part" (Ibid.), and that the starting point of capitalism, primitive 
accumulation, was nothing short of a violent process. Specifically, Marx described the 
enclosures of the commons as a period of primitive accumulation that preceded capitalist 
accumulation in which "great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their 
means of subsistence and hurled into labour markets as free, unprotected and rightless 
proletarians. The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil 
is the basis of the whole process" (Marx 1954, 669). Once the peasant farmers were now 
'free' from their means of production through dispossession, and 'free' to sell their labour 
power as a commodity, they were considered to be free in the classical "dual sense' 
allowing for surplus value to be appropriated from labour which was the basis of capital 
accumulation extracted under relations of exploitation (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009, 12-
13). Through this process, large segments of the peasantry were transformed into wage 
labour, and the landed estates became capitalist farms enabling proprietors to reap 
surplus-value from hired wage labour. The expropriations of the agricultural population 
by a class of capitalist landowners set 'free' (rendered landless) the peasantry and created 
a new proletarian class of workers that would serve as a labour force on capitalist farms 
and form a reserve army of labour for a class of industrial capitalists that would emerge 
later. As necessary precursors to capitalism, these expropriations thus led to the 
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formation of class relations of capital and labour which were bound by conflict and class 
struggle shaped and defined by the capitalist mode of production. 
The genesis of agrarian capitalism required then changes in social relations that saw the 
reconfiguration of access to and control over productive assets, which, in turn, led to 
changes in the structure of economic processes and rural transformation that allowed for 
the production and reproduction of capitalist social relations. Marx noted that capitalist 
production "of itself reproduces the separation between labour power and the means of 
labour... [and] produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also 
produces and reproduces the capitalist relation: on the one side the capitalist, on the other, 
the wage-labourer" (Eastman 1932, 155-56). In this regard, capitalist production 
reproduces and perpetuates the condition for exploiting the labourer who is forced to sell 
his labour-power in order to live and enables the capitalist to purchase labour-power to 
enrich himself through a process of capital accumulation (Marx 1954, 541). When 
referring to the genius of Marx, Lenin highlighted how bourgeois economists of the 18 
and 19th century saw only a relation between things in the exchange of commodity for 
commodity while Marx discovered "a relation between people" whereby the product of 
general labour became increasingly appropriated by a handful of capitalists and the mass 
of the population faced the insecurity of existence (Lenin 1932, xxiii-iv). The enclosure 
of the commons in the pre-capitalist stage of primitive accumulation resulted in the 
creation of a vast reserve army of surplus labour whose reproduction depended on the 
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selling of labour-power in a capitalist mode of production where surplus value could be 
extracted from the labour of the working class to serve the capitalist imperative of 
accumulation19. Marx recognized that the forces of production (land, labour, and capital) 
were subordinated to the relations of production (class relations within the labour 
process). In his analysis, uncompensated surplus labour formed the basis of exploitation, 
and the control over productive forces (such as land) by the elite class of capital stemmed 
from latter's economic, political, and ideological power that dominated the class of 
labour under a social system created through capitalist production (Peet 2006, 168-9). 
Though Marx spoke out against the exploitation of labour and the injustice of 
dispossession, he viewed capitalism as a necessary stage in history. In his view, the "the 
irrational, old-fashioned methods of agriculture are replaced by scientific ones" in a 
capitalist mode of production, and peasants, "that bulwark of the old society" are to be 
replaced by the wage-labourer (Marx 1954, 474) through paths of agrarian transition that 
can either be dominated by private class coalition or by public agricultural commune. 
How the forces of capital would transform existing rural economies over time became a 
subject of critical importance among scholars, and the debate that continues to this day 
Jason Read (2002) has argued that observers tracing the causal logics of capitalism, namely, the historical 
conjunctures, the sets of social forces, and the interventions that bring particular capitalist relations into 
being, have overlooked important historical facts: the movement to enclose agricultural land which began 
in 15th century England was driven by a class of landlords quite distinct from the class of manufacturers 
that would later profit from the availability of landless people desperate for waged work. In other words, 
the class that required proletarians was different from the one that evicted peasants (Li and Semedi 2010: 
15). 
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was framed in the context of the 'agrarian question' first posed by Karl Kautsky at the 
end of the 19 century. 
Within political economy, Kautsky's The Agrarian Question (1988) first published in 
1899, along with the foundational writings of Lenin and Engels20 of that same period, 
have formed a distinct field of enquiry concerning rural transformation related to issues 
of labour and capital, agrarian capital, and rural capital accumulation (Akram-Lodhi and 
Kay 2009, 7). Kautsky defined the agrarian question by asking "is capital, and in what 
way is capital, taking hold of agriculture, revolutionising it, smashing the old forms of 
production and of poverty and establishing the new forms which must succeed?" (Banaji 
1980, 46). In essence, the agrarian question centered on the transformation of pre-
capitalist agrarian classes by the emergence of capitalist social relations of production 
that saw the displacement of predatory landed property and the dispossession of the 
peasantry through the enclosure model of agrarian transition and proletarianization as 
outlined by Marx (Bernstein 2006, 450). While Engels highlighted how the development 
of the capitalist form of production had "cut the life-strings of small production in 
agriculture," both Kautsky and Lenin viewed the force behind rural political and social 
transformation as a process that facilitated the emergence of the capital-labour 
relationship through capitalist industrialisation that would revolutionize property relations 
20 See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899,1964) and Freidrich 
Engel's The Peasant Question in France and Germany (1894,1950). 
21 See A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Cristobal Kay (eds) (2009) Peasants and Globalization: Political 
Economy, rural transformation and the agrarian question for comprehensive historical and contemporary 
debates on the agrarian question and the fate of the peasantry in a globalized world. 
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and lead to the predominance of private property (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009, 7-8). 
Such processes of agrarian transformation did not occur without struggle, however, nor 
was the system of social-economic relations among the peasantry and emerging 
capitalists free of contradictions. In reference to the Russian agrarian changes of the 
early twentieth century, Lenin listed the struggles and contradictions that were inherent in 
every commodity economy and every order of capitalism as being 
...competition, the struggle for economic independence, the grabbing of land 
(purchasable and rentable), the concentration of production in the hands of a 
minority, the forcing of the majority into the ranks of the proletariat, their 
exploitation by a minority through the medium of merchant's capital and the 
hiring of farm labourers. 
(Lenin 1982,130) 
These contradictions would form the basis of class struggle between capital and labour. 
Pre-capitalist and capitalist processes of accumulation, which saw the dispossession of 
the peasantry of land on the one hand, and the extraction of surplus value from labour on 
the other, thus became increasingly entrenched within a capitalist mode of agricultural 
production. 
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Though Marx considered expropriation and the expulsion of agricultural populations as a 
form of primitive accumulation that was a necessary precursor for the development of 
capitalist mode of production and not a means of capitalist accumulation (Marx 1954, 
668), others have carried this argument one step further. Citing Rosa Luxemburg's The 
Accumulation of Capital, David Harvey (2006) points to her analysis that brings together 
the exploitation of living labour in production and the appropriation of productive assets 
such as land through either force, fraud, or predation as two aspects of social accumulation 
that are "organically linked" and that form "the historical career of capitalism [that] can 
only be appreciated by taking them together" (Harvey 2006, xvi). According to 
Luxemburg, both aspects of capitalistic accumulation, one concerning the commodity 
market and the other associated with the place where surplus value is produced, come to 
rely upon the keen dialectics of scientific analysis to rationalize how the right of 
ownership changes into appropriation of other people's property and how commodity 
exchange turns into exploitation (Luxemburg 2003, 432). She rejected Marx's account of 
primitive accumulation as being solely an attribute of capitalism's pre-history, and instead 
she designated the on-going twin processes of exploitation and dispossession as inherent 
features of capitalism's "imperialistic plunder of non-capitalistic social formations" 
(Harvey 2006, xvi). Harvey extends her argument by noting that such predatory activity 
has in essence become internalized within neoliberal capitalism and that 'accumulation by 
dispossession' is a more accurate and appropriate term for what has traditionally been 
referred to as primitive accumulation (Ibid., xvii). Viewed in this light, resistance to 
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neoliberalisation and capitalism thus exhibits a dual character: the first involving struggles 
against dispossession, while the second relating to class struggles characteristic of the 
labour process that have long dominated Marxist politics. The nature and intensity of 
these struggles are largely shaped by capitalism's inherent cycles of slump, boom, and 
crisis deemed to be "the most striking peculiarity of capitalist reproduction" (Luxemburg 
2003, 7), and in order to better understand the cyclical crises of capitalism, it is important 
to first examine the internal dynamics of capitalism as first outlined by Marx. 
Capitalism, being highly dynamic and expansionary, operates along complex inner laws of 
motion within a capitalistic mode of production, and it embodies fundamental 
contradictions between production and exchange that inevitably leads to periods of crises 
which Marx sought to explain according to his distinct theories of crisis. His first theory, 
characterised as a 'profit-squeeze' theory, illustrates how labour organisation and labour 
scarcity drive down the rate of accumulation to a point of crisis for the capitalist class and 
for the capitalist system as a whole (Harvey 2006, xxiii). In a more contemporary context, 
this theory can be linked in part to the economic crisis of the 1970s, though the end of 
Keynesian welfare economics at that time and the progressive undermining of organised 
labour by capital interests over the past few decades have made this theory less relevant in 
explaining the current global economic crisis. Marx's second theory of crisis, known as 
22 
See Section III 'A System in Crisis: The Political Economy of Globalisation' in Tools for Change: A 
Handbook for Critical Development Studies, Henry Veltmeyer (ed) (forthcoming). Doctoral Programme in 
Development Studies,Universidad Autonoma de Zacatecas, CDS Network (2009). 
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the 'falling rate of profit,' relates to the constant pursuit of higher profits that drives the 
competitive search for labour-saving innovations resulting in the displacement of living 
labour (the source of all value and surplus value in Marxian theory) from production 
which brings about a trend toward a falling rate of profit (Stilwell 2006, 139-40). In other 
words, as capitalists continue to accumulate capital and expand their businesses by 
investing in technology that increases productive capacity and reduces the need for labour, 
the rate of profit declines when expressed as a ratio of total capital outlaid and the surplus 
value generated. Marx noted, however, that offsetting forces could help avert this 
tendency toward crisis in the short-term: increasing the intensity of labour (faster work 
pace, longer days) or depressing wages (reducing the value of labour power) would lead to 
an increase in surplus value, but would not prevent capitalism's cycles of accumulation 
followed by recession (Ibid., 140). A final strand of Marx's theory of crisis is defined by 
the problem of 'underconsumption' also known as a deficiency of effective demand 
whereby capitalists are reinvesting and workers are consuming less value than they 
produce leading to a productive surplus that cannot be consumed on the market (Harvey 
2006, xxiii). He recognized a crucial contradiction within a capitalist model of production 
that ultimately restricted the purchasing power of the masses whereby 
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the realisation of commodity capital and hence also of the surplus value, is limited 
not only by the consumption requirements of society in general, but by the 
consumption requirements of a society in which the great majority are poor and 
must always remain poor. 
(Stilwell 2006,142) 
Harvey (2006) acknowledged that each theory advanced by Marx revealed important 
dimensions of the contradictory dynamics of capitalism, but he added that they should all 
be seen as the surface manifestations of a deeper problem being that of a tendency towards 
overaccumulation. In this analysis, a crisis arises when surplus-value-producing 
technological change is coupled with the capitalist social imperative of 'accumulation for 
accumulation's sake' leading to a surplus of capital relative to the opportunities to employ 
that capital productively (Harvey 2006, 192). The overaccumulation that stems from the 
contradictions between the productive forces and social relations within the process of 
circulation of capital results in a declining rate of profit that in turn creates an impetus for 
capitalism to seek out new opportunities for accumulation through what is termed 
'accumulation by dispossession.' In a contemporary setting, where overaccumulation 
"has been the spectre that has hovered over the global economy since the 1970s" (Bello 
2007, 15), accumulation by dispossession can be exacted in a number of ways. In relation 
to agricultural development and rural landscapes, this particular form of capitalist 
accumulation can include the commodification and privatisation of land, the forceful 
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expulsion of peasant populations, the conversion of various property rights into exclusive 
property rights, and the suppression of rights to the commons, to name a few (Harvey 
2005, 159). Furthermore, with the closing of the frontiers of accumulation 'through sheer 
exhaustion of possibilities,' capitalism must also invariably seek out fresh sources of 
labour power (Harvey 2006,437-8,443) in pursuit of what Marx identified as the 'original 
sources of all wealth,' the land together with the labourer (Marx 1954, 475) which leads to 
a critical attribute of the global agrarian transformation that is currently underway: the role 
and fate of the peasantry and their increasing incorporation into commodified modes of 
capitalist agricultural production. 
2.14 The Differentiation of the Peasantry and Contract Farming 
The principal debate concerning the peasantry in the context of agrarian transition from 
pre-capitalist to capitalist societies centers on the key issues of peasant differentiation and 
the persistence of the peasantry. One perspective advanced by renowned peasantry 
historian, Eric Hobsbawm, is captured in his assertion that the "most dramatic and far-
reaching social change of the second half of this century, and the one which cuts us off 
for ever from the world of the past, is the death of the peasantry" that was at last 
evidently coming true in alignment with "Marx's prediction that industrialization would 
eliminate the peasantry" (Hobsbawm 1994, 289-90). The main assumption in this case is 
that as capitalist agricultural production gains greater prominence in the countryside, 
increased commoditization and commercialization of agrarian societies would lead to the 
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formation of distinct rural classes: a class of capitalist farmers (former landlords or richer 
peasants), a larger class of labourers (with or without land), and a 'middle peasantry' that 
was largely self-sufficient though was expected to be progressively squeezed out through 
the process of rural differentiation (Harriss 1982, 24). This meant that the class of 
'middle peasantry' that was primarily engaged in petty commodity production 
(subsistence farming) and still retained access to the means of production (land) would 
eventually no longer be able to socially reproduce under the transformative forces of 
capitalist agricultural accumulation and would come to rely on the selling of their labour 
power for their reproduction. The other side of this debate drew attention to the 
persistence of the peasantry, its ability to retain a degree of control over land and family 
labour and to engage in farming despite the growing pressures of capital and the 
subordinating tendencies of globalization and capitalist agricultural production. Agro-
ecologist Miguel Altieri notes that hundreds of millions of small farmers in the Global 
South still produce the majority of staple crops needed to feed the planet's rural and 
urban populations, a testimony, not only to the persistence of the peasantry, but also to 
their efficiency in land use given that most farm on parcels of less than two hectares 
(Altieri 2008). Proponents of this perspective argue that peasants are not relics of a pre-
capitalist by-gone era, and that they indeed have a place in creating a world free of 
hunger. Within this on-going debate the term "peasantry" itself remains highly 
contested,23 and for the purposes of this study "peasants" will be broadly defined to mean 
23 Henry Bernstein (2006:454) states that "nothing is gained, and much obscured, by characterizing 
55 
The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
landless or near-landless tenant and farmers, farm workers, and other rural wage 
labourers and rural semi-proletariat (Borras 2007, 4). 
The class differentiation of the peasantry as a central dynamic to capitalism in the 
countryside is rooted in the classic 'Lenin-Chayanov' debate that resonate to this day in 
contemporary development discourse in agrarian studies. In reference to the emergence 
of capitalist agricultural production in Russia at the turn of the twentieth century, Lenin 
determined the peasantry as being completely subordinated to the market and was being 
transformed into new types of rural inhabitants, namely, a smaller class of rural 
bourgeoisie class (rich agrarian capital), a majority class of rural proletariat (poor wage-
labourers), and a minority class of middle peasants that would eventually see some 
joining the rich with a majority joining the poor over time (Lenin 1982, 130-31). In his 
view, the old peasantry was not only differentiating, it was being completely dissolved 
and ceasing to exist. According to Lenin, the majority of the middle peasantry existed in 
extremely precarious conditions and could not make ends meet without the sale of labour 
power or by resorting to alternative income sources outside of farming. In keeping with 
the characteristics of a capitalist economy, he concluded that "the middle members are 
swept away, and the extremes [rich bourgeoisie and poor proletariat] are reinforced" 
(Ibid., 133-34). The differentiation of the peasantry was regarded by Lenin as being 
contemporary small farmers as 'peasants,' while Henry Veltmeyer (2006: 445) argues that peasants are a 
'historical anachronism, unable to survive the dynamics of the capitalist development of agriculture." For 
further insights about this debate, refer to Wolf (1969) and Landsberger (1974). 
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central to the development of capitalism and the class dynamics of its 'laws of motion' 
theorised by Marx, and he added significantly to the latter's model of agrarian transition 
that was based on the British 'enclosure' model of primitive accumulation (Bernstein 
2009b, 61). The processes of agrarian transition involving the transformation of landed 
estates into capitalist farms and the peasantry into wage labour were central to the 
accumulation of agrarian capital, and led to a process of 'depeasantisation' according to 
Lenin that was a natural progression of a capitalist economy that aimed to increase the 
productive capacity of agriculture deemed essential to industrialisation. 
Alexander Vasilevich Chayanov, a contemporary of Lenin and holder of the leading chair 
of agricultural economics in Soviet Russia, rejected Lenin's analysis of peasant 
differentiation and derived his own theory of peasant economy that revealed resilient and 
enduring peasant households based on family labour. He challenged the validity of 
applying standard profit-seeking models of classical and neoclassical economics to 
analyse small peasant farms and argued instead that family economics centered on the 
concept of 'labour-consumer balance' that involved varying degrees of self-exploitation 
dependent on demographic cycles within the household (Thorner 1966, xiii-xvii). These 
demographic cycles, described as a recurrent process of generational reproduction in 
peasant households, involved an ever-changing ratio of producers (working adults) to 
consumers (working adults and dependents) that required variable rates of self-
exploitation through an increase the length and intensity of agricultural work to meet 
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simple reproductive needs. He countered that the apparent inequality among the Russian 
peasantry in terms of land size and instruments of labour was not a result of class 
formation, but rather reflected the demographic cycles of particular households that 
adhered to a logic of peasant economics (simple reproduction) and not the capitalist 
imperative of accumulation for its own sake (expanded reproduction) (Bernstein 2009b, 
59, 61). Chayanov concluded that not only were family farms economically viable "the 
competitive power of peasant family farms versus large-scale capitalist farms was much 
greater than had been foreseen in the writings of Marx, Kautsky, Lenin, and their 
successors" (Ibid., xviii). In this regard, he rejected Marx's law of increasing division of 
labour in society that stated that small-scale peasant agriculture must inevitably give way 
to large-scale capitalist agriculture, and he saw the continued existence of peasant 
subsistence agriculture based on household labour as an enduring feature of the 
countryside that played an important role in agricultural production. 
In contemporary development discourse, Chayanov's work remains a source of on-going 
debate within the larger discussion of the role of the peasantry in global agricultural 
production, and it continues to serve as a rallying point for advocates of a peasant 
economy and peasant agriculture "from below." Echoing Chayanov, James C. Scott 
(1976, 4, 27) notes how the peasant household "has little scope for the profit 
maximization calculus of traditional neoclassical economics" and relies on the moral 
economy of subsistence ethics where "shared values and social controls combine to 
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reinforce mutual assistance." This moral economy can help offset the hardships of 'self-
exploitation' and 'hunger rents' (another Chayanovian term) that refers to situations 
where land-poor peasants with few labour outlets are willing to pay high prices for land 
to reach an adequate subsistence level for the family. Given that peasants generally live 
close to the subsistence margin and are typically risk averse regarding agricultural 
practices, Scott highlights how both 'self-exploitation' and 'hunger rents' "conspire to 
drive peasants to tragic choices and allows others, in turn, to extract high returns from 
their predicament" (Ibid., 14-15). This is particularly relevant today in much of the 
developing world where poverty continues to be largely concentrated in rural settings 
against a backdrop of rapidly transforming agricultural landscapes, and where peasant 
production appears to be more than a transitory form of petty production as modernist 
Marxists may claim. Under the heading of neopopulism and in reference to the 
persistence of the peasantry, Farshad Araghi points out that for Chayanovians, history for 
the most part has corresponded to theory in that in the developing world peasantries are 
numerous and show weak signs of rapid class differentiation (Araghi 2009, 117). In 
support of this argument, Arturo Warman (1988, 499) reminds us that "peasants make up 
the majority of humanity." As noted earlier, however, the terms peasants and peasantry 
are contested ones, and neopopulists who look to Chayanov's writings and other works24 
in support 'the peasant way' draw criticism from the likes of Henry Bernstein who 
24 See Michael Lipton (1977) Why poor people stay poor. A Study of urban bias in world development for 
populist arguments for redistributive land reform under the notion of 'efficiency and equity.' Also see 
Journal of Agrarian Change 2004, Vol 4, a special edition devoted to the inverse-relationship debate and 
redistributive land reform. 
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delivers a sharp critique centered on how advocates of a peasant economy ultimately lack 
specification of "alternative systems of production" and ignore "issues of feeding the 
world's population" (Bernstein 2009a, 74-75). Though the issue of peasant food 
production falls outside of the scope of this research project, it is central to the ongoing 
debate of the role of the peasantry in agricultural production, and naturally leads to a 
critical theme in agrarian studies: the growing subordination of the peasantry to global 
capital through the increased commodification of agricultural production. 
Gaining insight into the processes involved in transforming peasants from simple 
subsistence producers into commodity producers for the capitalist purpose of exchange is 
essential to understand how and why the global peasantry is being progressively 
subordinated to capital. In its initial stages, the relations between capital and peasants 
have been 'deposited' historically by the destruction of pre-capitalist modes of production 
during the colonial era that generally involved an initial phase of coercion to establish 
conditions of peasant commodity production (i.e. taxes, corvee labour), whereby the latter 
eventually became an economic necessity to maintain reproductive cycles of the 
household (Bernstein 1982, 163-64). The commoditization of production has thus led to 
the incorporation of small-scale producers into markets by having production for 
subsistence replaced or subsumed by production for exchange. Though this process was 
by no means uniform or linear in developing countries and it resulted in extreme 
unevenness both between social formations and within them (regional differentiation), 
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some general historical themes prevail. The colonial states established conditions of 
exploitation of labour along two main patterns of exploitation: the first required the 
alienation and appropriation of land for production of agricultural or mineral 
commodities which created a continuous labour supply for settlers or capitalist 
companies; and the second established peasant commodity production which did not 
involve the direct separation of the producers from the means of production, nor changes 
in instruments and forms of labour processes (Ibid., 161-62). This gave rise to a form of 
dual economy where subsistence farming co-existed alongside agricultural commodity 
production for export or local consumption which allowed for agrarian capital 
accumulation from peasants engaged in production for markets and who still retained 
control over and/or access to land though in insufficient amounts to ensure social 
reproduction (Harriss 1982, 22). Over the course of the post-war nation-building era, 
where industrial interests, local capital, and the state worked together to control 
agricultural production of traditional and non-traditional export crops, peasant farmers 
experienced a 'simple reproduction squeeze' as commodity prices fell, inputs costs 
increased, and land productivity declined over time. As commodity relations and 
acquisition of income increasingly became a condition of reproduction, shortfalls led to 
cycles of indebtedness, 'starvation rents,' or 'crop-mortgaging,' in addition to an 
intensification of household labour to maintain or increase commodity production 
(Bernstein 1982, 167-8). The reproduction 'squeeze' therefore, provided an opportunity 
for greater capital accumulation from increased labour intensity, higher rents, and 
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production surplus extraction that further entrenched growing inequality and rural social 
differentiation. 
Contract Farming 
In the early 1980s, contract farming increasingly came into use in developing countries as 
a form specialised intensification of commodity relations that brought small producers 
into more direct contact with productive capital. The theoretical debates pertaining to 
contract farming reach back to the formative period of agrarian transformation in Europe 
(see Lenin 1964; Kautsky 1988; Chayanov 1966) where two competing models of 
development emerged: one involving large, enterprise farming and wage labour, and the 
other relying on small, household-based family units vertically linked to capitalised 
enterprise. Though contracted export-crop cultivation by peasants is in itself not new as 
in the case of classic plantation economies for such crops as coffee, sugarcane, or 
tobacco, for example, contract farming did represent new organisational forms of 
production, processing, and production linking smallholders by contract to a larger 
agribusiness core which exercise varying forms of control (and varying degrees of 
coercion) over the production process (White 1997, 101). As noted by Michael Watts, 
these developments have profound implications for economic opportunity and welfare, as 
well as for the structure of rural society itself in that 
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the dispersion of contracting marks something of a watershed in the 
transformation of rural life and agrarian systems in the Third World... [and] 
signifies both the advance of the industrial appropriation of rural production 
processes.. .and of the social integration of agriculture associated with 
transnationalization. 
(Watts 1994, 24) 
Earlier, Sanderson (1985) had already drawn attention to the implications of an 
increasingly internationalized agriculture that incorporated a new international division of 
labour in agriculture in which transnational agribusinesses and local firms refashioned 
colonial models of agriculture and development as a means of deepening the processes of 
capital accumulation. The rise in prominence of contract farming as an approach to 
development can be traced back to the 1981 World Bank Berg Report, Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, which mapped out a strategy for growth in 
agricultural production that would lead to increased productivity and poverty reduction. 
This strategy emerged, not coincidentally, at a time when structural adjustments 
programmes (SAPs) were undermining the state's role in agriculture, privatization and 
liberalization policies were being implemented, and foreign investors were seeking new 
outlets for investment in the agricultural sector (Smaller and Mann 2009, 1). Advocates 
of 'outgrower' schemes and contract farming (Glover 1984; Williams and Karen 1985) 
pointed to the prospect of a path out of poverty through a 'dynamic partnership' between 
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small and large private enterprises and peasant growers that upheld the rights and 
interests of all parties. In addition, contract farming was claimed to confer the 
advantages of technological and productivity enhancement, and to provide wealth for an 
emerging prosperous middle class, as well as national governments in the form of greater 
foreign-exchange revenues (Little and Watts 1994, 7). In this model of agricultural 
development, agribusiness was unequivocally considered to be the 'primary agent of 
change' (Williams 1985). 
Contract farming distinguishes itself from conventional capitalist commodity or 
smallholder subsistence agricultural production in a number of ways, and it relies on a 
distinct labour process that resembles a form of neo-Fordism or 'flexible accumulation' 
in sectors of industrial capitalism where peasants work as de facto piece workers. Glover 
and Kusterer (1990, 4) define contract farming as an arrangement between a grower and 
firms in which non-transferable contracts specify one or more conditions of marketing 
and production. Yet, as Little and Watts (1994, 16) point out, it in fact disguises a wage 
relationship between buyer and grower so that peasants become mere hired hands on their 
own land further subjugating labour rather than enhancing farmer autonomy. According 
to Payer (1980), contract farming serves the interests of large scale capital by allowing 
for surplus profit to be captured by the 'core' and not the producer directly and by 
transforming peasants into a class of virtual 'development peons,' or as Watts (1994, 71) 
notes 'disguised proletarians' where "peasants produce under contract in varying 
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positions of unfreedom." The lack of freedom in this case relates to how a 'free' peasant 
is converted into an unfree grower as a result of a commodity production contract that 
sees the contractor directly and indirectly control the overall production process with 
flexible household peasant labour acting as building blocks for capitalist development. 
As such, contract farming extends a number of other advantages to agribusiness in that it 
shifts the risks onto the farmer, it reduces the cost of labour management where farmers 
contract to sell their crops, and contracting firms may gain access to unpaid household 
labour (women and children) thus taking advantage of the Chayanovian capacity of 
family farms for 'self-exploitation' (Whitel997, 105). In this regard, the contract speaks 
directly to how social relations shape what Marx called the effective control of the means 
of production and of labour power, and how the labour process is in essence a structured 
relationship between labour and the means of production. 
When considering the social organisations of contract farming and the social relations 
embedded within the model of agricultural production, some benefits can accrue to 
peasant farmers, though these can be largely overshadowed by important disadvantages 
and the potential risks of exclusion that arise with respect to poorer segments of 
smallholder households. In noting some of the advantages for smallholder farmers, 
White (1997, 105) highlights that, to some degree, contract farming does insulate 
producers from the open market, it provides more reliable income, and it allows 
smallholders to capture benefits of economies of scale including access to inputs, support 
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services, and markets. Bernstein (1996), however, emphasises that as with all food 
commodity chains, the setting of prices along various points in the producing, processing, 
and marketing chain is not a matter of 'real' value-added or supply-demand interactions, 
but rather reflect the social and political bargaining strengths of respective parties, which 
in the case of contract farming, according to Mackintosh (1990), institutionalises 
monopoly and monopsony relations. Furthermore, contract relations may systematically 
exclude segments of the rural poor by targeting prosperous middle peasants or full-
fledged capitalist growers (Little and Watt 1994, 54), and can thus lead to greater social 
differentiation and a widening gap between the rich and the poor in rural settings. In 
"The Moral Economy of the Contract,' Clapp (1994, 79 & 92) underlines how the 
contract is primarily a social relation of domination and an attempt to naturalise an 
unequal social relationship and to represent that inequality as just. It is in part for this 
reason that the dominant theoretical model of contract farming put forward by 
Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986)25 is criticised for their disregard for the social and 
political contexts of contract production and for their exclusive emphasis on the technical 
characteristics of contract commodities (Little and Watt 1994, 12). Similarly, 
mainstream attempts to define rural poverty strictly in residual terms of exclusion from 
the benefits of markets, in essence seek to 'render technical' (Li 2007) what remains a 
25 
In their article 'Behavioural and material determinants of production relations in agriculture,' the 
authors offer an analysis of production relations in agriculture by exclusively examining behavioural and 
technological factors. They adopted an institutional / neoinstitutional framework that emphasised 
informations costs, market incentives, and property rights, while defining farmers and rural workers as self-
interested individuals that valued consumption and disliked effort (535, 507-08). 
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problem of class relations shaped by unequal access to power and productive resources, 
and endeavours to depoliticise the development process and the deepening of rural social 
differentiation. 
2.15 Chronic poverty, Social Exclusion, and Adverse Incorporation 
Strategies and development policies aiming to reduce rural poverty differ radically 
depending on the approach that is adopted as a solution to poverty, which in turn reflects 
the underlying view as to the root causes of chronic poverty. Mainstream development 
theory and practice has typically adopted a residual approach to poverty, which posits 
that poverty is a consequence of being 'left out' of development initiatives, and that the 
solution to poverty lies in ensuring that the poor are 'included' in the development 
process (Bernstein 1992, 24). From this perspective, pro-poor initiatives involve having 
the private sector bring the market to the rural poor, with the state forging strategic 
public-private partnerships to promote the agribusiness sector, while at the same time 
supporting the greater inclusion of smallholders and rural workers (WDR 2008, 8). As 
such, this model takes a narrowly focused approach to poverty reduction by relying 
exclusively on economic factors and market mechanisms to 'include' those who are 
typically 'excluded' from the benefits of growth. In contrast, a relational approach 
recognizes the economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions of rural poverty. It 
begins by attributing the root causes of poverty to social relations of production and 
reproduction, or of property and power, that characterise certain types of development 
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such as those associated with the growth and spread of capitalism (Bernstein 1992, 24). 
This model stipulates that poverty, as an embedded social relation, is being produced and 
reproduced within economic, social, political, and cultural systems, and that the long-
term solution to poverty and inequality ultimately rests on major reforms that address the 
multiple imbalances in each of these areas (Kay 2006, 494). Poverty, as viewed by the 
relational approach, extends beyond simplistic economic models of inclusion and 
exclusion as described by proponents of the residual approach. 
Out of this debate centered on the causes of chronic poverty and how to resolve it, there 
emerged the concept of social exclusion that sought to capture the multidimensional 
nature of poverty and the processes that allowed it to propagate within a social system. 
Broadly defined, social exclusion can be seen as "a lack of access to economic resources 
and public services, such as education, health, and housing, that address the population's 
basic needs" (Veltmeyer 2007, 67).26 More specifically, it can be described as the 
marginalisation and deprivation which arise when processes of economic and social 
transformation render 'traditional' systems of welfare and social protection inadequate or 
obsolete (Hickey and du Toit 2007, 2). In addition, the economic, political, and cultural 
dimensions of social exclusion are considered to be inter-related and self-reinforcing 
processes that perpetuate the problem of poverty across a diversity of rural and urban 
settings. Social exclusion, as a concept, thus makes an important contribution to 
26 See Veltmeyer (2007, 90-91) for an elaboration on six pillars of social exclusion that is derived from the 
way production is organised on the basis of capital-labour relations. 
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development and poverty studies by i) contextualising poverty within social systems and 
structures; ii) focusing on causality; iii) identifying the multidimensional nature of 
deprivation that goes beyond the usual 'income plus human development'; iv) identifying 
the political aspects related to social rights, political freedom, and equality of 
opportunity; and v) recognising the importance of politics and history (Hickey and du 
Toit 2007, 3). In this regard, social exclusion allows for a deeper critical analysis of 
chronic poverty with the understanding that persistent poverty is inherently rooted in 
social and political norms and institutions. Du Toit (2004, 987), however, also offers a 
critique of social exclusion by arguing that the most common usage of the term generally 
fails to capture how poverty can flow, not only from exclusion, but also from processes of 
integration into broader economic and social networks. Echoing this interpretation, Bush 
(2004, 673) qualifies that it is the 'differential incorporation' of the poor into economic 
and political processes that gives rise to poverty, not exclusion per se, while Kay (2006, 
462) suggests that its may be more appropriate to distinguish between different degrees of 
exclusion, or to speak of 'exclusionary inclusion' or 'discriminatory inclusion.' Within 
this context, the notion of 'adverse incorporation' came to embody a more fitting term 
that captured the complexity of how market forces propagated chronic poverty. 
Hickey and du Toit (2007, 1-2) argue that the term 'adverse incorporation' was "used to 
'clear away' some of the conceptual and ideological baggage that the term social 
exclusion is argued to have accumulated along the way, and to make space for a more 
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explicit focus on power relations, history, social dynamics, and political economy." The 
authors acknowledge that though the concept of social exclusion has enriched and 
enhanced development studies in significant ways, a number of important criticisms have, 
nonetheless, emerged in recent years. First, it often ignores the ways in which the terms 
of inclusion can be problematic, disempowering or inequitable; second, it emphasises the 
expectations that the poor people 'will somehow be able to pull themselves up by their 
bootstraps'; and third, it tends to uncritically apply western concepts of 'social exclusion' 
to poverty reduction policies without understanding what 'exclusion' might mean in 
different cultural contexts (Ibid., 2-3). In addition, social exclusion has been criticised for 
its emphasis on the residual aspects of poverty, rather than on the relational processes that 
drive poverty. Critics of the social exclusion discourse have thus argued that 
'differential,' or adverse incorporation into the state, the market, or civil society is 
perhaps more appropriate when investigating chronic poverty,27 all the while recognizing 
that adverse incorporation and social exclusion stand in a complex relation to one another 
(Hickey and du Toit 2007, 7). Significantly, adverse incorporation helps draw attention 
to ways in which capitalist 'free-markets' create wealth for some, while also generating 
and perpetuating poverty for others (Harriss-White 2005), which is overlooked in 
neoliberal interpretations of social exclusion and poverty reduction initiatives. Adverse 
incorporation will serve as an important lens of analysis when examining the processes 
related to contract farming schemes characteristic of Indonesia's oil palm industry. 
See Murray 2001; Bracking 2003. 
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2.2 Global Land Politics under a Neoliberal Regime 
2.21 Land Reform - A Brief Overview 
With more than three quarters of the world's poor residing in the countryside, it stands to 
reason that rural poverty should figure prominently in contemporary development 
agendas and that issues related to access to, use of, and control over land occupy centre-
stage of any rural pro-poor development strategy. It has long since been argued that the 
lack of access to land is strongly related to poverty and inequality (see Griffin 1976; El-
Ghonemy 1990; Kay 2005), and that the effective control by the rural poor over 
productive resources like land remains crucial to their capacity to construct a rural 
livelihood and to overcome poverty (Borras, Kay, and Akram-Lodhi 2007, 1). At the 
2006 International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD), a 
number of key points emerged related to rural poverty and land: 1) a significant portion 
of income for the rural poor come from farming despite livelihood diversification; 2) the 
lack of control over land and water resources was accompanied by poverty and 
inequality; and 3) land had multidimensional attributes in that it provided an economic 
livelihood, it offered a socio-political means by which the poor could exercise citizenship 
rights, and it embodied cultural dimensions that helped preserve a people's collective 
identity and dignity (Borras 2008, 2). Among scholars and policymakers from a diversity 
of ideological perspectives, there is a general consensus on the relevance of land reform 
to economic development and rural poverty eradication, though opinions differ as to the 
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type of development land reform should target, and toward what developmental end 
should rural surplus be directed. As noted by Borras (2008, 4), "despite the series of 
agrarian reform and rural development interventions in the past, landlessness and rural 
poverty remain a great problem in developing and transitions countries," and the best way 
to set about to resolve these problems and address the issues of land and labour 
productivity remain points of heated debate and competing perspectives. 
Historically, up to the early 1980s, land reform had been primarily state-led and 
redistributive in nature, and the period from the 1940s to the 1970s in particular was what 
Eric Wolf deemed the last phase of 'peasant wars' (Wolf 1969), thus marking the end of 
the 'golden age' of land reform in recent history (Bernstein 2006, 452). Under the rubric 
of a 'state-building agenda', this state-led redistributive land reform was initiated for two 
dominant reasons: either economic or socio-political. On the one hand, the economic 
justification for land reform centered on the debate of under-utilised land on large farms 
versus the low productivity of labour on small farms which led to a coUectivist type of 
land reform in socialist countries, while capitalist nations used land reform to develop 
private property rights (Borras et al. 2007, 5). The socio-political reasons behind land 
reform, on the other hand, related to a host of complex and interlinked factors ranging 
from post-World War II decolonisation (King 1977; Migdal 1988; Matondi and Moyo 
See Akram-Lodhi, Borras Jr, and Kay (2007) Land, Poverty and Livelihoods in an Era of Globalization, 
Oxon/New York: Routledge for a detailed historical overview of agrarian reform and rural development, as 
well as current issues related to land reform. 
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2003), Cold War geopolitical and ideological imperatives (O'Laughlin 1995; Ross 1998), 
national projects resulting from victorious peasant-based revolutions, incidents of rural 
unrest, and finally, efforts by the state to legitimize and/or consolidate hold on state 
power (Borras 2008, 5-6). These socio-political factors of influence and forces of change 
prompted state-led land reform that resulted in a diversity of outcomes across a variety or 
rural settings. In short, these land reforms were pursued for different purposes by 
different social and political forces through more or less radical means (Bernstein 2006, 
452) and typically involved the conversion of large estates and privately held tracts of 
land to small shareholders (Cypher and Dietz 2009, 379). It is important to note that 
post-war land reforms occurred within dominant 'protectionist' development strategies, 
and that in general, the over-arching goal of redistributing land to all poor households in 
need was only partially achieved in most scenarios, except in the cases of Cuba and 
China where redistribution was nearly fully completed (Borras 2008, 3-4). 
By the end of the 1980s, however, land reform abruptly disappeared from development 
policy agendas, there was a lack of political will to pursue land reform, and national 
governments simply placed agrarian reform initiatives in a dormant state. It is within this 
historical juncture that neoliberal pro-market land policy reforms began to take shape 
against the backdrop of the Third World debt crisis and the World Bank-IMF SAPs that 
imposed severe macro-economic policies that, in essence, deprived states of the financial 
means and the capacity to implement land reform (Borras et al. 2007, 11). In addition, 
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the agricultural sector had also entered into low productivity crisis in a number of 
countries that had established collective farming, creating an undercurrent of discontent 
regarding existing land reforms. Partially in response to the problem of low agricultural 
production, technological innovations from the 1970s onward incorporated new farm 
mechanisation and rural infrastructure with the high-yield-variety packages of the Green 
Revolution (Griffin 1974) that significantly increased crop yields and helped address the 
problem of food shortages and hunger in many parts of the developing world. This 
technical solution, to what is largely regarded as a socio-political problem of unequal 
land distribution that lies at the root of rural poverty, was able, for a time, to subdue the 
call for land reform and averted the need for any new state-led redistributive policies. 
Another important factor that led to the absence of land reform initiatives throughout the 
1980s was the relative calm and lack of militancy from within peasant societies which 
had, in the past, played a critical role in agitating for land redistribution during the so-
called 'golden era' of land reform (Borras et al. 2007, 12). The end of the Cold War 
marked the final and definitive driving force behind the land reform lull, as pre-emptive 
agrarian reform was no longer required to prevent the spread of communism, and the 
triumphant West was now in a position to further extend and deepen the reach of 
capitalist accumulation of a decidedly neoliberal 'free-market' nature. This new global 
economic and political context would bring with it new concerns and challenges related 
See Kerkvliet (2005) for Vietnam and O'Brien (1996) for China. 
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to growing poverty and inequity in the rural global South and would eventually lead to a 
return of land reform to mainstream development agenda by the 1990s. 
Land reform re-emerged in mainstream policy as a result of the on-going economic and 
socio-political concerns cited earlier that now extended to include broader issues of 
gender, the environment, human rights, ethnic violence, and indigenous land rights, all 
within the larger context of rapidly changing global economic and socio-political 
conditions (Borras 2008, 4). A resurgence of land-based political conflicts 'from 
below'30 forced national governments to respond, while the international community 
sought to interpret the implications of such up-risings. It appeared that Ronald Herring 
(2003) had been correct in observing that land reform had never really left the political 
agendas of peasants despite the hiatus of the 1980s, and that the socio-economic 
conditions of the 1990s created a space for land reform to re-emerge. Another important 
factor linked to the resurrection of land reform was its role in helping solve problems of 
poverty and social exclusion in post-conflict peace-building processes in such countries 
as El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines, as well as in the case of post-apartheid 
South Africa where land and leasehold reform policies were being adopted, or in post-
dictatorship Indonesia where land policies became a point of heated debate (Borras et al. 
2007, 13-14). The need for the restructuring of large estate and collective farms in 
former socialist countries following the end of the Cold War also played a critical role in 
30 For example, the Chiapas uprising in southern Mexico, the state-instigated land invasion in Zimbabwe, 
and the militant peasant land occupations in Brazil (Borras et al. 2007,12-13). 
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bringing the question of land and property rights back to the forefront of development 
discourse (see Spoor 2007, 2003; Deininger 1995, 2002), as did the changes brought to 
the agricultural sector of existing socialist countries where various new land-based 
property rights were implemented (see Akram-Lodhi 2004, 2005; Kerkvliet 1993, 2005). 
In the mid-1990s, as well, the persistence of poverty and growing inequality31 in the 
developing world led to increasing criticism of neoliberalism's growth-oriented 
approaches to poverty reduction. This forced a return of land issues to mainstream 
development agendas, though under a new framework that coincided with the capitalist 
imperative of increasing productivity, and hence accumulation, within the global circuits 
of production, trade, and finance now universally known as 'globalization' (Akram-Lodhi 
and Kay 2009, 4). Within this context, a market-oriented approach to land access came 
to define neoliberal land policies that rested on the promotion of formal private and 
individual land property rights as a means of reducing poverty and which was to spur on 
economic growth and increase agricultural productivity. 
2.22 Neoliberal Land Policies and a 'Code of Conduct' 
The neoliberal land policies that emerged in the 1990s have come to represent the 
dominant mainstream approach to agrarian reform and are founded on pro-market 
principles that claim to better address issues of poverty, landlessness, and economic 
31 According to the UNDP, 20 percent of the world's population appropriates 87 percent of the global 
income, and that in less than three decades since the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, the 
dsitribution of world income, aggregated and calculated at the national level changed from 30:1 to 60:1 
(Veltmeyer 2007,17-18). 
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growth than the previous state-led initiatives of the past. In critiquing earlier attempts at 
land redistribution, Klaus Deininger and Hans Binswanger from the World Bank state 
that "most land reforms have relied on expropriation and have been more successful at 
creating bureaucratic behemoths and in colonizing frontiers than in redistributing land 
from large to small farmers" (Deininger and Binswanger 1999a, 267). They argued that 
state-led reform was economically inefficient in that it subdivided large productive 
parcels of land into smaller, less productive ones, that it granted land to recipients 
deemed 'unfit' to farm land productively, and that ultimately, the under-utilisation of land 
resources for productive purposes was the fundamental reason for low growth in 
agriculture and for rural poverty (Borras 2008, 52-53). The solution, according to the 
World Bank (2003), was to establish clearly defined property rights that would allow for 
private individual land rights to be traded in open land markets that would increase land 
access and security for the poor, while at the same time attracting greater investment in 
rural economies. Neoliberal land policies centered on the principle that "well-defined 
and secure land rights are critical to provide incentives for investment and sustainable 
resource management, to facilitate low cost transfers of land, and to credit access" (World 
Bank 2003, 1). In relation to rural poverty and land, the assumption was that the poor are 
poor because they lack access to productive resources and that insecure access to land 
leads to unstable livelihoods and low levels of investments in land by the poor (Borras et 
al. 2007, 14). New, pro-market land policies could, therefore, help overcome long-
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standing problems of asset distribution and social exclusion (Deininger and Binswanger 
1999b, 249). 
The neoliberal stance on land policies which underlies the contemporary development 
policy discourse and practice thus centers on notions of 'free trade' and export-oriented 
agricultural and encompasses public and private lands where policies are carried out in 
four broad settings. The first represents the main target for privatization, namely public 
and/or communal lands where it is argued that systemic privatization and the 
individualization of property rights will transform these land resources into productive 
capital (Borras et al. 2007, 18)32. These lands are of particular interest for development 
and investment as they comprise vast tracts of land, as in the case of Africa where more 
than 90 percent remains outside of existing legal systems (World Bank 2003, 6) or 
Indonesia's 'forest estate' held under state control that includes 70 percent of the 
republic's total land mass (Peluso 1992). The second area of 'non-private' land 
addressed by neoliberal land policies relates to the privatisation and parcelisation of state 
and collective farms in capitalist and 'transition economies' with the understanding that 
private property rights will provide the necessary incentives to increase agricultural 
productivity and efficiency (Deininger 1995; Spoor 2003), as well as to allow for the 
emergence of a more fluid land market that was largely restricted by institutional 
limitations stemming from earlier land reform initiatives (Borras et al. 2007, 19). The 
32 For mainstream arguments related to land titling, registration, and related policies see Bryant (1996) and 
also De Soto (2000). 
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third setting upon which neoliberal land policies come into play involve private farms 
that are not considered productive or efficient due to persistent 'distortions' in land 
markets, according to mainstream economists, that enable such producers to continue to 
own and control land despite their low economic performance (World Bank 2003). The 
policy solution is to promote a form of non-coercive sharecropping tenancy reform 
through leasehold arrangements that may help the landless capitalise the returns of 
otherwise idle assets such as family labour and move up the 'agricultural ladder' leading 
to eventual land ownership (Sadoulet et al. 2001, 196-97). The final neoliberal policy 
agenda also pertains to private land, and in this scenario, it seeks to replace conventional 
redistributive land reform with a voluntary model involving 'willing sellers' and 'willing 
buyers' in a pro-market approach popularly known as Market-Led Agrarian Reform 
(MLAR) (World Bank 2003; 2005, 156-175). Collectively, these policies are considered 
by mainstream economists as being 'pro-poor land policies,' and they have come to 
embody the mainstream approach to poverty reduction and economic development. 
In advocating for the formalisation of property rights in the context where land is used 
and accessed under customary tenure, the neoliberal mainstream model points to the lack 
of security inherent within traditional land holdings and to the limitations such tenure 
offers in addressing issues of rural poverty and increasing agricultural productivity. 
Traditional land holdings are seen as discouraging investment in land needed to increase 
its agricultural production. The World Development Report 2006: Equity and 
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Development highlights how customary systems "can be incompatible with economic, 
social, and civil rights," and that customary practices "are also seen as archaic and rigid -
not amenable to modernization, efficient market relations, or broader development goals" 
(World Bank 2005, 159). Pursuing the issue of customary tenure as being an obstacle to 
poverty reduction and an impediment to growth, Klaus Deininger argues that such 
"insecure land tenure prevents large parts of the population from realizing the economic 
and non-economic benefits such as greater investment incentives, transferability of land, 
and improved credit market access" (Deininger 1999, 6). If one of the main purposes of 
obtaining property rights is to facilitate investment, as neoliberal land policies suggest, 
then land held communally and that is utilised in a complexity of ways as determined by 
community agreement, in essence lacks the security needed to promote capital 
investment, either local or external, and thus prevents growth in the agricultural sector 
and inhibits poverty reduction associated with economic growth. Hernando de Soto 
(2000), who provides much of the ideological grounding for contemporary neoliberal 
policies related to land, argues this point and reiterates that until clear, secure, and 
individual property rights are established, land held under customary tenure is 'dead' 
capital, and as such, cannot serve as collateral by individuals to make productivity-
enhancing investments in the land to increase its output and to generate greater wealth. 
From this perspective, the privatization of communal property offers smallholders the 
opportunity to own land, to invest in it, and to raise its productivity, which is in keeping 
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with the World Bank's more recent 'discovery' of the inverse relationship33 that links 
smallholder access to land with higher productivity. Regardless of the setting in which 
neoliberal land policies are enacted, however, the state is expected to play a necessary 
administrative role that falls under the rubric of 'land governance,' a term which has 
emerged in recent years as a distinct pole of the governance agenda and that has 
developed alongside the revival of land issues in development discourse. 
Within mainstream agencies, land governance generally refers to the state's role in 
providing efficient technical and administrative support in such areas as cadastres, land 
titling, and land transactions as required by contemporary pro-market land policies. The 
FAO (2007a, 1-5) outlines how governance involves private sector and civil society 
working alongside the government, and that one of the state's primary responsibilities in 
land administration is to provide security of tenure. Providing land tenure security is in-
step with the role assigned to the state by the World Bank, the land governance model 
directs the state to support market development by "improving the investment climate for 
the private sector.. .and in better natural resources management by introducing incentives 
and assigning property rights" (World Bank 2007, 23). The issue of tenure security is of 
central importance to land governance, though Lorenzo Cotula of IIED cautions that by 
'importing' a one-size-fits-all legal model in a context where extensive legal pluralism 
33 Akram-Lodhi, Kay, and Borras (2009) argue that instead of questioning the social and economic failures 
of the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank opted instead to 'rediscover' the inverse relationship. As an 
economic argument that had wide currency in the 1960s and early 1970s, it provided the intellectual 
support for a type of land reform that promoted smallholder access to land on the basis of productivity and 
efficiency, (p. 222-23). 
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exits as in the case of Africa, tenure insecurity follows, which only further discourages 
agricultural investment and enables elites to grab common lands (IIED 2005). Cotula 
departs from the generally "technical" framework implied in the land governance 
mainstream agenda by noting that the design and adoption of legal interventions "is a 
highly political issue, as it may affect the distribution of income, wealth and power within 
society," and he underlines how securing strong political will and access for the poor are 
key (cf Palmer 2007, 14). Deininger (2003, 51) in turn, also points to the need to 
recognize customary rights in pluralistic settings. Yet, the dominant thinking remains 
"firmly located within the issues of economically efficient (re)allocation of resources, 
administrative efficiency ('corruption-free'), and fiscal prudence ('cheap')" with good 
land governance implying 'one-stop-shop' types of land privatization, registration, and 
titling programmes (Borras and Franco 2010, 8). Even in the case where the World 
Bank's own reports (2003, 31-3; 2006, 165) indicate how, in some quarters, communal 
land rights can be economically efficient, mainstream neoliberal land policies continue to 
press for the formalisation of individual land rights with important implications for the 
rural poor in the Global South. 
At a most fundamental level, neoliberal land policies continue to view land primarily in 
strict economic terms, and they fail to capture the multidimensional nature of land, the 
social relations embedded within it, and the complexity and purpose of customary tenure. 
In reference to rural Africa, Celestine Nyamu-Musembi (2007) offers a critique of de 
82 
The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
Soto's (2000) position on the necessity of titling and the formalisation of rights which is 
based purely on Western culture and values. She argues that such an approach to land 
disregards how a "property system is a social system and [how] it takes shape according 
to the cultural context in which it is rooted," adding that "given the reality of legal 
pluralism, to argue that formalisation of title yields an efficiently functioning property 
system is to make a hollow claim" (2007, 1462). Musembi illustrates her point by 
providing an example of the Akamba customary land tenure in Kenya that defines six 
broad types of land use to illustrate the dynamic and adaptable nature of property 
relations that allow for various holding arrangements to coexist depending on the type of 
property and even the types of relationships between people using and managing the 
property (Ibid., 1463)34. The complex multi-tenure system of land use and land access 
under customary tenure cannot be represented in the formalisation of individual property 
rights that invariably will prevent access to and use of land by certain groups such as 
pastoralists, thus undermining their livelihoods and increasing rural poverty. Elizabeth 
Fortin (2005, 161) also highlights the complex social and economic role of land held 
under customary tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and notes that "unless the World 
Bank adopts a more textured analysis than its 'individualisation' thesis and its 
cost/benefit approach to the protection of rights... it is likely that the layers of rights will 
neither be recognized nor protected in policies adopted." There is ample evidence 
34 The six customary lands uses are: 1) Weu which refers to unsettled land that is used for common grazing 
and hunting; 2) Kisesi which is used for grazing and is associated with families and groups of families; 3) 
Isesi which is seasonal and temporary grazing land; 4) Kitheka which is uncultivated land; 5) Muunda 
which is cultivated land belonging to a distinct family or household; and 6) Ng'undu which is cultivated 
land that has been farmed by the same family for at least three or four generations. 
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showing how titling has actually been detrimental to particularly socially embedded 
rights which have not been recognized in the titling process (Toulmin and Quan 2000; 
Griffin et al. 2002). By failing to consider that 'rights' to land are derived from the 
'interaction of social relations with land' (Mafeje 2003), the World Bank's land policies 
pose a threat to the livelihoods of the rural poor who depend on communal access to land. 
Neoliberal policies, in practice, are successful in establishing land tenure security that is 
conducive to attracting investment in the agricultural sector, but can the same be said of 
smallholders who are now the beneficiaries of individual titles? 
The claim by advocates of pro-market land policies that individual, secure, and alienable 
property rights result in access to credit and enable smallholders to invest in land to 
increase productivity remains highly contested and is rejected outright by some on the 
basis of lack of empirical evidence. Robert Smith from the School of Oriental and 
African Studies in London states that there are only weak links between land rights and 
the use of formal credit in Africa, and that the credit demand effect should be viewed as 
null (Smith 2003, 212, 214). Musembi (2007, 1466) echoes this point and adds that title 
does little to change institutionalised practices and biases in that commercial banks tend 
to shun small-scale landholders on the basis of standard cost-benefit analyses. She also 
notes that smallholders generally rely on informal credit sources that are not secured on 
land which is more attractive in a context where people fear losing their family land 
(Ibid.). In the cases where individual title is actually used by a smallholder farmer to 
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secure formal credit, Manji (2003, 108) highlights that it is more likely to be used to buy 
food and to access healthcare rather than to invest in land. These authors also raise 
important concerns about neoliberal land policies that promote privatisation and 
individualisation of property as a way to use land more efficiently and to increase overall 
agricultural productivity. Smith (2003, 212) points out that there are no strong links 
between land rights and productivity, while Musembi (2007, 1467) notes that the links 
between formal ownership and productivity have been discredited by empirical data 
which reveals that holders of unregistered land have made equally productive 
investments. Given that claims of credit access and productivity by advocates of pro-
market land policies are in conflict with a significant body of by empirical evidence, the 
possibility of such an approach to land reform being pro-poor and leading to poverty 
reduction becomes suspect. When considering how land is transacted in practice, Smith 
(2003, 213) argues that "titling increases tenure insecurity for the poor because it places a 
formidable weapon in the hands of the rich who have both better ability to pay for the 
price of registration and superior knowledge of government bureaucracy and procedures." 
On the issue of 'pro-poor' land policies Toulmin (2003) highlights that it is perhaps 
appropriate, when discussing policies related to pro-market land reform as a means of 
reducing poverty, that this 'red herring of an argument should be allowed to rest in 
peace.' As such, neoliberal land policies largely favour the rich over the poor, and 
nowhere has this been more evident than in the case of MLAR that is promoted as a 
means of achieving 'pro-poor' land redistribution through open markets. 
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Since the 1990s, MLAR has been promoted by the World Bank, supported by 
mainstream development institutions, and implemented by national governments 
countries as an approach to contemporary land and agrarian reforms through the private, 
individual ownership of land, though it largely failed to adequately redistribute land to 
the poor and to redress issues of land inequity in many parts of the developing world for a 
number of critical reasons. According to Fortin (2005, 147) a fundamental problem 
centered on land policies not addressing the structural reasons for the distortions of land 
holdings in rural settings, and the market-led model largely served to reaffirm and 
reproduce inequality. In the case of South Africa following the end of apartheid, 
MLAR's inability to render social justice and distribute land to the rural poor in a timely 
manner was all too evident. Between 1995 and 1999, of the 29 million ha of land that 
had been designated for redistribution to over 8 million poor households, MLAR had 
only succeeded in allotting 1.65 percent of the land to 2.5 percent of the intended 
beneficiary families (Borras 2008, 98). In this instance, the 'willing seller, willing buyer' 
model broke down entirely in part due to the absence of willing sellers, and as a result of 
land markets being biased against family farming, as noted by the World Bank in its own 
publication (World Bank 2006, 164). In a recent comparative study of MLAR initiatives 
undertaken in Brazil, Colombia, and Africa, Borras (2008, 101-107) has identified three 
core assumptions in mainstream thinking that has resulted in the overall failure of its pro-
market land reform schemes. The first assumption is that peasants and landlords will 
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behave in a 'rational' way given the proper incentives which is not the case where issues 
related to class and political power characteristic of developing countries saw landlords 
overprice their land and engage land price 'fixing.' A second assumption was that 
peasants and landlords could negotiate freely and fairly which ignored the nature and 
dynamics of political power relations in most rural areas in the South. A final assumption 
was that decentralisation would lead to guarantees of transparency and efficiency which 
was not the case given the rural polity of most developing countries that is shaped by 
'local authoritarian enclaves'(Ibid.). In the context of present-day land grabbing, the 
emerging mainstream development narrative focuses on a proposed 'Code of Conduct' 
(CoC) that will manage the risks associated with transnational land deals, offset the 
imbalances of power and capital characteristic of the MLAR model, and ultimately create 
"a win-win scenario for both local communities and foreign investors" (IFPRI 2009, 3). 
An international CoC thus constitutes and important pillar in the neoliberal model of 
contemporary rural development, though its ability to effectively protect the rights of the 
local people, while at the same time fostering an environment that is attractive for profit-
seeking investors, has led to the emergence of divergent perspectives on the subject when 
framed within a pro-poor model of rural development. 
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A Code of Conduct and 'Win-win' scenarios 
A number organisations and development agencies have made reference to the need for a 
'code of conduct' that would serve as guiding principles for investors, national 
governments and foreign governments as a way to ensure fairness and transparency in 
large-scale land transactions. Joachim von Braun from IFPRI (2009, 3) recommends 
adopting a policy of 'free, prior, and informed consent' to control the potential threat of 
foreign investments and 'land-grabbing,' and that would lead to a 'win-win' situation 
where virtue is made a necessity. The IIED (2009, 96-7) presents a 'rule of law' 
approach as a recourse for individuals or communities that have been displaced or have 
lost access to land, though it acknowledges that the rural poor to sue the government 
presents serious obstacles, the first being lack of access to legal services. The ILC (2009, 
17) makes reference to the World Bank's governance framework as way to achieve 
transparency in investment negotiations and to ensure that local rights and needs are 
respected. Klaus Deininger (2009), from the World Bank, frames the need for a code of 
conduct in the following manner: i) there are vast opportunities in the recent re-valuation 
of land; ii) although there are risks, they can be avoided; iii) establish secure property 
rights; iv) transactions via local government is preferable over the corrupt state; and v) in 
cases where national government cannot be by-passed, a 'code of conduct' agreed upon 
by investors and governments can be used. Borras and Franco (2009, 7) argue that a 
'code of conduct' is likely to encourage more local land grabs, and that peasants and 
other rural poor are "likely to lose out to corporate and other elite political and economic 
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interests through a code of conduct because the processes are usually marked by 
imbalances in political power among competing actors." Despite the well-meaning 
intentions of establishing such a code of conduct, it is ultimately fraught with risks for 
smallholders who must engage in negotiating across a highly uneven terrain. 
There are a number of important shortcomings inherent within the voluntary CoC that is 
intended to manage potential risks to the poor associated with large-scale investments in 
agricultural land. Advocates of a CoC frame the initiative within a two-prong approach 
that includes creating a favourable climate for investment and relying on an international 
CoC, both of which rest on the premise that the problem to rural poverty is not a land 
issue per se, but is rather one of investment (Borras and Franco 2010b, 511). Proponents 
of this model argue that increased investment in the agricultural sector will in turn create 
new farm and off-farm employment and it will also result in a number of multiplier 
effects beneficial to rural communities. A critical point of contention with this approach 
is that it first assumes that there are no fundamental problems with the existing agro-
industrial food complex that it seeks to promote, and second that it is used in conjunction 
with the notion of developing 'reserve agricultural land' that most often already being 
cultivated by rural communities, meaning that displacement and dispossession are likely 
outcomes of this development initiative (Ibid, 516). When considering how the CoC is 
intended to be applied, it becomes apparent that assumptions made about 'marginal' or 
'idle' land conveniently overlook the reality that much of this land is actively sustaining 
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the livelihoods of diverse rural communities that access and use the land through a 
variety of informal and communal systems. At a more fundamental level, the CoC 
proposed in mainstream development models is set within a depoliticised framework, and 
for that reason is likely to fail. In reference to the World Bank's latest report on land 
grabbing, Ian Scoones (2010) notes that the set of principles termed the CoC "are hailed 
as the administrative-managerial solution to the troublesome governance problems of 
large-scale land investment," yet there is no political analysis of how they might actually 
work in a given setting. The author adds that the report itself shows clearly "why such 
principles are doomed to failure" given the issues of weak governance, institutional 
capacity, and others cited in the report. Many of the shortfalls associated with a CoC can 
also be extended to the more recent rights-based approach to land reform that is set on 
'fighting rural poverty.' The Legal Empowerment of the Poor (LEP) agenda is based on 
the recent work of the UN-sponsored Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 
(CLEP), is broadly endorsed in mainstream development discourse, and is the subject of 
considerable debate which will be reviewed in the following section. 
2.23 Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: Pro-poor or Pro-poverty? 
The CLEP 2008 report entitled 'Making the law work for everyone: report of the 
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor' is inspired by the ideas of Hernando de 
Soto (2000) and brings together his notions of individual private property rights with a 
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rights-based approach to empowerment and poverty reduction.35 Drawing on earlier 
proposals to empower the poor (Singh and Titi 1995; World Bank 2002), the Commission 
"argues that four billion people are robbed of a chance to better their lives and climb out 
of poverty because they are excluded from the rule of law" (CLEP 2008, 1). Naresh 
Singh, who acted as one of the commissioners, states that poverty is man-made either 
through action or inaction, as well as through the failure of public policies and of markets 
(Singh 2009, 878). He adds that people in rich countries enjoy access to justice as 
workers, businesspeople, and owners of property, and are able to create wealth as a result 
of various legal protections, norms, and institutional instruments (Ibid.). The solution to 
poverty in the developing world is thus to provide protection and opportunities for the 
poor. CLEP thus puts forward a four pillar model that is to guide national and 
international efforts in making systematic legal changes aimed at unlocking the civic and 
economic potential of the poor. The four pillars include i) access to justice and the rule 
of law, ii) property rights, iii) labour rights, and iv) business rights which are expected to 
reinforce each other in such a way that their convergence and synergy will lead to legal 
empowerment of the poor. The report offers encouragement to social reformers by 
stating that as the poor find protection and opportunity in the legal system, the informal 
economy will become more documented, the tax base will widen, and national revenues 
will increase allowing for the expansion of the rule of law (CLEP 2008,4). 
CLEP was established by the UN in 2005 and concluded its work in 2008. The commission was co-
chaired by Hernando de Soto and Madeleine Albright, involved several countries from North and South, 
and was hosted by the UNDP. 
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The CLEP agenda is widely endorsed within mainstream development circles, though it 
remains highly contested from a political economy perspective, not only in reference to 
Hernando de Soto's analysis of the role of property rights and economic development as 
noted earlier, but also in the overall premise of how poverty is defined and how it is to be 
resolved within a legal framework.36 Ben Cousins (2009, 894) rejects CLEP's notion that 
poverty and inequality are a result of exclusion from the rule of law, but rather are the 
outcome of highly adverse terms within which people are included in dynamic market 
economies governed by the rule of law. Poverty, he argues, derives from situations 
where people are situated within unequal class structures which render poverty relational 
in character (Bernstein et al. 1992, 24-5), not residual as CLEP suggests. For Cousins 
(2009, 898) the report is an expression of neoliberal ideology that celebrates markets, 
entrepreneurs, and private property while assuming that tensions and conflicts in the 
sphere of the economy have been resolved into a 'win-win' situation. In the real world of 
capitalism, he points out, such 'win-'win' solutions are "elusive, if not entirely illusory" 
in that often "winners become so only because others are losers" (Ibid.). Banik (2009, 
127-30) is equally critical of CLEP in that the report represents a top-down, state-
centered and orthodox approach that promotes legal empowerment to reduce poverty, yet 
underestimates the capacity of those who wield power to bypass the rule of law or 
See Sjaastad and Cousins (2009) for a critique of de Soto's The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism 
Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (2000). 
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selectively implement judicial outcomes. In this regard, he contends that the report is 
anaemic in its analysis of power relations, and that it fails to establish appropriate 
linkages between complementary legal empowerment and existing approaches to 
development, poverty reduction, as well as democratisation and human rights (Ibid, 121). 
Ultimately, the root of the problem with CLEP, according to Cousins, is that capitalism is 
obscured: in the real world, 'elite capture' and 'exclusion' appear to be as common in the 
heartlands of advanced capitalism as anywhere in the developing world (Cousins 2009, 
898), a point that is omitted in the report and reflects much of de Soto's own views on the 
merits of Western capitalism. 
As one of the four pillars of the CLEP agenda, property rights are identified as being a 
critical component of the 'pro-poor' legal empowerment strategy, though their 
formalisation is defined within such a narrow construction of legality that it risks creating 
greater tenure insecurity for the poor, and in particular, can further erode women's rights 
to land. Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi (2009) note how de Soto's formalisation of property 
rights involves transforming them in the direction of Western, legal forms of private 
property in which land can easily be lost within market transactions. This point is also 
echoed by Musembi (2007, 1457) who is critical of de Soto for failing to acknowledge 
that formalisation can result in both security and insecurity depending on the context 
where title has been obtained. On this topic, Cousins (2009, 897) points to how in many 
societies property is not private in character, nor commodified, and that restrictions on 
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alienation of property are a defence against loss of rights. For this reason, formalisation 
schemes are often evaded or subverted by their beneficiaries who prefer flexible, 
negotiable, and socially embedded property rights (Berry 1993). CLEP's underlying 
neoliberal framework incorporated within a legal empowerment approach to poverty 
reduction becomes questionable as a 'pro-poor' model given that privatisation of land 
rarely leads to credit access, nor to productivity-enhancing investments for smallholder 
farmers who risk losing their land as a result of distress sales or outright dispossession. 
In the case of South Africa, for example, where many of the strategies recommended by 
CLEP have been implemented, the outcomes have been 'bitterly disappointing' in the 
way tenure security laws were ineffective in preventing up to one million evictions from 
commercial farms in the first decade of democracy (Cousins 2009, 901). Legal 
empowerment strategies failed almost completely to secure tenure rights, and in 
particular, the 2004 Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) exemplified the limits of legal 
empowerment legislation in this context. In relation to women, specifically, Razavi 
(2007) and Walker (2005) criticized CLRA for having further entrenched the powers of 
undemocratic traditional authority and for failed to the secure tenure rights of women 
who were deprived of access to communal land and of a critical livelihood strategy. 
Given the importance of women in agricultural production in much of the developing 
world, the issue of women's right to land is gaining prominence and the experience of 
South African women is a testimony that there is a need for such recognition. 
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2.24 Gender Perspectives - Women's Rights to Land 
Over the past few decades gender analysis has interrogated some of the dominant 
orthodoxies in agrarian studies and has made important contributions in furthering an 
understanding of domestic institutions and the critical role played by women in 
agricultural production in developing countries. It is widely recognized that rural women 
produce between 60 to 80 percent of food and are the main producers of the world's 
principal staple crops (rice, wheat, maize) which, in the case of South-East Asia's rice 
cultivation, up to 90 percent is undertaken by women (de Schutter 2009, 9). In addition, 
most women engaged in agriculture assume a dual production role in that, on the one 
hand, they work independently of other household members having separate access to 
land and other resources for economic activity, while on the other hand, they contribute 
to household production as unremunerated family labour (Whitehead 1990, 439). Despite 
women occupying such a central place in the reproduction of the household, Elson (1998, 
198) notes how domestic structures have generally been taken for granted by much of the 
new political economy as they were by 19 century political economists, and that peasant 
studies tended to treat the household as a 'black box.' The concept of the unitary 
household has long since been challenged in feminist literature and attention has been 
drawn to the unequal distributions of power and resources along gender and generational 
lines (Razavi 2009, 200). As such, gender analyses generally view households as sites of 
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struggles and inequalities, though there is less consensus as to how these sites of tension 
interact within the dynamics of common interests and cooperative behaviour (Ibid, 208). 
Bina Agarwal (2003b, 573) has done considerable work on intra-household bargaining 
which she conceptualises as both cooperation and conflict, and her 'bargaining model 
approach' has served as a framework for gender analysis in the context of land tenure 
institutions in South Asia. To date, Agarwal (1994; 2003a) has developed the most 
detailed theoretical account of the liberal argument for women's land rights, and she 
combines a rights-based approach to gender equity with the efficiency concerns of 
neoclassical economics when pleading her case that women need fields of their own on 
the basis of individual autonomy and freedom (O'Laughlin 2009, 197). Her work has 
since acquired much credibility with the World Bank Gender Unit that advocates the 
formalisation of women's land rights as an important means to poverty reduction. 
Although Agarwal's research focuses on South Asia, it can readily be extended to Africa 
where women do much of the farm work which serves to strengthen the ethical, 
economic, and political arguments that women's control over land is an essential right 
(Ibid.) 
An important critique that emerges of an approach that merges gender justice and land 
rights is that it offers a powerful tool for advocates of neoliberal land policies that 
promote individual private property rights and land privatisation, despite the fact that that 
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many women in the Global South remain especially vulnerable under land titling 
schemes. Razavi (2007) points out how such neoliberal schemes and land rights 
implemented under a 'rule of law' model are unlikely to see low-income women emerge 
as winners in an MLAR model, nor in agricultural land transactions more broadly. In 
reference to SSA, Lastarria-Cornhiel (1997) notes that continent-wide evidence on the 
effects of land privatisation points to women as the largest group who have little to gain 
from the trend toward privatised land tenure systems, adding that community leaders and 
male household heads have been able to effectively strengthen their control over land to 
the detriment of women and minorities. This issue is particularly evident in the case of 
South Africa where recently enacted legislation has created significant obstacles for 
women to acquire land. Claassens (2005, 41) draws attention to two important pieces of 
legislation passed into law in February, 2004, the Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) 
and the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA), which he 
describes as a lasting legacy that will bolster the power of traditional leaders relative to 
that of the holders and users of family and individual rights. He adds that these acts have 
ultimately hardened the terrain within which rural people, and especially women, struggle 
for change, and he makes reference to how many women recounted their difficulty in 
trying to secure land from 'traditional' leaders, especially if they were a widow or a 
single mother (Ibid, 18-21). As Cousins (2009, 906) noted earlier, the "conception of 
legal empowerment as a solution to poverty rests on both a misdiagnosis of the causes of 
poverty and on a one-sided and flawed model of society." By relying on legal 
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instruments without considering the dynamics of social class issues that shape the context 
of where 'the rule of law' is inserted can serve to deepen inequality and poverty, and 
further undermine women's access and use of land. O'Laughlin (2009, 202-03) supports 
this claim and adds that formal titling will simply not resolve the problem of rural poverty 
in Southern Africa given that it stems from structural problems of accumulation, class 
relations, and the politics that cross the rural/urban divide. 
Given such adverse effects on poor women, how to account, then, for the continued 
emphasis on pro-market neoliberal land policies in the context of gender justice and land, 
and the larger issue of rural livelihoods related to agricultural production? McAuslan 
(1998, 2003) notes how since the 1990s, there has been substantial pressure from bilateral 
donors, the IMF, and the World Bank to draft land laws that would give investors greater 
security of tenure and codify liberal notions of governance and the rule of law. Land, 
being viewed as a scarce commodity and considered to under-utilised in terms of its 
productive potential, needs to be secured under statutory law in order to attract 
investment and allow for greater agrarian accumulation by local and foreign investors. 
From an exclusively economic perspective, the World Bank reiterates that "governing 
property rights emerge to capture or internalize the full income streams from scarce 
resources" (World Bank 2006, 8). In areas not covered by freehold tenure, as in the case 
with customary and public land, land tenure reform has been promoted along the lines of 
de Soto's argument that the state ownership of land and customary regimes hinder the 
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free flow of labour and the allocation of land to more productive forms of production. 
According to Bridget O'Laughlin (2009, 191, 203) "the issue of women's land rights has 
been deployed in the policy discourse on agrarian change in Southern Africa to reinforce 
the moral claims of a liberal project," and the narrow emphasis on legalizing women's 
rights is embedded in the centrality of privatization and the commodification of land in a 
framework of human rights language." She adds that for those women who are landless, 
titling is meaningless outside of some sort of redistributive land reform, and that the 
current neoliberal proposition leads away from the fundamental question of restructuring 
a migrant labour systems and redistributing wealth and power in post-colonial states 
(Ibid, 203). Fortin (2005, 147, 153) supports this view and states that World Bank 
agricultural and land reform policies continue to reproduce and reaffirm the distortions of 
landholdings, and instead of overcoming the dual economies of colonial times, have only 
succeeded in deepening poverty and inequality. Women in Indonesia who are involved 
in the oil palm industry face similar issues with respect to the negative impacts the 
privatization of land rights is having on rural women. 
The agrarian transformation that is currently unfolding in settings across the Global South 
under the dictates of transnational agribusiness is doing so within increasingly contested 
landscapes as peasants and their allies resist in varying degrees and modalities such 
forces of change in an effort to secure sustainable livelihoods in rapidly altering rural 
settings. 
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2.3 Rural Resistance and Transnational Agrarian Movements (TAMs) 
2.31 The Neoliberal Regime: A Catalyst for Resistance and the Rise of TAMs 
Neoliberalism has significantly altered the nature of agrarian production and exchange 
relations North and South, and as a result of the simultaneous processes of globalization 
'from above', decentralization 'from below', and privatization 'from the side', rural 
societies have been shaken at the core (Borras, Edelman, and Kay 2008, l)37. Though 
neoliberalism is suffering from an ideological defeat in light of the current global crisis, 
as an economic model it persists in full force and perseveres today largely by default 
(Moyo and Yeros 2005, 3). The impact of neoliberal 'free-market' policies as promoted 
through mainstream development agencies like the World Bank, the IMF, and allied 
financial institutions and agencies has been unprecedented with respect to the global 
peasantry. As noted by Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2009, 4) the "states and economies 
within which peasants are subordinated have become increasingly integrated into global 
circuits of production, trade, and finance, a phenomenon universally known as 
'globalization'.38 Under the forces of globalization, inequality has risen dramatically 
(Edelman and Haugerud 2005), and rural households have had to increasingly diversify 
their ways of earning a living (Scoones 2009). Capitalist globalization has thus witnessed 
the emergence of a 'neoliberal agrarian restructuring' that is characterised by realignment 
and deepening of a 'bifurcated' agrarian structure in which an export-oriented agrarian 
37 See also Edelman (1999), Gwynne and Kay (2004). 
38 For critical reviews of globalization, see Hirst and Thompson (1996), Weis (1997), and Chernomas and 
Sepheri (2005). 
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subsector sits beside a peasant producer subsector, which may itself be subject to 
processes of differentiation (Akram-Lodhi, Kay, and Borras 2009, 215). Transnational 
corporations and local rural capitalists working with development agencies have thus 
restructured global agricultural production along export-driven imperatives that has 
increasingly transformed petty commodity producers into wage labour and a semi-
proletarianized rural class that must rely on market mechanisms to construct a livelihood. 
As noted by Henry Bernstein (1996), the broadening and deepening of capitalist social 
property relations requires, as a necessary condition, diminishing the relative power of 
peasants and workers in favour of local and/or global dominant classes which can be 
achieved by market-based processes that are supplemented by direct action of the state. 
These changes in social property relations are thus leading to a widespread diversification 
of livelihoods (rural and rural-urban; on-farm, off-farm, or non-farm), either forced or 
voluntary, as access to and control over land resources are being redefined and landed 
property rights restructured to favour private capital (Borras et al. 2008b, 170). It is 
against this backdrop of the increasing penetration of capital in the countryside, and the 
growing competition for productive resources such as land, that a resurgence of rural 
movements has emerged in protest against neoliberal globalisation. 
Neoliberalism has had varying impacts on different social classes, regions, sectors, and in 
the case of the rural poor who have oftentimes suffered adverse effects, some have 
formed organisations, others have joined social movements, and most have remain 
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localized (Borras, Edelman, and Kay 2008, 13). It is widely recognized that the rural 
poor are a highly heterogeneous group made up of the peasantry (stratified), landless 
rural labourers, migrant workers, forest dwellers, subsistence fishers, indigenous people, 
and pastoralists. This high degree of diversity necessarily influences the character of 
these movements and associations which affects decision-making processes that include 
agenda-setting and courses of action to protest or bring about change. Moyo and Yeros 
(2005, 9) argue that contemporary rural movements generally share the same social basis, 
are militant on land and agrarian reform, often employ land occupation as a tactic, and 
they represent a leading force of opposition to neoliberalism and to the neocolonial state. 
They also underline the significance of how twentieth century capitalism has led to the 
rapid expansion of the world's labour force that has become a reserve army of labour 
located on the periphery of the system outside the circuit of capital, and as such, is a 
nexus of struggle and discontent that lies at the core of rural social movements (Ibid., 8). 
In reference to the peasants who increasingly must confront poverty and diminishing 
livelihood prospects, Raikes (2000, 68) points out that there has been an intensified 
struggle to access land illegally or to squat in both rural or urban areas as an enforced 
extension of peasant survival strategies under pressure of impoverishment. Mattei (2005) 
describes the process of how the Landless Workers Movement, or MST, in Brazil initially 
resorted to land occupations that eventually gave way to land reform programmes that 
have in all resettled over two hundred and seventy thousand families onto land as part of 
a re-peasantisation initiative. Moyo and Yeros (2005, 30-31) highlight that it is the 
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'disarticulated accumulation' characteristic of the transition to capitalism in the periphery 
under a neoliberal regime that is presently driving extensive social differentiation in rural 
areas and is fuelling a rise in social movements and acts of protest at the local, national, 
and transnational levels. 
In recent years, Transnational Agrarian Movements (TAMs)39 have come to gain 
considerable power and political influence in global arenas, and as a 'solidarity network' 
of the 'rural poor', a number of them have become important forces of opposition to 
neoliberalism and a means of organising and mobilising collective action. La Via 
Campesina (The Way of the Peasant), considered to be one of the most well-known 
movements (Borras 2004) and is perhaps the most politically coherent of all 
contemporary TAMS (Borras et al. 2008b, 172), engages in left-wing politics as an 
'alternative voice from below'. The peasant movement is comprised of poor peasants 
and small farmers in the developing and industrialised worlds, and since 1999, has 
launched an aggressive campaign (Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform - GCAR) 
against the neoliberal MLAR model which gained significant ground transnationally in 
terms of putting the issue of land reform onto official agendas and helped reshape the 
terms of current policy and political debates (Borras 2008b, 114). As with other TAMs, 
such as the largest agrarian network today, the International Planning Committee (IPC) 
39 TAMs is loosely defined to mean 'movements', 'organisations', 'coalitions', 'networks', and 'solidarity 
linkages' of the 'rural poor' linked to transnational movements that have gained considerable power and 
political influence (Borras et al. 2008b, 170-71). Marc Edelman (2003) notes that TAMs are not new, 
however, and that IFAP, founded in 1946, is one of the oldest groups on the global goverance scene. 
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for Food Sovereignty, the issue of claims to representation is often remains a point of 
contestation and debate (Borras, Edelman, and Kay 2008, 3-17). The question of 
representation is a critical one in that it not only determines how issues and decision-
making are framed, but also the importance, urgency, necessity, and justness that are 
based on the claims to representation. Borras et al. (2008a) state that in principle TAMs 
can only claim 'partial representation' given that most do not include important segment 
of the global population, such as China, Russia, and Central Asia, to name a few, adding 
that at the national level, no single organisation can fully represent the vast diversity of 
groups therein. In a similar vein, as Moro and Yeros point out (2005, 41) that a plethora 
of organisations may seek to 'speak' for the rural poor, enlist them in their ranks, or 
otherwise secure their support, be it from NGOs, church organisations, political parties, 
trade unions, farmers' unions, and landless people's movements, yet no single entity can 
rightfully claim full representation. As such, the issue of representation remains 
complicated and is often contentious (Borras et al. 2008b, 186/ Moreover, though 
TAMs may share an underlying common interest in achieving social justice in its 
multiplicity of forms, the means by which this objective is pursued varies greatly and is a 
reflection of the distinct makeup of each movement. 
In this regard, though TAMs will rally around a common theme of agrarian reform, they 
could employ political strategies and engage in forms of action characteristic of their 
movement that may, or may not, share similarities with other movements that have 
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mobilised for the same cause. The main differences among TAMs notably centre on 
issues of social class origin and base, ideology and politics, and its 
organisational/institutional makeup, in addition to other critical social relations such as 
gender, caste, and ethnicity (Borras 2010, 773). The complex interplay of these elements 
largely shape the alliances that are forged among various NGOs, peasant movements, 
agrarian reform movements, and civil society groups, which in turn determine strategies 
and actions adopted by a particular TAM. For example, Via Campesina, as a 
transnational movement that represents mainly poor and small farmers, resorts to a 
combination of confrontation and critical collaboration that may include forms of direct 
action, while IFAP, representing small, medium and rich commercially-oriented farmers, 
prefer to engage in uncritical collaboration and establish formal alliances with 
mainstream organisations such as the FAO and IF AD (Borras et al. 2008b, 187). The 
difference in social classes is a key defining feature that sets both TAMs apart and places 
them in opposite camps of agricultural development discourse. Another example is the 
International Land Coalition (ILC) which is led by middle-class professionals and is part 
of a global alliance that includes IFIs such as the World Bank and EFAD, 
intergovernmental institutions like the EU and the FAO, and a number of NGOs. The 
ILC represents and promotes mainstream, neoliberal development policies in contrast to 
those advocated by IPC and its allies that place smallholder sovereignty over land and 
over food production for local and domestic markets ahead of large-scale agricultural 
production for international export (Ibid, 788-90). As a result of class, ideological, and 
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organisational differences, TAMs can therefore resort to oftentimes competing and 
conflicting political strategies and forms of action, which may also occur within larger 
movements themselves articulating a diversity of agendas across a multitude of 
international settings. An important issue to consider, ultimately, is how TAMs impact 
national and local rural social movements, in addition to understanding what forms 
resistance may take in the struggle for control over natural resources and claims to 
sustainable rural livelihoods. 
2.32 Rural Social Movements: The Politics and Dynamics of Resistance 
Neoliberal policies that have been driving mainstream development initiatives in 
agriculture for decades have given rise to more horizontal "'polycentric' rural social 
movements," as national movements further localise in response to state decentralisation, 
while at the same time internationalising their movements, advocacy work, and actions in 
response to globalisation (Borras 2010, 772). As a result, rural social movements find 
themselves simultaneously engaged in a struggle to construct coordinative structures for 
'vertical' integration (Fox 2001) through new 'partnerships' that include TAMs, all of 
which are operating in differentiated rural settings that encompass the 'rural poor'.40 The 
latter group is comprised of various 'classes of labour' (Bernstein 2010) such as landless 
labourers and small-scale farmers, yet also includes landlords, medium-scale farmers, and 
moneylenders, which, as individual groups, experience neoliberal globalisation in a 
40 The term 'rural poor' is used in a broad sense to mean the socially, economically, and politically 
marginalised segments of the rural population (Borras 2010). 
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distinct manner, and as a result engage in politics and forms of resistance differently 
(Borras 2010, 775-6). Though each group is part of a local community and shares a 
common link to land in terms of its relation to the means of production, they remain 
highly differentiated along class lines, and thus represent competing class interests 
regarding agrarian reform initiatives and agricultural development policies. In such rural 
settings, elite social groups made up of rich farmers, traditional chiefs, and corrupt petty 
state bureaucrats and officials, for example, may support foreign investment in large-
scale agricultural projects on the one hand, while at the same blocking redistributive land 
reforms, both of which work against the interests of the class of landless labourers and 
poor smallholder farmers (Ibid., 776-7). Oftentimes, development discourse will fail to 
make a distinction between competing classes within a local community, which in turn 
leads to failed initiatives that only further entrench rural poverty instead of improving the 
lives of the most marginalised and impoverished segments of rural society. In addition, 
as a result of competing interests and class struggles, conflict and resistance follows 
along a multitude of trajectories that can either take more 'invisible' forms that are 
unstructured, unorganised, or covert, or can culminate in more 'visible' direct 
confrontations that can lead to violence. 
In Weapons of the Weak, James C. Scott (1985) first drew attention to 'everyday forms of 
resistance' that often went unrecognized and unacknowledged in analyses on rural 
resistance, and similarly, Benedict Kerkvliet (2005, 2009) highlighted the importance of 
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reaching beyond conventional political studies to better understand resistance and protest 
within peasant societies. Scott noted that though resistance can, on some occasions, 
become active and even violent, more often "it takes the form of passive non-compliance, 
subtle sabotage, evasion, and deception," with peasant claims ordinarily having to do 
with 'the material nexus' of class struggle, namely the appropriation of land, labour, rent, 
and taxes (1985, 31-33). He qualified, however, that class did not exhaust the total 
explanatory of social actions in a peasant village where kinship, neighbourhood, factions, 
and ritual links may compete with class, and that beyond the village level, ethnicity, 
language group, and religion may act as a focus of loyalty (Ibid, 43). In developing his 
theory of 'everyday politics' in peasant society, Kerkvliet argued that by associating 
politics primarily with what governments, politicians, lobbyists do, the conventional view 
of politics ultimately missed a great deal of what is politically significant, and for this 
reason a broader perspective of politics was essential (2009, 228-29). According to the 
author, of the three types of politics, namely official, advocacy, and everyday, the latter 
oftentimes remained overlooked as a legitimate form of politics. Kerkvliet described 
everyday politics as "embracing, adjusting to, and contesting norms and rules regarding 
authority over issues of production or resource allocation" that could include quiet, 
mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that indirectly, and for the most part, privately, 
endorse, modify, or resist prevailing procedures, rules or orders (2005, 22). Everyday 
politics could be outright public criticism, taking grain from the cooperative, slowing 
down work and reducing productivity, and even earning a living outside of the 
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cooperative, which in his field of research, was forbidden by the communist Vietnamese 
government (Ibid., 161-63). These actions became 'the weapons' of a politically 'weak' 
segment of rural society that eventually feed into official politics in important ways, with 
the most critical being that, for the Vietnamese peasants, power ultimately was derived 
from their ability to affect outcomes that were important to authorities (Ibid., 235).41 The 
manner in which all three forms of everyday politics and rural resistance occur in the 
context of Indonesia's oil palm industry will be developed in the following sections, in 
addition to the role played by local, national, and transnational movements. 
41 Everyday resistance of this kind led to a radical decline in food and rice production from 1976 to 1980, 
after which the Vietnamese government opted to convert all collective state farms into family farms 
(Kerkvliet2005, 174 & 190). 
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Chapter 3 - Biofuels in a Global Context and the Indonesian Oil Palm Industry 
3.1 Biofuels, Agribusiness, and Land Grabbing: A Global Context 
Biofuels42, such as bioethanol and biodiesel, are primarily derived from a variety of 
agricultural crops plant and are categorised according to the 'feedstocks' from which they 
are produced (Dauvergne and Neville 2010, 635). 'First-generation' fuels are produced 
largely from sugar, starchy, or oil crops that also serve as food staples, with the exception 
of Jatropha curcas that produces an inedible oil used to make biodiesel.43 'Second-
generation' biofuels, on the other hand, are made from non-food crop cellulosic materials 
such as switch grass, willow, and a variety of agricultural waste products including straw 
and stock (see Figure 4). In addition, a more recent 'third-generation' of biofuels that is 
algae-based (EIC 2008) or produced from bacteria such as e-coli (Biello 2010) is also in 
the early stages of development. Currently, however, only 'first-generation' bioethanol 
and biodiesel are being produced for large-scale domestic and export markets, while 
subsequent generations of biofuels fuels still face significant technological challenges 
before becoming commercially competitive (FAO 2008a, 19). Despite cellulosic biomass 
being the most abundant biological material on earth (Ibid.), the technology-intensive 
requirements of converting it into 'second-generation' biofuels (Clancy 2008), make it 
42 A number of critics reject the use of 'bio' as a prefix because it masks harmful social and environmental 
effects, and prefer instead the term 'agrofueP to emphasize the threat posed by industrial farming of 
monocrops for the production of fuel for the transport sector. (Franco et al. 2010, 665). 
43 Ethanol is made primarily from such sugar crops as sugar cane and sugar beets, as well as from starchy 
crops such as maize, cassava, and potatoes. Biodiesel, in contrast, is produced primarily from food oil 
crops such as rapeseed, oil palm, soybean, and sunflower, in addition to a non-food oil extracted from 
Jatropha curcas. (FAO 2008, 14). 
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such that developed economies, especially the European Union and the USA, may likely 
continue to dominate their production for years to come before the technology is 
eventually transferred to the South (White et al. 2009, 19).44 A study by the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre considers it unlikely that 2nd generation biofuels will 
be competitive with 1st generation fuels by 2020 (Eide 2009, 9). Countries located in 
tropical regions, however, do retain a comparative advantage in terms of yield per 
hectare, where sugarcane in Brazil and India, as well as oil palm in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, offer the highest yield of litres per hectare of bioethanol and biodiesel 
respectively (see Table 2). When coupled with relatively low labour costs in the South 
associated with the production of agricultural feedstocks like sugarcane and palm oil, it is 
expected that investment in 'first-generation' biofuels will continue to dominate the 
expansion of this industry in the Global South for the foreseeable future. 
The use of liquid biofuels as an alternative energy source can be traced back to the 
Second World War, though it was not until decades later that large-scale production and 
use would emerge and eventually leading to the prominence of biofuels in contemporary 
agricultural development initiatives. In the 1940s, the US responded to the global fuel 
shortage by implementing a short-term bioethanol program based on maize which 
In reference to the oil palm sector, Almuth Ernsting estimated that the development of more efficient 
second-generation fuels would take at least 15 years or more (2007, 30). 
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Figure 4: Conversion of Agricultural Feedstocks into Liquid Biofuels. Adapted from The State of Food 
and Agriculture — Biofuels: Prospects, Risks, Opportunities, by FAO, Rome: FAO, 2008, p. 14. 
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resulted in the construction of more than 100 distilleries across the country (IEC 2008, 
43). This program was phased out over time as post-war fuel prices dropped and the 
production of maize ethanol was not economically sustainable. However, it was not until 
the 1970s energy crisis that Brazil would emerge as a leading producer of ethanol as a 
result of its Pro-Alcool initiative that led to the quadrupling of national sugar production 
from 1975 to 198645 (Moreira et al 2005, 28-30). The US has since developed its maize-
based ethanol program from the 1990s onward to a point where today, the US and Brazil 
account for more than three quarters of the world's ethanol production (OECD 2008, 15) 
(see Table 3). Dauvergne and Neville point out how Brazil's discourse with respect to 
the US has shifted away from earlier claims of producing a more economically and 
ecologically superior biofuel, to one that now highlights a US-Brazil biofuel 
collaboration that is characteristic of emerging North-South linkages associated with the 
current biofuel boom (2010, 638). 
The EU has also forged important economic alliances with countries in Asia and Africa 
that provide agricultural oils (mostly palm oil) used as feedstock for its biodiesel industry 
which currently produces more than 60 percent of the global output of biodiesel (Ibid., 
16) and accounts for 81 percent of the EU's biofuel market (EIC 2008, 58). In order to 
spur on the current biofuel boom and to secure significant global market shares, however, 
45 In the 1970s, fuel costs accounted for 40 percent of Brazil's import bill (EIC 2008, 43). Also, despite a 
subsequent slowdown in the biofuel sector due to low oil prices (1980s and early 1990s) and the removal of 
government subsidies, Brazil was well positioned to capitalise on the biofuel boom that emerged later. 
(Dauvergne and Neville 2010, 636). 
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Table 2: 2007 Biofuel Yields and Conversion Efficiency for Various Feedstocks 
Global and Crop Yield Conversion Biofuel Yield 
Crop National Biofuel (tonnes/ha) Efficiency (litres/ha) 
Estimates (litres/tonne) 
gar cane Brazil Efcaaoi.;.: ; •. 73 Ac !• . - ' - W . " . 5 476 ;̂:;.. 
Soybean Brazil Biodiesel 1A 205 491 
Note. Adapted from The State of Food and Agriculture — Biofuels: Prospects, Risks, Opportunities, by 
FAO, Rome: FAO, 2008, p. 16. 
both the US and the EU have had to rely on aggressive support policies in order to offset 
the per unit costs of biofuels, that in most cases far exceed the production costs for fossil 
fuels they are aiming to replace (OECD 2008,10). Without the use of extensive publicly-
funded support mechanisms, the biofuel industry would not be able to expand at such an 
unprecedented pace and across such large expanses of agricultural land in both developed 
and developing countries. 
In the first decade of the 21s century and in the context of a confluence of crises, namely 
environmental, 'energy,' food, and financial, the US and the EU have implemented 
comprehensive support policies that include high blending mandates, direct and indirect 
subsidies, and protectionist import tariffs. The US Energy Independence and Security 
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Act of 2007 established a 136 billion litres Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) target for 
2022 with mandatory blending mandates for ethanol and biodiesel set at 10 percent and 5 
percent respectively (OECD 2008, 31 & 17-18). 
Table 3: Biofuel Production by Country (2007) 
















































Note. Adapted from The State of Food and Agriculture — Biofuels: Prospects, Risks, Opportunities, by 
FAO, Rome: FAO, 2008, p. 15. 
Similarly, in January 2007, the European Commission unveiled its EU Strategic Energy 
Review that set forth a number of support measures for biofuel production and use and 
recommended that member states set mandatory blending targets of 10 per cent for 
transport fuels to be fully implemented by the end of 2020 (Reyes 2007, 7). The US and 
the EU have also set an ambitious combined biofuel goal of 25-30 percent of the 
transportation fuel market by 2030 which would require a rapid expansion of production 
when considering that at present, biofuel consumption amounts to less than 1 percent of 
the fuel used in the transport sector (OECD 2008: 33). Direct and indirect biofuel 
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subsidies are also providing critical incentives to drive the industry's expansion. As 
reported by the FAO (2008a, 88-89), public subsidies for biofuels in OECD countries 
amounted to US$ 11-12 billion in 2006, while the OECD (2008, 9) noted that the 
combined annual biofuel subsidy for the US, Canada, and the EU is projected to increase 
to US$ 25 billion per year by 2013. If the estimated annual agro-subsidies for OECD 
countries of US$ 365 billion (Weiss 2007, 141) are also factored in, it is clear that 
subsidies available to OECD-affiliated agribusiness transnational corporations (TNCs) 
are being provided tremendous non-competitive market power in the booming biofuel 
industry. Tony Weiss adds that for OECD countries, roughly 80 percent of total farm 
subsidised are paid to the top 20 percent of farmers, with the largest subsidy recipients 
being the biggest landholders made up of wealthy individuals or corporate-owned farms 
(Ibid., 68). When OECD trade restrictions (such as import tariffs to protect the domestic 
biofuel sector) are also factored into incentive policies (OECD 2008, 9), it is possible to 
see how such biofuel drivers are facilitating the accumulation of capital by wealthier 
segments of the population, and are helping further advance the consolidation of 
corporate power in the energy and agribusiness sectors linked to the emerging 'biofuel 
complex.' 
The initial hubris surrounding energy security and net environmental gains claimed by 
promoters of biofuels has dampened somewhat in recent years, as critics continue to raise 
important questions regarding assumptions being made about biofuels. In reference to 
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the potential energy security offered by the latter, the FAO points to the growing number 
of studies that indicate how the land requirements are simply "too large to allow liquid 
biofuels to displace fossil fuels on a large scale" (FAO 2008a, 89).46 The World Bank's 
own commissioned report on biofuel development in Mozambique made a similar 
observation by noting that, in the case of Europe and Brazil which have over 30 years of 
experience in biofuels, there is a "clear perception that renewable fuels are not substitutes 
for fossil fuels" (EIC 2008, 44). Oxfam International offered its own assessment in 
highlighting that the entire yearly harvest of US maize would provide one sixth of the 
country's present fossil fuel consumption, while the entire global oilseed production 
would meet less than 10 percent of the diesel fuel currently used in the transport sector; it 
went on to add that biofuels essentially allow "rich-country governments to avoid 
difficult but urgent decisions about how to reduce oil consumption of oil" (Oxfam 2008, 
2-3). Franco et al. (2010, 672) qualify that though the blending of biofuels with regular 
fossil fuels does diversify energy supplies and may address sustainability in terms of 
energy security, this is not necessarily the case in terms of reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions which depends on a variety of factors including crop, location, land 
type, as well as production, processing, and distribution methods.47 The ability of 
biofuels to mitigate global warming thus remains highly case specific, and the many 
assumptions underlying their promotion are presently being challenged on a number of 
46 The UK's Gallagher Report (2008) noted that in order to the meet biofuel targets currently set for the 
year 2020, an additional 500 million ha of new land would need to be brought under cultivation, which is 
more than one third of the agricultural land in presently in active production worldwide. 
47 Dauvergne and Neville note how biofuels differ in input needs, and as a result, their total net energy and 
carbon balances vary accordingly (2010, 635). See also John McCarthy (2010). 
117 
The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
fronts, not the least of which is how they are pushing the expansion of farming into 
critical carbon sinks like forests, wetlands, and grasslands (see Searchinger et al. 2008; 
Scharlemann and Laurance 2008). Yet despite important shortcomings related to energy 
security and GHG emissions, government subsidies and support policies remain a driving 
force behind the expansion of the sector and biofuels continue to be conveniently 
packaged under the green "sunny glow of alternative fuels" (Shattuck 2009, 89). As 
these policies and incentives enable agribusiness TNCs to extend their control of global 
commodity chains and foster new 'South-South-North' alliances and partnerships with 
capital in the 'North' (Dauvergne and Neville, 2010), it is important to consider the some 
of the forms agricultural production can take in the context of biofuel development and 
the role allocated to smallholders and rural workers in these various models. 
The production of agricultural feedstocks for biofuels for either local consumption or 
export markets can take a number of forms, though the model that predominates is 
corporate-driven involving large-scale plantations and industrial farming of monoculture 
crops. In some cases, however, such as in the making of biodiesel from jatropha, castor 
or coconut oil, production can be community-based and small-scale (see Puente-
Rodriguez 2008), and may even offer opportunities for 'energy sovereignty' as described 
in the Landless Workers Movement (MST) of Brazil's fundamental principles put 
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forward in late 2007. In places like Brazil, Honduras, the Philippines and India, for 
example, local governments, community organisation, and NGOs are exploring and 
developing small-scale biofuel production for household electrification and fuel for local 
transport through primarily intercropped farming practices (Borras and Franco 2009a, 
11). In contrast, large-scale monocrops of maize and sugarcane for ethanol production, 
or oil palm and soya for biodiesel production, are the preferred model for corporate-led 
models where economies of scale allow for greater efficiency, financial viability, and 
higher profitability. Smallholder peasants and rural workers are inserted into typical 
agrarian structures and labour regimes characteristic of plantation economies (see 
Beckford 1972) or as contract farmers and labourers linked to agro-export commodity 
chains (see Watts and Little 1994; Bernstein and Campling 2006a, 2006b) which 
oftentimes involves socio-political processes that include promises of a better livelihood, 
deceit, coercion, and even violence (Borras and Franco 2009a, 12). In reference to how 
smallholders fit into economy of scale that is a key to profitable biofuel production, Eide 
(2009, 17) notes that "[s]mallholders are likely to have a minor space in this production, 
which requires an integrated industrial/agricultural organisation of production, factory 
processing, transport, and distribution." Therefore, while the World Bank's 2008 World 
Development Report advocates that "a strong link between agribusiness and smallholders 
can reduce rural poverty," (World Bank 2007, 135-7), others point to how an 'agriculture 
Joao Pedro Stedile from MST outlined that the production of agrofuels by small farmers and peasants 
should be discusssed in the political orientation of production based on the principles of food sovereignty 
and energy sovereignty (Stedile 2007). 
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for development' model dominated by agribusiness TNCs will only reinforce "the path 
dependence of an exclusionary corporate agriculture" (McMichael 2009c, 243). It is 
against the backdrop of an emerging biofuel regime that new corporate alliances North 
and South are on the leading edge of a pursuit for profit through increased investment in 
land and agriculture with important consequences for rural livelihoods across the globe. 
Since the 1970s, agro-TNCs have been a dominant force in transforming the nature of 
agriculture, and in the context of the rise in demand for biofuels, new interactions 
between state actors, private companies, and finance are deepening corporate-led 
agricultural development. Tony Weiss notes how the current support regime is leading to 
ever-greater agglomerations of capital and uneven market integration by directing nearly 
80 percent of total farm subsidies to the top 20 percent of farmers made up of the 
wealthiest landholders, corporate-owned farms, and agribusiness TNCs (2007, 68 and 
161-2). Corporations like Archer Daniels Midland (the largest US and multinational 
grain processor) and US-based Cargill presently control 75 percent of the global grain 
trade (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 2009) benefitting directly and indirectly from OECD 
supports. Both are well positioned to dominate growing segments of agricultural 
feedstocks linked to biofuel production, as are other agribusiness corporate leaders. 
Combined incentives and subsidies that are driving a rise in demand for biofuels have 
resulted in an 800 percent increase in venture capital in the biofuel sector from 2004 to 
2007 and have led to an extreme concentration and capitalization of power in the industry 
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(Holt-Gimenez 2007). In the case of Africa, for example, over US$1 billion in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) was channelled into sugar ethanol production between 2007 and 
2009 (Richardson 2010). Dauvergne and Neville (2009) note that new South-South and 
North-South-South biofuel alliances reveal that leaders in the South have not supplanted 
developed country investors, but rather have partnered with them thereby "reinforcing 
process and structures that further wrest control of resources from subsistence farmers, 
indigenous peoples and people with insecure land rights" (631, 637). Under the current 
conditions of rapid and large-scale expansion of the biofuel sector, the historical legacies 
of land tenure and control over productive resources like land are unfolding along 
familiar patterns of development where the greatest benefits accrue to more privileged 
social groups, the vulnerability of the poor is further entrenched, and "agribusiness TNCs 
progressively squeeze out smallholder production" (Fortin 2005, 153-6). The complex 
relationships that make up the emerging biofuel regime sees state actors facilitating land 
acquisitions, private companies investing in new agribusiness operations, and the finance 
industry providing capital for sovereign funds and speculative investors (Li 2010a). 
Under the pressures of global capital, the biofuel boom is prompting unprecedented land 
use changes and land grabbing that is radically altering social relations to land and rural 
livelihoods in the global South. 
In order to meet the global demand for biofuels, food-producing land is being redirected 
to biofuel production, new non-food-producing land is being brought into production for 
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biofuels, and land grabbing is occurring across a broad spectrum of existing agricultural 
land and so-called 'idle' or 'marginal' lands. Currently, an estimated 14 million ha (one 
to two percent of the world's arable land) is dedicated to the production of biofuels, and 
one projection by Liversage (2010) forecasts a two- to fourfold increase by 2030 (White 
and Dasgupta 2010, 594). In 2007, the US allocated 23 percent of its coarse grain 
(mostly maize) to ethanol production, and in the same year, the EU used 47 percent of its 
vegetable oil production for the manufacturing of biodiesel (Eide 2009, 10). As the 
world's second largest producer of ethanol, Brazil also dedicates a considerable 
percentage of its 5.8 million hectares of sugarcane harvest to biofuel production 
(Fernandes et al. 2010). Presently, Brazil's soya production is also in a state of rapid 
expansion in response to the demand for biodiesel and to related market shortages due 
linked to the US displacement of soya crops in favour of higher priced maize used for 
food and ethanol production, all of which result in more of Brazil's savannah and forest 
area dedicated to large-scale agricultural production (Biofuelwatch et al. 2007, 17). As 
the demand for biofuels rises, it is expected that countries will continue to increase their 
allocation of agricultural food production to biofuels inciting greater opposition and 
protest in the 'fuel versus food'49 debate being led by activists, civil society groups, social 
movements, and their supporters worldwide. In addition, as biofuel production continues 
to expand onto land formerly used for food crops and progressively comes to incorporate 
In an OECD paper, Doornbusch and Steenblik (2007, 4) argued that current government policies could 
draw the world into a 'food-versus-fueP battle and noted that the 200 kilogrammes of maize required to 
produce 50 litres of ethanol could in fact feed one person for an entire year. 
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'idle' or 'marginal' lands into active production, the competition for land intensifies 
greatly leading to widespread land grabbing in 'land rich' countries in the South. In the 
global arena, satellite imagery and cadastral data is being used to identify areas for 
potential land investment with particular emphasis on 'non-private' lands which remain 
largely under the control of the state or are held under customary law that is vulnerable to 
exploitation and expropriation either by the state, investors, or by local elites. According 
to von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009) from the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI), between 2006 and 2009 an estimated 15 to 20 million hectares of land 
have been leased by foreign investors for offshore farming related to food and/or biofuel 
feedstock production.50 Though a number of these land grabbing deals are in the process 
of being negotiated and finalized, it is clear that private-sector and state alliances are key 
actors in these transactions and that the biofuel boom is driving extensive changes in land 
use with important social and environmental repercussions. 
The large-scale conversion of land to biofuel feedstock production is not only 
undermining food security for millions of poor as noted earlier, but is also provoking 
widespread human rights violations in the global South and compromising biodiversity in 
important forested regions in the tropics. Fidel Mingorance (2007) from the Belgian-
based Human Rights Everywhere (HREV) has documented forced evictions, the 
See von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009) for a breakdown of land grabbing by foreign investors based on 
media reports from 2006 to 2009. Also, see Seized! GRAIN Briefing Annex for a breakdown of 2008 land 
grabbers for food and financial security (GRAIN 2008b). 
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appropriation of land, and human rights violations related to palm oil plantations in 
Colombia. FIAN International has also drawn attention to this issue and reported on "the 
complicity of agroindustrial corporations, large land owners, and security forces in forced 
evictions in Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Paraguay, and Indonesia (Ziegler 2007, 13). In 
reference to Brazil's booming sugarcane sector linked to ethanol production, MST leader 
Alexandre Conceicao warned of the overexploitation of labour of seasonal workers living 
in already precarious conditions, while Camila Moreno from the Rural University of Rio 
de Janeiro signalled that the growth of the ethanol industry is in essence breathing life in 
a modern-day version of the sugar plantation slave-labour of the past (Ibid., 14). The 
expansion of large-scale industrial farming and the subsequent increased competition for 
land thus deprives smallholder peasant farmers of access to land, creates conditions of 
exploitation for workers, and promotes industrial farming practices that threatens the 
environment. A good example of environmental degradation associated with the biofuel 
boom is found in a NASA 2006 report that noted how the expansion of soya (for 
biodiesel and food production) has been identified as the main current driver for 
deforestation in the Amazon (Biofuelwatch et al. 2007, 18). Indonesia is another critical 
site of forest cover loss and damage to the environment due to logging concessions and 
the expansion of oil palm plantations. The 1997 and 1998 forest fires in Sumatra and 
Kalimantan that led to the destruction of some seven to ten million hectares of forest and 
agricultural land (McCarthy 2000, 91), and drew worldwide attention to the 
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environmental damage that followed in the wake of plantation development.51 Having 
already lost more than 60 percent (64 million hectares) of its forest cover since 1950, and 
with a rate of forest destruction estimated at between 2 million and 2.4 million hectares 
annually (Glastra et al. 2002, 4) Indonesia finds itself at the centre of the current oil palm 
expansion that is sweeping the globe. In order to understand the processes and 
mechanisms that are shaping Indonesia's oil palm expansion, it is essential to first situate 
it within the context of the current global oil palm industry. 
3.2 The Global Oil Palm Industry 
The oil palm plant originated in coastal West Africa where palm oil has long been a part 
of a staple diet for subsistence farmers, and today, it has become a major global 
agricultural commodity. The commercial planting of oil palm can be traced back to the 
early 20th century in colonial Southeast Asia and Africa, though large scale expansion did 
not begin until the 1960s, primarily in response to sustained declining rubber prices on 
the global market (Teoh 2010, 8). At present, palm oil is cultivated in 43 tropical 
countries around the world, yet major producers are largely concentrated in Southeast 
Asia, with Indonesia and Malaysia being responsible for nearly 85 percent of the global 
output (World Bank 2010, 3) . Countries in Latin America and Africa, however, are 
progressively seeking to expand their industry, as the availability for suitable land in 
51 Estimates vary widely as to the extent of area destroyed in Indonesia through the practice of using fire to 
clear forest land for plantation development. See McCarthy 2000 for a breakdown of the areas affected. 
52 Though Indonesia and Malaysia are the first and second top producers of oil palm in the world, 
respectively, Thailand, Nigeria, and Colombia are increasing their production through a rapid expansion of 
area devoted to oil palm plantations. 
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Malaysia (and to a lesser extent in Indonesia) decreases, and as the global demand for oil 
palm continues to rise. At the height of the food crisis in 2008, crude palm oil (CPO) 
prices peaked at nearly US $1200 per metric ton, though have now dropped to an average 
of about US $800 per metric ton which is over 50 percent higher than the long-run trend 
over this past decade (see Figure 5). Palm oil is now the world's most abundant 
vegetable oil by volume: it accounts for more than 59 percent of international trade in 
vegetable oils, almost three-fourths of the global production is traded on the global 
market, and China, the European Union, India, and Pakistan remain key, major importers 
(Ibid, 7 - 8). Between 1980 and 2009, global oil palm production has increased more 
than nine-fold (see Table 4), and global demand is expected to double by the next decade 
(Colchester et al. 2006, 20). 
It is palm oil's high versatility that has helped make it an increasingly sought-after 
commodity, coupled with its comparatively high yield in oil production per hectare of 
land used. The harvested fresh fruit bunches (FFB) are processed into CPO that in turn 
can be used in the production of a wide variety of food and non-food products. Palm oil 
is found in more that 50 percent of packaged supermarket goods such as cooking oils, 
chocolates, soaps, detergents, and cosmetics (Teoh 2010, 4), and it yields oleins that can 
be used to produce a host of goods such as plastics, textiles, emulsifiers, explosives, and 
pharmaceuticals (Colchester et al. 2006, 21). In addition, in the context of the more 
recent biofuel boom spurred on by blending mandates and national government subsidies, 
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Figure 5: Crude Palm Oil (CPO) prices from October 2000 to September 2010. Note. Adapted from 'Palm 
Oil Monthly Price.' Data retrieved from Index Mundi 
htlp://www.indexmundi.corn/cornmodities/?commodity=palm-oil&months=120. 
Accessed on 31 October, 2010. 
palm oil is now increasingly being used as a feedstock for biodiesel production intended 
for domestic and foreign markets. As a feedstock for the manufacturing of biodiesel, oil 
palm is widely recognized as being the most productive in terms of litres of oil produced 
per hectare of land. According to Oil World, the average yield of palm oil is 3.8 tonnes 
of oil per hectare, which is considerably higher than other agricultural crops used in 
biodiesel production such as soybean oil, rapeseed oil, and sunflower oil that provide an 
average lower yield of 9.3, 7.6, and 5.8 times less, respectively, in comparison to palm oil 
(Teoh 2010, 7). At the January 2010 Global Donors Platform on Rural Development 
conference held in Rome, the World Bank's land tenure adviser, Klaus Deininger, noted 
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that oil palm was one of the fastest growing crops and that it was more profitable than 
any other land use given the current market conditions and rising global demand 
(Deininger 2010). The World Bank estimates that, at present, oil palm is being 
commercially cultivated on about 12 million hectares of land worldwide (World Bank 
2010, 3), though that amount is set to dramatically increase as corporate interests, 
working with multilateral and bilateral organisations, government agencies, and local 
actors, seek to capitalize on newly emerging markets in the oil palm sector. 
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Note. Adapted from Key Sustainability Issue in the Palm Oil Sector: A Discussion Paper for Multi-
Stakeholders Consultations, by Cheng Hai Teoh, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010, p. 6. 
Globally, palm oil development is dominated by the private sector, and ongoing corporate 
mergers are resulting in a 'palm oil industrial complex' characterised by new corporate-
state arrangements that are determining the scope and speed of plantation expansion. The 
top 10 companies presently control about 2.3 million hectares of land and produce 
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approximately 22 percent of the world's palm oil production, while recent mergers and 
acquisitions by such companies as Sime Darby Berhad and Wilmar International have 
given rise to mega plantations representing new levels of market concentration (Teoh 
2010, 6). Listed as being Asia's leading agribusiness group, the Singapore-based firm, 
Wilmar International, describes itself as the world's largest global processor and 
merchandiser of palm oil, in addition to being the largest palm oil biodiesel manufacturer 
in the world (Wilmar n.d.). It has shareholder alliances with US-based Archer Daniels 
Midland (ADM) and the agribusiness firm Kuok based in Malaysia. Wilmar 
International competes with such firms as Synergy Drive (a merger of Malaysian 
companies controlled by the national government) set to become the world's largest palm 
oil entity, as well as with Cargill, the largest, privately-held company in the world 
(Greenpeace 2007, 39-40). These large TNCs, and others, have become dominant global 
commodity traders which have control over supply chains, plantation concessions, palm 
oil processing mills, biodiesel refineries, in addition to having direct control over 
extensive land banks in producing countries. Governments in the Global South are eager 
to attract foreign investors as a means of generating new sources of foreign exchange and 
national revenue, and as once-forested areas continue to be rapidly transformed into oil 
palm plantations, forces of resistance related to a host of environmental and social issues 
ADM claims to he the world's leading processor of agricultural crops and also claims to be Europe's 
leader in biofuels production, while the founder of Kuok, Robert Kuok Hock-Nien, was listed as being the 
richest man in Asia by Forbes in 2005 (Greenpeace 2007, 39). 
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that have been gaining momentum for decades, are increasingly being played out on 
local, national, and transnational settings. 
The massive expansion of the palm oil industry did not really catch the attention of major 
NGOs until "the year the world caught fire" in 1997 when vast forest fires occurred in 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Brazil, Colombia, and Africa as a result of fire being used 
to clear land for plantations (Dudley et al. 1997). Indonesia was one of the worst affected 
countries with millions of hectares of forest were destroyed by fire. A joint report 
prepared by the Ministry of State for Environment (KLH) and the UNDP concluded that 
there was considerable evidence pointing to how companies intentionally used fire to 
clear and prepare land for planting in order to meet ambitious planting targets (KLH and 
UNDP 1998, 76-9). A follow-up study conducted in 2000 by the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) International and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) reached similar 
conclusions and also linked market players such as Unilever, the world's largest buyer of 
palm oil, and key financial institutions such as Dutch banks ABN-AMRO, ING Bank and 
others, to the booming industry that was decimating Borneo forests and causing a drastic 
loss of biodiversity for the purposes of producing consumer goods intended for foreign 
markets (Rowell and Moore 2000). Soon after, WWF Germany launched a "Burning 
forests for margarine" campaign in an effort to hold German corporations accountable for 
using palm oil in their products (AidEnvironment 2007). Greenpeace International 
focused instead on the destruction of habitats for orang-utans in Indonesian rainforests 
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and how the conversion of peat lands into oil palm plantations was releasing massive 
stocks of CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby significantly accelerating global warming 
(Greenpeace 2007).54 A host of transnational NGOs, working with local organisations 
and social movements, thus targeted key players along the oil palm supply chain and 
sought to raise consumer awareness in the North in an effort to bring greater pressure to 
bear on the industry to adopt a more sustainable model of development for oil palm. The 
campaign eventually broadened to include social issues such as rural livelihoods, 
indigenous people's rights, and conditions of employment linked with oil palm plantation 
expansion and deforestation, which in turn, prompted a response by industry to counter 
the accusations of environmental and social damage caused by the oil palm sector. This 
response took the form of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) as an 
initiative put forward by major palm oil industries to, on the one hand, counteract public 
awareness campaigns that presented oil palm as a major threat to tropical forests and their 
inhabitants, while on the other, seek to establish sustainability standards for the industry. 
In April, 2004, RSPO was incorporated under article 60 of Swiss Civil Law by leading 
actors in the oil palm sector that represent 40 percent of global production, in 
collaboration with major environmental NGOs, notably WWF (Colchester and Jiwan 
In 'Cooking the Climate,'Greenpeace noted that GHG emissions from peatlands are set to rise by at least 
50 percent by 2030 at the current rate of oil palm expansion; it cited a European Commission report stating 
that the draining of wetlands to produce biofuels would produce a loss of stored carbon that would take 
hundreds of years to make up through the biofuels' annual GHG savings (Greenpeace 2007,2-4). 
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2006, 1). RSPO is chaired by Unilever, has a voluntary membership55 comprised of 
growers, producers, processors, traders, retailers, bankers, investors, and NGOs, and it 
aims to use market mechanisms to reform the way palm oil is produced, processed, and 
retailed by setting standards for the industry that discourage negative impacts and 
encourage 'responsible' expansion of the oil palm sector (Colchester et al. 2006, 32). In 
late 2005, all members voluntarily adopted the Principles and Criteria for Sustainable 
Palm Oil that addressed key environmental and social issues attributed to the industry 
with the understanding that members were "expected to support the Roundtable standards 
and actively promote the use of sustainably produced palm oil" (Worldwatch Institute 
2007, 301). At a first glance, the public relations campaign linked to RSPO has, to date, 
yielded some positive results along the supply chain. In December, 2009, Unilever 
suspended palm oil purchases from Indonesian suppliers (PT Smart from Sinar Mas 
Group and PT Duta Palma) for destruction of peat lands; in March 2010, Nestle similarly 
discontinued supplies of palm oil from Sinar Mas following a Greenpeace campaign 
against KitKat (Teoh 2010, 22). However, there continue to be a large number of major 
outstanding RSPO challenges linked to social and environmental issues, not the least of 
which is the traceability of 'sustainable' CPO by industry (Greenpeace 2007, 3). In 2008, 
some 250 organisations signed an "International Declaration Against the 'Greenwashing' 
of palm oil by RSPO, with a growing number rejecting RSPO as a solution to the 
negative outcomes of oil palm expansion as the politically induced demand for biofuels in 
55 As of December, 2010, the official RSPO website lists 399 Ordinary Members, 84 Affiliate Members, 
and 27 Supply Chain Associates (RSPO n.d.). 
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the Global North continues to attract massive investments and fuelling the oil palm boom 
(Pye 2010, 862). In order to understand the broader social issues associated with 
Indonesia's oil palm sector and the significant shortcomings inherent within the RSPO, it 
is necessary to first situate the booming sector in a historical context where agrarian 
reform and issues related to land have long been arenas of struggle and conflict for the 
peasantry and those who rely on forests and the land for their livelihoods. 
3.3 Indonesia: Historical Background and Agrarian Issues 
The Republic of Indonesia is an archipelago that consists of an estimated 17,000 islands 
located in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and it has the world's fourth largest population 
with over 234 million inhabitants (Picotich and Schultz, 2006, 234-35). The three largest 
islands, Sumatra, Irian Jaya (Western New Guinea), and Kalimantan are situated in what 
is termed the outer islands and account for nearly 75 percent of Indonesia's land mass and 
97 percent of the nation's 'state forests' (Peluso 1991, 5). The latter are recognized as 
being the third most extensive tropical forests in the world (DTE 2005, 25) that not only 
houses some of the richest biodiversity on the planet, but is also home to a diversity of 
indigenous peoples and forest dwellers with a long history of residing in the uplands. 
The Center for International Forestry Research estimates that in Indonesia some 50 
million people live on 'state forest land' with an additional 20 million more living in 
villages near forests, all of which depend on the forest for their livelihoods (CEFOR 
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2004)56. With 80 percent of Indonesia's rainforest already having disappeared since the 
mid-1960s (Gouverneur 2009, 5), coupled with the current rate of deforestations 
estimated by the Indonesian Department of Forestry at 3.8 million hectares per year (DTE 
2005, 25), it is clear that upland areas are increasingly becoming sites of contestation and 
protest as competing land claims and control over productive resources intensify. As 
noted by Nancy Peluso, rural poverty and 'land hunger' have been historically linked to 
the 'theft' of forest products or the 'squatting' on state or corporate forest lands by local 
peasants (1992, 9). Much of the modern-day conflict related to land can be traced back to 
earlier colonial policies "that were implemented by foreign and local elite whose interest 
was to maximize and extract profit," but is also linked to post-colonial and more recent 
reform policies that "remain biased against rural communities...[and] exclude the rural 
poor from the natural wealth around them" (Larson and Ribot 2007,189). 
At the time of independence from Dutch rule following the end of a three year Japanese 
occupation in 1945, Indonesia initially sought to pursue a path of nation building that 
included redressing issues of landlessness, rural poverty and violence linked to its 
colonial past. As a former plantation colony that saw its agriculture largely developed 
along export imperatives determined by foreign interests and controlled by local elites, 
frequent confrontations occurred between farmers and enterprises over the issue of land 
ownership and usage rights (Kano 2008, 297). With over a third of rural farming 
56 Colchester et al. (2006) estimate that between 60 and 90 million Indonesians make a livelihood from 
'State Forest Areas' (p. 11). 
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households lacking land (more than 40 percent in Java) (Ibid.), agrarian reform thus 
became a key priority for the newly formed nationalist government. "Public attention 
focused on the need to overcome inequalities of colonial patterns of land use and to 
recognize the primary rights of those working the land" (Lucas and Warren 2000, 221). 
The Constitution of 1945 now restricted land ownership exclusively to Indonesians and 
national industries, it stipulated a maximum size for agricultural landholdings, and it 
provided the legal foundation for land reform and future endeavours for small tenant 
rights (Kano 2008, 289 & 293). The new Constitution also explicitly stated that every 
person had the right to own property (Colchester et al. 2006,48). The Act would come to 
serve as the foundation for President Sukarno's Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) that was 
enacted in 1960 and which reflected the nationalist sentiment of independent Indonesia 
and "embodied the cultural significance and social security function of land" (Lucas and 
Warren 2000, 221). Under the Land Reform Programme (LRP) of the BAL, state land 
was prioritised for local people with the aim of redistributing it to poor peasants to 
improve their livelihoods and to maintain social justice with the understanding that 
having land was an 'obligatory right' (Bachriadi 2009, 3). 
Land reform was sharply resisted by aristocrats, army officers, and members of the 
bureaucracy who had invested in land, and against the backdrop of mass land occupations 
by peasants seeking the implementation of BAL, hyper-inflation, and an alleged coup 
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attempt by the PKI Communist Party,57 General Suharto rose to power58 marking the 
beginning of a corrupt and brutal dictatorship that would last over 30 years.59 In the wake 
of Suharto's ascendency to power, an estimated half million people, mostly rural peasants 
and farmers alleged to be supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party (Li 2007, 8), 
were exterminated as part of an effort to 'clear the ground' for re-growing the idea and 
practice of capitalist development (Fardi 2000). Land reform was brought to an abrupt 
halt, and land which had been distributed through LRP was taken back by local elites 
(Bachriadi 2009, 4), while the New Order established by Suharto placed capitalist 
development at the center of Indonesia's National Policy. According to Nancy Peluso et 
al. (2008, 212), the violence of 1965-66 "constituted a critical moment of primitive 
accumulation that has underpinned all further phases of capitalist development and forms 
of state, corporate and private accumulation in Indonesia." Agrarian transformation 
during the New Order period (1965-1998) generally took the form of large-scale land 
dispossession by central state institutions and their associated cronies (see Aditjondro 
1993; Fauzi 1999), and development initiatives, supported by state violence and 
repression, were "an explicit attempt to contain the challenge presented by a mobilized 
peasantry demanding land reform" (Li 2007, 8). Suharto relied extensively on foreign 
57 See Harold Crouch (1973) 'Another look at the Indonesian "coup," Indonesia (15), April, p.1-20 for an 
analysis on the 30th of September movement (G30S) that also includes a comprehensive list of publications. 
58 On March 11, 1966, General Suharto was alleged to have received an executive letter (Supersemaf) from 
President Sukarno giving him the authority to keep order in the country which served as the legal footing 
for his ascendency to power. The origin of this letter remains in dispute and the letter itself is 'missing'. 
(Saripudin, 1994: 40). Suharto also received extensive military support from the US (Li 2007). 
59 In 2004, Transparency International listed Suharto as the world's most corrupt leader ever, having 
allegedly stolen between US$ 15 to 35 billion during his 32 years in power ('Suharto tops...' 2004). 
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investment from Japan, the US, and the EU, and he promptly replaced the nationalist 
pribumi (children of the homeland) entrepreneurial class with his business cronies that 
now headed the state-run and military-run enterprises (Kano 2008, 247-48). Unfettered 
access to land thus became an essential, oftentimes bloodied, input to industrialisation 
and economic growth under the New Order. 
Suharto recognized, however, that though he held absolute political and military power in 
Indonesia, any attempt to dismantle the Constitution, and in particular the 1960 Basic 
Agrarian Law that had taken 10 years to formulate, would lead to wide-spread revolt. His 
solution was to neither revise nor revoke the Constitution, but to simply circumvent it by 
passing new forestry, mining, and land use laws that ultimately "facilitated the 
exploitation of natural resources by private interests" (Lucas and Warren 2000, 222). 
Significantly, restrictions on foreign ownership were relaxed and deregulation policies 
were implemented to allow for the compulsory release of title under the requirements of 
'national interest,' which paradoxically, is a part of the 'social function' of the Basic 
Agrarian Law (Ibid., 221). The New Order government established its legal claim to 
ownership and control over national resources by referring to Article 33 of the 1945 
Constitution that stated that "land and water and the natural riches contained therein shall 
be controlled by the State and shall be made use of for the people" (McCarthy 2006, 1). 
Article 33 (and other sections of BAL) provided the State with the constitutional 
authority to enact Basic Forestry Law (BFL) No. 5 in 1967 which extended the state's 
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sovereignty over all forested areas (70 percent of Indonesia's land mass), effectively 
treating these forests as 'empty', and subordinating all use and access rights to forestry 
exploitation (Colchester et al. 2006, 50). As a result of BFL 5/1967, millions of hectares 
of land were thus appropriated as 'state forests' and large capital investments in forest 
resource extraction have followed ever since in the form of lucrative logging and 
plantation concessions. 
Suharto's development policies thus centered on controlling natural resources by 
designating large portions of the outer islands as 'forest,' irrespective of long-standing 
agrarian uses (Li 1999), and by allocating these areas to private interests that were usually 
urban elites with close ties to key political figures (McCarthy 2006, 9). As part of the 
economic take-off strategy of the New Order, the government adhered to an 
"overwhelming policy commitment to making Indonesia's resources available for large-
scale capital investment" (Lucas and Warren 2000, 223) which translated into a "massive 
transfer of land access, entitlement, and ownership from the many to the few" (Katoppo 
2000, 214). Suharto's state-led development policies allowed for rapid and extensive 
deforestation in the uplands, and in the name of "national interest", timber was extracted 
at an alarming rate and scale. By 1980, an average of 5,500 square kilometres of forest 
was cut down annually, and this rate would continue to increase over time so that by the 
1990s, an estimated 12,000 square kilometres of forest was being clear-cut logged every 
year (Kiddell-Monroe 1993, 230). Suharto and his military ruling party, GOLKAR, thus 
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orchestrated large-scale forest enclosures where land and forest resources could be 
appropriated and assigned to beneficiaries loyal to the party and who were deemed to be 
more 'efficient' users of national resources, while order was maintained through the 
calculated use of punishment and reward (Li 2007, 58). Former State Minister for the 
Environment Sawono Kusumaatmadja revealed that by the early 1990s, "Indonesia's 
growth euphoria gave way to greed-driven economic growth, and the country was 
subjected to a regime of runaway rent-seeking, crony capitalism, nepotism, and blatant 
corruption" (Kusumaatmadja, 2000, 207). In essence, the New Order's forest policy 
entailed a transfer of the flow of benefits arising from resource extraction away from 
villagers who accessed land under customary arrangements {adat) (McCarthy 2006, 9) 
which invariably placed forestry "right at the heart of most agrarian struggles in 
Indonesia" (Peluso etal 2008, 209). 
In most forested upland areas, communities have long asserted a customary claim over 
surrounding land and territory with respect to other groups, and since the time of Dutch 
colonial scholarship, the traditional arrangements of local communities has been known 
as adat. As noted by McCarthy (2006, 3), in "the years, decades, or even centuries of 
local use, villagers have collected forest products or opened areas for cultivation" and 
"[ajccess to the land and the forest within such territories has long been a right of 
members of a village". In the context of colonial administrative expansion and the 
continued encroachment of capitalism into land 'held' by local villagers, Leiden 
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professor Cornells Van Vollenhoven put forward the concept of adat law that came to be 
incorporated in a dual legal system of customary and statutory law under the Dutch 
Agrarian Law of 1870.60 Under the dual system of land tenure, plantation holdings and 
administrative lands were to be governed by statutory European law, which also included 
land disputes with local residents, while for purposes of traditional agriculture and 
community land tenure, adat law was to apply (Kano 2008, 283-84). A distinction was 
made between communal land allotted by the village and private land that was owned by 
individual households, and in theory, villages could exercise communal rights by 
controlling: 1) the clearing and use of uncultivated land; 2) the use and disposal of 
reclaimed land, and in particular arable land; and 3) the provisioning of land to village 
officials in lieu of salary (Ibid., 285-6). In practice, however, the colonial government 
could still invoke 'eminent domain'61 over adat land, while at the same time recognizing 
some local rights over land. The Agrarian Law of 1870 declared "the state to be the 
owner of forests and any other 'wasteland' not under permanent cultivation," and 
officials ruled that the category of wasteland included "managed forests and the fallow 
land Native farmers used for rotational or swidden agriculture" (Li 2007, 39). Therefore, 
the concept of adat law elaborated on by Van Vollenhoven was not intended to challenge 
the legitimacy of colonial rule or capitalism, but rather to forestall the upheaval that was 
sure to follow; he ultimately argued that customary land tenures would gradually be 
60 This law embodied the basic principles that governed land tenure in Indonesia until BAL 1960 (Kano 
2008, 282) 
61 The principle of 'eminent domain' asserts that the state can seize a citizen's rights in property with due 
compensation, but without the owner's consent. 
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phased out by the 'Natives' themselves as individualized tenure became more common, 
and if not, they should be expropriated by due legal process (Ibid., 49). 
For the 60 to 120 million indigenous peoples, comprised of some 500 ethnic groups and 
an estimated 600 language groups, who refer to themselves as Masyarakat Adat62, the 
nature and status of adat, customary rights (ulayat), and customary land {Jonah adat) 
have been central to on-going struggles over land in Indonesia (Sirait 2009). Under the 
traditional adat land rights system, land was regarded as the common property of a 
community, and the communal right to land, hak ulayat, could not be bought, sold or 
leased (Kiddell-Monroe 1993, 231). Adat, however, can vary widely across the 
archipelago where there are presently 16 broad forms of adat law identified throughout 
Indonesia (Ibid., 232), which not only relate to issues pertaining to land access and land 
use, but also "inform village practice and facilitate settlement of village disputes" 
(McCarthy 2006, 3). It is important to also note that, historically, stratification within 
villages was the norm: the prevalent classes consisting of village officials who held 
individual and communal land rights, the core villagers who had about an equal amount 
of land, and the landless who were granted communal land use for subsistence agriculture 
(Kano 2008, 286). By the time of independence, however, the traditional adat system 
had already changed considerably, with private ownership, the buying and selling of land, 
62 Masyarakat Adat is defined by the indigenous peoples of Indonesia as communities "that live on the 
basis of their hereditary ancestral origins in a specific customary territory, that possess sovereignty over 
their land and riches, whose socio-cultural life is ordered by customary law, and whose customary 
institutions manage continuity of their social life" (Sirait 2009,2). 
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and unequal distributions within a community considered common place (Ibid.). Against 
this backdrop of a differentiated rural landscape, the New Order regime enacted land and 
forest laws that made reference to customary rights on paper, but in practice overrode 
them with the claim of eminent domain (Li 2007, 51). 
In the Reformasi63 period that followed the demise of the Suharto regime in May 1998, 
and which has included a number of decentralisation initiatives leading all the way up to 
present day, Indonesian laws continue to interpreted by the state and by capital for the 
latter's own interests without respecting the rights of indigenous peoples (Sirait 2009, 2). 
While revisions to the Basic Forest Act (No.5/1967) recognised the existence of adat 
forest (hutan adat), it maintained the concept of the 'forest areas' (kawasan hutari) as 
falling under the dominion of the state, thus retaining the power of the centralized 
forestry bureaucracy, and therefore, did not meet the demands for more regional 
autonomy (McCarthy 2000, 122-23). In reference to more recent laws (i.e., Presidential 
Regulation No. 36/2005)64 related to land procurement by the state for development 
purposes, once a public interest is demonstrated, ownership may be readily revoked and a 
community has no right to stop land acquisition by the government. Colchester et al. 
drew attention to how Indonesian land laws differ from those in most other countries 
63 The fall of Suharto led to a more open political atmosphere and a movement against corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism (KKN). It resulted in a series of political changes known as Reformasi that were 
intended to shift power away from the center through decentralization, yet in many respects led to the 
empowerment of local interests seeking political and financial gain and who benefitted from the support of 
the military and the police (McCarthy 2006, 138-41). 
64 See Colchester et al. (2006, 55). 
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regarding land acquired for public purposes, in which owners have the right to due 
process and compensation, and land acquired for private purposes, in which owners have 
the right to refuse sale. The authors note that 
[u]nder Indonesian Land laws these distinctions are blurred because all land 
tenures are subject to the test of performing their social function. Tenures are thus 
relatively insecure and even development projects consonant with the 
achievement of government-set targets can be considered to be of 'public 
interest,' even where the direct beneficiaries are private corporations. 
(2006, 52) 
Advocates for indigenous rights, thus represent an important aspect of the multi-faceted 
social movements and organisations centered on agrarian and environmental justice in 
Indonesia. Coalitions among various movements and organisations, whether at the local, 
national, or transnational levels, remain in a regular state of flux linked to competing 
interests over land and the politics of access to those lands which are shaped by a 
complexity of relations between the state, capital, and society. In order to better 
understand contemporary rural resistance in Indonesia, however, it is first necessary to 
review the origins and dynamic nature of agrarian and environmental movements in 
Indonesia, and how competing claims and interests have led to a diversity of rural 
resistance in the larger context of agrarian reform. 
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3.31 Rural Politics and Resistance 
Following the 1965 massacre orchestrated by Suharto, which created a deep and long 
political crisis for villagers (Heryanto 2006) and marked a decisive turning point in 
history of social movements in Indonesia, urban and rural grassroots movements, peasant 
and worker organisations, and civil society as a whole were banned and systematically 
suppressed under the New Order regime. During this period of authoritarian 
developmentalism, national projects further entrenched unequal land distribution 
inherited from the colonial era and increased landlessness (Bachriadi 2009, 4),65 while 
agrarian politics shifted from one of reform, mass mobilisation and intensification, to a 
top-down Green Revolution model that precluded land reform and virtually silenced all 
critical discourse on agrarian transition and rural poverty (White 2005, 121-2). The state, 
corporate agro-industry, and forestry institutions concentrated land power, and pro-
capitalist agrarian programs were implemented in the form of forest exploitation, and 
large state/corporate plantations, and all were tied to global capital and backed by 
Suharto's military-bureaucratic regime. The New Order government had no tolerance for 
political protest, and it established institutional and legal controls that were accompanied 
by a depoliticisation of the rural population through the replacement of existing peasant 
organisations with the Indonesian Peasant Harmony Association (HKTI) which was 
managed by the military and formally affiliated with the state ruling party, GOLKAR 
65 The percentage of landless people relative to farm households went from 21 percent in 1983, to 30 
percent in 1993, and up to 36 percent in 2003 (see Bachriadi and Wiradi 2009). 
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(Peluso et al. 2008, 214). Political activity was essentially co-opted by state corporatism 
and controlled by the authorities through the military officers that were stationed in 
villages, by regulating peasant movements via the HKTI, and through the elected heads 
who administered the newly-imposed hierarchical structure at the village level (modeled 
on the desa of Java) and who were "responsible for delivering development, order, and 
votes for the ruling party" (Li 2007, 57-8). As Gillian Hart (1989) points out, state 
patronage is central to understanding agrarian processes, and the suppression of open 
antagonism between rich and poor within rural society reinforces the state's need to 
exercise direct control which partly takes the form of incorporating rural elites into the 
state machinery as functionaries (31, 41). As a result, though there were organised and 
spontaneous protests, even in the form of land occupations,66 that occurred during the 
1970s and early 1980s, the pervasive control of the military regime was successful in 
maintaining a high degree of 'political stability,' though at an unconscionable social and 
environmental costs. 
By the early 1980s, however, a grassroots environmental justice movement began to gain 
some traction as a 'safe' arena for activists to voice their opposition to Suharto's large-
scale extractive projects that were having a devastating impact on the environment and on 
local communities. Though political expression was severely restricted during the New 
Order, environmentalism was seen as an alternative avenue for dissent (Kusumaatmadja 
66 Since the 1970s, the Pasundan Peasant Union (SPP) in Garut, West Java was involved in direct land 
occupations that continued into the 1980s (see Bachriadi 2002). 
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2000, 206). A new umbrella institution, the Indonesian Forum for the Environment 
(WALHI) was founded in 1980, and with the support of transnational institutions, 
environmental lawyers, and policy advisers, it called for a more sustainable approach to 
development and argued that the state's modernisation and extractive policies were done 
at the expense of the environment and were responsible for displacing cultivators and 
forest-dependent people (Peluso et al. 2008, 214-5). Though the New Order Regime 
treated any criticism of its development policy as subversive, environmental debates 
became the only public media through which farmers' rights could be discussed. The 
repressive and authoritarian nature of Suharto's government, in fact helped generate 
further support from international environmental NGOs, advocate organisations, and 
sympathetic foreign governments. In time, WALHI allied itself with a key participant of 
the environmental movement, the Masyarakat Adat, which was founded in the early 
1990s both as an agrarian and environmental justice organisation, and with the additional 
support of YLBI, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, and rural- and urban-based 
student groups, the coalition framed its criticism of existing laws by framing its advocacy 
in terms of indigenous rights and environmental justice (Ibid., 218). The organisations 
also found common ground in mobilizing against sections of BAL that allowed for land 
appropriation by the state, and though agrarian activists and farmers, who traced their 
movement's origins back to the Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI) formed in 1945, were 
not attuned to environmental issues per se, they remained broadly allied to the 
environmental and indigenous movements, albeit largely under the public radar screen to 
146 
The Biofiiel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
avoid persecution (Ibid., 212 and 219). During this time of 'tolerance' for dissent on 
environmental matters, it is important to note that there always remained tangible risks of 
being labelled a 'communist supporter', and since the mid-1980s, thousands of protesters 
were arrested, many were killed, and many more faced desperate living conditions 
following eviction (Bachriadi 1998, 2004). The nature of resistance and protest in 
Indonesia, however, underwent a dramatic change once the Suharto regime collapsed 
following the economic crisis of 1998 (krismon) and under the escalating pressure of the 
Reformasi movement. 
In the aftermath of Suharto's fall, the unresolved agrarian tensions related to large-scale 
land appropriations, which often involved bloody clashes, exploded as tens of thousands 
of peasants, farmers, landless people and smallholders occupied state forests and 
plantation land. The 'social time bomb' related to land that had long been brewing in 
Indonesia had ignited. Within the first 6 months, the National Land Agency (BPN) 
recorded some 1,395 land dispute claims, most of which centered on the principal issues 
of "the aborted land reform program which left most farmers without legal title, the 
consequent weakness of their position in the negotiation process, and the inadequacy of 
compensation" (Lucas and Warren 2000, 226). Pro-reform academic Gunawan Wiradi 
(1997) advocated a strategy of 'land reform by leverage' (Powelson and Stock 1990) that 
essentially entailed occupying, holding, and transforming the use of land (Peluso et al. 
67 An editorial in the Jakarta Post (November 4, 1995) observed that 'the land problem in this country 
could become a social time bomb if it is not handled with care.' (cf Lucas and Warren 2000, 220). 
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2008, 221-2). Following this approach, the Pasundan Peasant Union (SPP), as the largest 
peasant organisation in Java representing over 30,000 mostly landless and extremely poor 
peasants, confronted the State Forest Corporation (SFC) and the State Plantation Corp 
(SPC), occupied more than 15,000 hectares of state land in the uplands of West Java, and 
successfully maintained this occupation despite the SFC and SPC having hired hundreds 
of thugs to evict them (Ibid.). Thus, the more open political climate of the Reformasi era 
enabled once underground agrarian reform groups to emerge in the public forum, to 
negotiate with government officials, to undertake measures to reclaim land that had been 
appropriated, or to simply claim land as an inherent right to a better livelihood. The 
Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA), which was first established in 1994, adopted an 
initial focus on grassroots popular education programs on agrarian reform, while the 
fro 
Federation of Indonesian Peasant Union (FSPI), founded in 1998 and building on an 
earlier peasant organisation, the West Java Peasant Union (SPJB) established in 1991, 
centered on returning the movement's leadership back to peasant leaders (Bachriadi 2009, 
7-8). Both movements came to represent different types of NGOs advocating pro-poor 
agrarian reform in Indonesia. Finally, the Alliance of the Indigenous Peoples of the 
Archipelago (AMAN) was founded in 1999 as a national organisation, and it pursued a 
strategy of legitimizing the territorial claims of indigenous peoples by tying their 
customary practices of agroforestry to the environmental goals of sustainability (Peluso et 
In 2007, the organisation changed its name to the Indonesian Peasant Union (SPI) and no longer allowed 
organisations to become members, arguing instead that individual memberships would better enable 
peasants to fight for their own class interests (See Bachriadi 2009 for a detailed account). 
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al. 2008, 218). It is within the context of a dynamic and complex 'agrarian environment,' 
that issues of representation and contestations over use, access, and control of land 
occurred between (and within) interconnected environmental, indigenous peoples, and 
agrarian reform movements, all of which involved shifting coalitions that were shaped by 
strategic political manoeuvres adopted by the various movements. 
As pro-poor agrarian movements re-emerged publicly in the late 1990s and into the 
Reformasi era, some of the common ground began to erode within and between the 
interconnected organisations over issues of resource management and agrarian reform. 
On the one hand, the environmental movement witnessed an internal split between 
'relatively coercive' conservationists (often international) who were intent on protecting 
forests from exploitation, and environmental justice advocates who argued for access to 
land and forest resources for Masyarakat Adat portrayed as sustainable resource 
managers (Pye 2010, 857). While on the other hand, a rift occurred between agrarian 
reform movements who advocated for land reform for peasants in areas designated as 
state forest, which conflicted with the environmental movement that had helped establish 
forest reserves for protection or conservation and not for large-scale production or 
development (Peluso et al. 2008, 228). In addition, within the agrarian reform movement 
there was a widely held perception that AMAN and other indigenous groups claiming 
'customary rights' were dominated by 'feudal elites' that had resisted anti-feudal and 
anti-colonial movements in the 1940s and 1950s. As a result, reform activists were 
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unwilling to facilitate their inclusion into agrarian reform initiatives (Ibid., 229). There 
were also significant differences that divided the agrarian movements FSPI (Sumatra-
based) and KPA (West Java-based) on issues related to the most suitable base for a 
national level organisation, funding, and other sources of competition, to name a few 
(Lucas and Warren 2003). It is important to note as well, that the fault lines that surfaced 
between and within the various movements in the Reformasi and post-Reformasi eras 
were also taking place against the backdrop of increasingly entrenched neoliberal 
reforms. These economic reforms had begun in the latter part of the Suharto regime and 
involved a shifting of power away from the center and toward regional and local arenas 
through decentralisation initiatives that would provoke different responses from the broad 
spectrum of movements in Indonesia. 
In the context of neoliberal reforms and decentralisation, critical differences also arose in 
relation to agrarian reform goals under BAL and national agrarian reform decrees issued 
by the central government that included community based natural resources management 
(CBNRM) initiatives and TAP MPR DC/2001.69 According to FSPI, the largest Via 
Campesina affiliate in Indonesia, the 2001 parliamentary decree, TAP MPR DC/2001, 
worked in favour of pro-market forces, invalidated the reform tenets of BAL, enhanced 
the process of liberalisation of natural resources, and served more the interests of 'dark 
According to Bachriadi (2009, 30) since 1999, the SPP has been a significant force in pressuring the 
National Assembly to promulgate the decree. Colchester et al. (2006, 13) note that the required reforms of 
forestry and agrarian laws have yet to be put into effect. 
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green' environmentalist and corporate environmentalism than the cause of environmental 
justice (Peluso et al. 2008, 225-6). For KPA and SPP, environmental justice 
organisations and agrarian reform movements were seeking the same solutions, and that 
by linking agrarian structural inequalities to the ecological crisis, they argued that solving 
the first problem might ameliorate the second, and that the TAP MPR DC/2001 offered a 
means of justifying occupation and bringing land reform back to the bargaining table 
(Ibid., 226). As such, the ideology underlying CBNRM initiatives that involved 
relocating control at a local level could be represented on the one hand, as being a 
neoliberal strategy for reducing big government (McCarthy 2005), while on the other, 
could serve as a mobilizing strategy for agrarian reform. A more recent land reform 
initiative announced by President SBY in 2006 that would involve the redistribution of 
8.15 million hectares of state land was would also prove to be divisive within agrarian 
movements. In reference to the Presidential decree, FSPI warned of the dangers of a 
'pseudo-agrarian reform' because "the scheme could be implemented without substantial 
political-economic transformation" (Peluso et al. 2008, 230-1), while KPA and some 
other peasant organisations argued that "although the political-economic structure would 
not radically change, the plan could be used to facilitate the legalization of hundreds of 
thousands of claims on occupied lands by dispossessed peasants and indigenous groups" 
(KPA 2006, cf. Peluso et al. 2008, 231). These and other points of contention play out in 
varying degrees with respect to agrarian reform issues linked to Indonesia's oil palm 
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sector, and a review of this important national industry is necessary in order to situate 
these debates in within this specific context. 
3.4 Indonesian Oil Palm: State-led Land Grabbing and Smallholder Incorporation 
Oil palm is considered to be the most significant boom crop in Southeast Asia, and since 
2007, Indonesia has become the world's leading producer of palm oil.70 Indonesian oil 
palm has the lowest production costs in terms of labour and land; it also offers the most 
efficient feedstock for biodiesel in litres per hectare, and as a result, the country is 
seeking to become the largest biodiesel producer in the world (McCarthy 2010, 822-3). 
Oil palm represents 13 per cent of Indonesia's agricultural output (second only to rice), 
and it generated US$ 7.9 billion in export earnings in 2007 with over 3 million workers 
directly employed in the industry (WB 2010, 8-9). Though palm oil was first cultivated 
for soap production in Central Java starting in the mid-19 century, plantations producing 
edible oil first appeared in Sumatra in 1911 which eventually expanded into large-scale 
production in the 1960s as rubber underwent a sustained decline in prices on the 
international market (Larson 1996, 5). The World Bank Group (IBRD / IDA) has 
supported earlier public sector Nucleus Estate Schemes (NES) by committing US$ 618.8 
million to government sponsored plantation-smallholder development projects between 
1969 and 1983 (WB 2010, 30), and have also supported subsequent joint public-private 
partnerships involving Indonesian and foreign companies from the mid-1990s onward 
70 Indonesia exports 68 percent of its production to 150 countries which include major importers such as 
China, India, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Netherlands (IPOB 2007,15). 
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during a period of extensive deregulation and privatisation. Currently, the island of 
Sumatra represents over 70 percent of the country's planted area, while Kalimantan has 
more than 25 percent of the estimated 7 million hectares of oil palm plantations in 
Indonesia (Colchester et al. 2006, 24). According to the Indonesian Ministry of 
Agriculture (IPOB 2007, 4), 12 percent of the total plantation area is owned by the 
government, 53 percent is in the hands of the private sector (national and foreign), and 35 
percent is owned by smallholders (see Table 5). Since the inception of large-scale oil 
palm crops in Indonesia, the sector has developed along distinct, and at times, over-
lapping periods of agrarian policy and practice, with smallholders being incorporated in 
shared various NES schemes modeled after the former colonial Cultivation System 
(White 1999,232). 
After having initially implemented various types of plantation schemes through direct 
state investment in state-owned companies, the New Order regime introduced an 'estate-
transmigration program' (PIR-TRANS)71 from 1986 to 1994 that "involved state-
supported large-scale conglomerate firms typically led by Sino-Indonesians close to the 
politico-bureaucrats at the regime's apex" (McCarthy 2010, 828). This model comprised 
In 1976, the Indonesian government first implemented the People's Nucleus Plantations Scheme, known 
as the Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (PIR) model, which was rooted in colonial cultivation systems where 
farmers in surrounding areas were to supply land and labour to plantation production (Kiddell-Monroe 
1993,251). 
153 
The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
Table 5: Area and Palm Oil Production in Indonesia 2000 - 2006 (1000 tons) 
Area 
(1000 Hectares) 












































































Note. Adapted from Indonesian palm oil in numbers, Indonesian Palm Oil Board and Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2007, Jakarta: DHB Printing, p. 7. 
of private-sector and state-owned companies charged with clearing the land and gaining 
access to forest land held under customary law by way of an estate-smallholder (Inti-
Plasmd) sharing scheme with 20 percent of the total land going to the estate and the 
remaining 80 percent granted to smallholders in maximum parcels of 2 hectares (Kiddell-
Monroe 1993, 253).72 The state thus facilitated access to forest and village lands, 
developed infrastructure, and provided credit at concessionary rates for plantation 
development. It would provide financing for smallholder plots, in addition to some 
expenses related to living and housing, while the nucleus estate was responsible for 
extension services, as well as the collecting and processing of fresh fruit bunches (FFBs) 
72 NES inti-plasma models are highly variable; for example, they can take the form of 30:70 or 2.5:7.5. 
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(Larson 1996, 5). However, what became known as 'the world's largest ever human 
exercise in resettlement' (Hancock 1997), the World Bank-funded transmigration 
program, which relocated an estimated 6 million people to rainforest areas and 
appropriated land and resources through a process of 'internal colonisation', was fraught 
with problems for both for the local and migrant populations. On the one hand, the local 
communities "faced the double indignity of having their lands taken over for the creation 
of transmigration sites and then being forcibly resettled back on their own lands" as a 
minority (Ibid., 236); while on the other, the transmigrants settled on inadequate sites, 
were often forced to abandon them as a result of starvation, disease, and limited water 
access, and were left to pursue economically marginal existences in forested regions or in 
deteriorating transmigration sites (Kiddell-Monroe 1993, 249). A second generation of 
oil palm plantation development would emerge in the mid-1990s, in part, to address some 
of the social issues associated with PIR-TRANS, but more importantly, in response to the 
World Bank's promotion of neoliberal 'free market' principles in the development of the 
oil palm sector and its criticism of on-going state support for smallholders (Larson 1996). 
Between 1995 and 1998, the Indonesian government implemented a series of 
deregulation and privatisation policy changes in an effort to encourage private sector 
initiatives, facilitate FDI, and accelerate estate crop development, while at the same time 
addressing issues related to land disputes, smallholder cooperatives (KUD) support, and 
73 The Transmigration Program had originally projected to relocate 65 million people in all (Kiddell-
Monroe 1993, 245). 
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infrastructure needs. Based on a new direct private-community 'partnership' model, 
private companies established a separate entity known as the Primary Cooperative Credit 
for Members (KKPA) that would 'partner' with existing smallholder cooperatives (KUD) 
and facilitate the provision of credit, provide training and extension services, and 
establish infrastructure without direct state engagement (McCarthy 2010, 830-1). The 
KKPA scheme also involved integrating local indigenous populations that had 
relinquished customary land in the earlier PIR-TRANS development model, yet had been 
excluded from the oil palm plantation project and which remained a major unresolved 
issue in the outer islands. In order to participate as a smallholder in the inti-plasma 
scheme (following the previous 80:20 model) available through the KKPA, however, 
individual households needed to release an additional 2 hectares of land that would be 
developed through the KKPA, with the entire cost of development and maintenance of 
the plot transferred onto the peasant households (Sirait 2009, 33). As noted by John 
McCarthy (2010, 831), "the KKPA model represented a clever strategy to access land 
while creating more acquiescent land owners," with the state providing the company with 
concessionary rates from an 'executing bank' supported by the Bank of Indonesia. With 
the plantation companies acting as brokers and guarantors to the bank, in addition to 
acting in role of liaison to the government, the KKPA system served to reinforce the 
hegemony of a third party company (Sirait 2009, 33). As such, smallholders are locked 
into a cycle of high indebtedness as they repay the cost of development for their parcel of 
land, in addition to the multiple fees related to maintenance, transportation, and inputs, to 
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name a few, through a system founded on the principles of monopoly and monopsony 
that further erode smallholder incomes engaged in such 'partnerships' (Julia and White 
2009, 7). Following the collapse of the Suharto regime, Indonesia entered a period of 
decentralisation during the Reformasi era, and in the context of a progressively neoliberal 
approach, a new generation of oil palm development models emerged alongside existing 
schemes implemented to date. 
As districts gained greater authority and control over local development initiatives under 
decentralisation, new pro-plantation policies were implemented to attract investors under 
a framework of 'partnership' schemes that fell under the rubric of kemitraan. Though 
earlier PIR-TRANS and KKPA models represented varying forms of 'partnerships' for 
smallholder oil palm development, the new policies driving the kemitraan schemes were 
also characteristically shaped by neoliberal 'free-market' reforms that propelled the 
industry into a frenzied expansionist phase of accumulation and growth for agribusiness 
and for well-positioned local entrepreneurs. The new model entailed a reversal of earlier 
smallholder-estate development models whereby the majority of the land surrendered by 
local landowners would now be dedicated to estate development such as in the case of a 
new 20:80 model. Under this business model, locals might relinquish 16,000 hectares of 
land, for example, yet only see 4,000 hectares developed into smallholder parcels; oil 
palm companies argued that any reduction of estate land would render the project 
financially non-viable (Zen et ah 2008, 2). The smallholder parcels would also remain 
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under the control of a cooperative financed by and answerable to the company with no 
local accountability or oversight of the processes for distributing benefits (Ibid, 3). In 
this particular version of the kemitraan model, the entire inti-plasma area is managed by 
the company, and the smallholder may, or may not be, involved in the labour force 
employed by the company to maintain the plots and harvest the oil palm fruit. As noted 
by Martua Sirait, 'the plantation companies had no interest in developing oil palm 
plantations for peasants or in renegotiating earlier oil palm schemes taken up by 
indigenous peoples," therefore, this model of peasant 'shareholdership' was offered as a 
solution to existing land conflicts where participating households 'received passive 
income from the average production of plots" (2009, 46). Significantly absent in this 
model is the issuance of title of the plasma plot to the smallholder following a cycle of 
repayment, which has important repercussions for current and future generations of 
smallholders who will have relinquished control over all their land under this 
'partnership' scheme. As such, the commodification and sale of village common and 
private lands has resulted in an "irreversible shift in the ownership of agricultural assets" 
away from the poor, and the capital-intensive development of oil palm plantations under 
this model of kemitraan makes it "ideal for an absentee landlord-wage labour mode of 
production" (McCarthy 2010, 845). Underlying the various oil palm schemes, however, 
distinct and ever-changing processes are associated with the development of the industry, 
and key stages of development are characteristic of the plantation cycle. 
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Most plantations are established on 'state forest land' that has since been converted to 
agricultural production land in accordance with established governments regulations, and 
oil palm production follows distinct stages in the plantation cycle. Land that is identified 
for plantation development needs to first be transferred from the Ministry of Forest to the 
Ministry of Agriculture which in turn jointly issues with the National Land Agency 
(BPN) a temporary location permit (Ijin Lokasi) that regulates capital investment in 
relation to land acquisition (Colchester et al. 2006, 63). In order for a company to receive 
a Plantation Business License (IUP) that is required to undertake oil palm production, it 
must first obtain the following: 1) written confirmation from the Forestry Department 
indicating that the land in question is not designated forest area; 2) Business Utilisation 
Rights (HGU) issued from the BPN which attests to the land being free from conflict and 
is the property of the state; and 3) approval of an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) 
by the local government regarding the social, economic and biophysical impacts of the 
project (Sirait 2009, 36). Fulfilling these requirements also involves a process of 
'socialisation' where villagers and local land owners are to be made fully aware of all 
aspects of the plantation project, including the obligations and responsibilities of the 
company and smallholders under a particular scheme, in order that informed consent can 
be given by the villagers who are being asked to have their private or community 
managed land converted to state land for development. Once a HGU is issued to either a 
state-owned, national private, or foreign investment company, the plantation concession 
is generally awarded for a duration of 25 years, with the option for an extension (Ibid, 
159 
The BiofUel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
32). The company then undertakes the development of the estate (inti) plantation and 
the smallholder plots (plasma) in accordance with the scheme adopted, with the latter 
being certified through individual land titling (SHM). Following the initial planting, the 
oil palm production cycle usually requires three to eight years before bearing quality 
fresh fruit bunches (FFBs) that can be processed into crude palm oil (CPO), and after 25 
years, the trees are too old or too high to harvest which initiates a new cycle of replanting 
(Ibid.). As mentioned earlier, large-scale oil palm plantations in Indonesia have 
historically been associated with the often illegal takeover of indigenous peoples' and 
farmers' lands, as well as the exploitation of workers and smallholders (Colchester et al. 
2006, 18), and key NGOs, social movements, and advocacy groups have played a critical 
role in addressing these and other issues associated with the sector. 
3.41 Activism, Conflict, and Resistance in the Indonesian Oil Palm Sector 
As noted earlier, rural social movements in Indonesia involve complex and dynamic 
interactions between environmental and agrarian justice movements that include peasant 
and indigenous people movements and various alliances with TAMs, all of which are 
engaged in competing and parallels claims that take distinct forms with respect to the oil 
palm industry. One segment of the local peasant movement is represented by FSPI and 
other allied groups that work actively with Via Campesina to bring issues related to 
7 According to Dianto Bachriadi from ARC, three years ago, foreign investors asked the government to 
extend the standard HGU of 25 years to 95 years. However, after massive public protests led by social 
movements across the country, the Constitutional Court ruled that a 95 year lease was in conflict with the 
BAL 1960 (Bachriadi 2010). 
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agrofuels to the global arena. Collectively, they represent Indonesian peasants who 
struggle against neoliberal globalisation and rally for peasant autonomy and the right to 
land under the banner of food and land sovereignty.75 As such, this element of the 
peasant movement is not directly engaged in supporting peasants who are involved in the 
oil palm sector, though they do play a critical role in resisting the incursions of capitalism 
and the expansion of TNC agribusiness in the name of agrarian justice. A second 
segment of the Indonesian peasant movement is represented by KPA and its allied 187 
organisations in 16 provinces, and it endeavours to support smallholder peasant oil palm 
producers, as well as the rights of peasants to engage in mixed agro-forestry practices and 
retain or reclaim their autonomous control over land. The KPA strongly advocates for 
agrarian reform, is actively involved in supporting peasants who occupy land controlled 
by oil palm companies, as in the case of peasants in Jambi province who are presently 
occupying land held under a Sinar Mas concessions (Simonet, 2010), and is exploring 
ways in which community ownership of land dedicated to palm oil can be achieved 
(Arsyad 2010). The indigenous people movement, AMAN, also plays an important role 
in the rural resistance to the oil palm industry, and it collaborates with a number of local 
and international organisations in defence of customary land rights and the rights of oil 
palm farmers. Finally, another significant segment of the resistance linked to the oil palm 
sector is workers unions engaged in the struggles for labour reform and who seek to 
Borras and Franco (2009a, 28) define land sovereignty as "the right of people to have effective access to, 
control over and use of land and live on it as a resource and territory." 
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represent plantation workers in an effort to gain better wages, working conditions, and 
employee benefits. 
Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) stands out as a key organisation that has worked in 
collaboration with a multitude of other local, national, and transnational organisations and 
movements in promoting the rights of Indigenous Peoples and smallholders affected by 
or involved in the oil palm industry in Indonesia. FPP has drawn attention to how the 
Indonesian government resorts to repressive laws and regulations that legitimate the use 
of violence in acquiring uluyat land from adat people and local communities, and how 
big oil palm companies try to benefit from these circumstances by conducting the same 
forcible and manipulative acquisitions (Colchester et al. 2006, 174-5). The organisation 
also note the processes and policies that have allowed for the allocation of HGU licenses 
for oil palm plantation development covering some 18 million hectares of forest area, yet 
less than seven million hectares have been developed to date, thus pointing to HGU 
licenses being issued for the purposes of accessing lucrative timber resources (Ibid., 
29).76 As a result, upland forest communities surrendered uluyat land without receiving 
the potential benefits of oil palm development, nor did they reap the benefits of the 
timber extraction either. Of central importance is the fact that during the Suharto regime, 
indigenous peoples were coerced to surrender customary land and were deceived into 
believing that the use would be temporary in nature. FPP asserts that no land has been 
76 The World Bank estimated that 40 percent of Indonesia's 'legal' timber came from land clearance for 
conversion to plantations which can yield profits of US$ 2,100 per hectare (c.f. Colchester et al. 2006,29). 
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acquired by free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) as outlined in the RSPO principles, 
adding that communities today are more aware of their rights and are prepared to 
confront those who abuse them which is increasing the popular resistance to palm oil 
(Ibid., 182,185). 
Working in close proximity to FPP, the Indonesian-based Sawit Watch has played a 
central role in supporting indigenous people and peasant farmers engaged in the oil palm 
industry, and the organisation has worked actively in identifying areas of conflicts related 
to oil palm and how best to support communities affected by the expanding agricultural 
sector. Sawit Watch, first established in June 1998 to counter the adverse social and 
environmental effects of oil palm development, is currently monitoring 513 active 
conflicts occurring in over 1000 communities across the archipelago and which involve 
135 companies from 23 groups of private and state-owned plantations (Marti 2008, 39).77 
Sawit Watch and other organisations have observed a sharp increase in the frequency and 
intensity of agrarian conflicts as a result of the current oil palm expansion.78 Horizontal 
conflicts may arise within a community involving locals amongst themselves, locals and 
transmigrants, and locals with respect to their leadership (Colchester and Jiwan 2006, 6). 
In many instances, village and adat leaders act on behalf of oil palm companies and 
government agencies for personal or political gain where village consent for plantation 
See Appendix D Figures 6 and 7. 
78 The KPA reported that in the first four months of 2007, 13 conflicts, of which five were oil palm related, 
resulted in community members being arrested, shot, and in one case killed (Marti 2008, 39-40). 
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development is not given and where plasma plots are misallocated, unfairly distributed, 
or not given at all (Sirait 2009, 69). In addition, even though villagers may claim land 
based on their investment in labour (e.g. cleared forest land for future use or existing tree 
crops), the village heads retain significant scope to recognize or deny the community 
rights of villagers who can be dispossessed of their land if the former want to access the 
land for themselves, or to favour a party, or to sell it to a third party (Li 2007, 99). In 
addition, these conflicts meld in with points of tension between local communities on the 
one side, and industry representatives, government officials, and village leaders on the 
other, giving rise to vertical conflicts that include a horizontal dimension. The district 
level task forces (TP3K), which are funded by the oil palm companies and are setup to 
support the land acquisition process and to resolve conflicts related to land disputes and 
over-lapping claims, also remain a critical focus of conflict within a community (Sirait 
2009, 28-29). That local government leaders (kepala desa), sub-leaders (kepala dusuri), 
and adat leaders are included in the TP3K and are thus receiving financial compensation 
directly from the companies, is widely perceived as a blatant conflict of interest where 
village and adat institutions are co-opted by the industry. Moreover, the TP3K 
membership also includes the police, the military, company representatives, and high 
level officials such as the district governor (bupati) and the sub-district head (camat) 
which adds another element to the long-standing vertical conflict that exists between a 
community and the oil palm companies. 
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In the context where various government institutions operate primarily in support of oil 
palm plantation development with seemingly- little regard for the interests and claims of 
local communities, there are significant vertical conflicts that arise that oftentimes can 
lead to acts of violence. First, the land allocated for oil palm plantations was done 
without proper consultation, no compensation was paid to locals for land, and the initial 
PIR-TRANS scheme was imposed on communities that had little opportunity to reject the 
initiative (Colchester 2005). Second, local communities were misled into believing the 
land transfer was temporary (i.e. - once the 25 year HGU expired, the land would revert 
back to the community, when in fact it returned to the State),79 many smallholder plots 
were not allocated or properly developed, and for those who did receive plasma parcels, 
they were encumbered with unjustifiable debts through a development scheme with the 
state-run or private company that lacked transparency and accountability (Colchester et 
al. 2006, 15). Third, the companies operating the processing mills established the price 
of the FFBs under a monopsonistic system that favoured the company over the producers 
who were obligated to sell their fruit to the mill and who were subjected to a protracted 
list of costs deducted by the company through the farmer cooperative, the KUD. Fourth, 
the subsequent KKPA scheme was also plagued with issues of transparency and 
accountability whereby villagers had only limited control over the institutions and 
processes associated with the state-sanctioned cooperative that operated in a classic 
'patron-client' fashion (McCarthy 2010, 838). The more recent kemitraan 'partnership' 
79 Government agencies duped community leaders by refering to a 'temporary' transfer of use rights which 
essentially resulted in the extinguishment of their rights in land (Colchester et al. 2006, 16). 
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schemes are also being promoted and developed against a background of existing land 
conflicts, and are fuelling new sites of social tension, disputes, and conflicts. The 
majority of the conflicts that stem from these and other issues related to oil palm 
development tend to follow a similar pattern. Villagers first complain to company and 
local government officials who fail to respond adequately to the villagers, which in turn 
leads to direct action such as the destroying or confiscating of company equipment, the 
occupying of base camps, and the blockading of roads to prevent access to the company 
mill. On many occasions, the conflict escalates into violence and human rights violations 
as the police and military, on hire by the company, intervene with the use of force (Marti 
2008, 38). As noted by Tania Li, the "main change post-Suharto was not in the level of 
violence but in the openness, determination, and scope of land-reclaiming movements, 
and their relatively sympathetic coverage by the press" (2007, 265). 
Despite the threat of intimidation, violence, and confrontations with the police, the Oil 
Palm Smallholders Union (SPKS - Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawitf0 was founded in 2006 
as the first independent smallholder association in Indonesia representing the interests of 
indigenous peoples, local communities, and other stakeholders in Jambi, Riau, East 
Kalimantan, and West Kalimantan (Colchester and Jiwan 2006, 14). The SPKS 
advocates smallholder rights and seeks to pressure the government into resolving 
The SPKS website identifies the union as a mass-based people's organisation representing oil palm 
farmers' struggle for independence in order that the industry be developed for the welfare and benefit of the 
people (SPKS, n.d.). See Sirait (2009) for detailed accounts of violence involving SPKS members. 
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outstanding land conflicts and improving transparency in the industry. Specifically, the 
organisation is asking important questions related to transparency and land in plasma-inti 
and KKPA schemes such as: what is the value of credits to date?; when will land be 
distributed to beneficiaries?; and which lands were taken without consent from original 
landowners? (Sirait 2009, 78). The biggest outstanding issue with the SPKS centers on 
the rights of a community to give or withhold consent to develop oil palm on uluyat land 
in the framework of FPIC in the RSPO criteria and standards. Though potential members 
receive threats to prevent them from joining RSPO, and existing members are intimidated 
and issued death threats for taking part in RSPO initiatives, the SPKS strives to establish 
the normative rights of oil palm smallholders, and it receives ongoing support from such 
organisations as Sawit Watch, FPP, AMAN, and WALHI among others. Another major 
issue of concern for SPKS is to have smallholders regain control over the company 
cooperatives, the KUD and the KKPA, in order to increase transparency in operations, to 
negotiate fair pricing for FFBs, and to improve the overall bargaining position of 
smallholders with respect to oil palm companies (Ibid, 79). At present, most oil palm 
farmer cooperatives are established and controlled by the companies that use the names 
of members to gain access to credit from national banks, while providing little, if any, 
documentation regarding the smallholders' terms of credit, their outstanding debt, and the 
various fees deducted from their harvest earnings. This lack of accountability and 
transparency leaves smallholders vulnerable to exploitation by the company, which 
oftentimes can lead to a permanent debt cycle that is difficult to exit (Colchester and 
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Jiwan 2006, 8). hi addition, there are also distinct vulnerabilities that are characteristic of 
the oil palm industry in Indonesia which involve a specific segment of the worker 
population involved in this agricultural sector, and that is with respect to women which is 
the subject of the next section. 
3.42 Gender Issues and the Oil Palm Sector in Indonesia 
It is widely recognised that women play a central role in subsistence and cash crop 
agricultural production in developing countries, and in the case of oil palm plantations in 
Indonesia, women are assigned a particular division of labour that brings with it distinct 
gender-differentiated risks and working conditions. On plantations, as well as on 
smallholder plots, women are predominantly responsible for the mixing, handling, and 
spraying of herbicides and pesticides, in addition to the application of fertilizers, all of 
which present significant reproductive hazards and long-term health risks for women 
(Wakker 2005, 24-25). The effects of these toxic products are further amplified by the 
lack of protective clothing or health and safety training that is generally called for with 
this type of hazardous work. Women tend to receive lower wages than their male 
counterparts because their work is considered to be 'easier', and also because their work 
generally does not involve bonus systems of payment, as is the case with men whose 
salary is based on the weight of oil palm fruit harvested with additional bonuses once a 
81 A common weed killer that is used in the oil palm industry is paraquat, which is considered to be highly 
toxic and is banned in a number of European countries (Wakker 2005,25). 
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minimum quota is reached (Marti 2008, 83). In addition, plantation foremen may prefer 
to hire women as casual labour, not only because of their lower wages (Rossi and 
Lambrau 2008, 14), but also in order to avoid the additional costs of menstrual leave time 
associated with full-time workers.82 It is common knowledge, as well, that many women 
(and children) enter the workforce on plantations as unpaid labour to help their husbands 
reach their harvest quotas without benefitting from tangible remuneration for their work 
(Wakker 2005, 11). In the context of corporate oil palm plantations and contract farming 
schemes, women in fact occupy a particular class of plantation labour, that also includes 
working on subsistence plots to sustain the family, which can be viewed as a form of 
'feminisation of agriculture' (Julia and White 2009, 15). 
Equally important to the position of women within this particular division of labour, is 
the impact of the plantation economy on the traditional gender gaps in land ownership in 
terms of their position in society, their livelihoods approaches, and their rights within a 
rural community. When considering land acquisition processes involved to establish a 
plantation on land that is typically held and accessed under customary tenure, it becomes 
readily apparent that the development of oil palm plantations largely serve to extend the 
patriarchal system of the state (Ibid.). The plantation company engages exclusively with 
the male leaders to negotiate the terms of development and of participation and 
smallholder parcels are registered only under the head of the household resulting in a 
82 This may be less of determining factor given that in March 2003, the law allowing women a menstrual 
leave of two days per month was abolished in Indonesia (Wakker 2005, 51). 
169 
The Biofiiel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
gender-biased narrowing of land tenure access. In the case of a Hibun Dayak community 
in West Kalimantan, Julia and White (2009, 9) note how the change of ownership form 
collective to state-codified individual forms reflects a gender blindness and a loss of 
women's rights in villages where women traditionally had rights of access to land even 
though they lacked access to communal formal politics. As a result of the formalisation 
of land ownership inherent in large-scale oil palm production that favours men over 
women, the livelihoods of the latter are undermined and rendered more precarious in the 
short and long term. Moreover, the process of land concentration and the expansion of a 
plantation monoculture onto 'marginal lands' further erodes the livelihoods of women 
who no longer have access to traditional a traditional sources of food, fodder, and fuel 
wood typically collected from these lands (Eide 2009, 18). As the expansion of oil palm 
progresses, women are thus required to increasingly seek out work as casual plantation 
labour and to find alternatives means to secure a livelihood under conditions of greatly 
reduced access to resources. When examining the details of the case study that follows, it 
will be important to keep in mind how the women in Kuala Buayan district are being 
impacted by the growing oil palm industry and what are the implications for their 
livelihoods in the future as the monoculture cash crop irreversibly transforms traditional 
agricultural practices and the social relations to land. 
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Chapter 4: Oil Palm in Sanggau District, West Kalimantan - Case Study 
As the westernmost province of the Indonesian Borneo, West Kalimantan covers an area 
of 14 million hectares of which nine million hectares (64 percent) are classified as 
National Forest (Sirait 2009, 10). Its involvement in large-scale oil palm production 
dates back to the early 1980s, and according to the current executive director of Sawit 
Watch, Abetnego Tarigan (2010), West Kalimantan has the second highest level of oil 
palm related conflicts in the country after South Sumatra (see Figure 6). To date, the 
province has issued temporary oil palm location permits (Ijin Lokasi) covering an area of 
4.2 million hectares83, and though only some 400,000 hectares have been cleared and are 
planted with oil palm, the province is expecting to expand its current plantation area by 
more than 5 million hectares over the next decade (White and Julie 2009, 2). This 
projected expansion is the largest than any other province in Indonesia, followed by the 
provinces of Riau and Papua with an anticipated expansion of three million hectares 
respectively over the same period (see Table 6). The provincial government has thus 
targeted so-called 'non-productive' or 'bare' lands for its oil palm plantation expansion 
which typically includes designated forest areas, as well as smallholder agricultural lands 
that lack official title. 
As noted earlier, many companies obtained land use permits solely for the purpose of extracting lucrative 
timber resources and had no intention of ever developing an oil palm plantation (Marti 2008, 36). 
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Figure 6: Oil Palm Conflicts across Indonesia, 2006-2011. 
Note. Reproduced with permission from Abetnego Tarigan, Director General of Sawit Watch , Indonesia. 
More than half of West Kalimantan's population of 4 million lives in rural areas, and 
with a majority engaged in small-scale agricultural production, its economy is based on a 
variety of agricultural food crops, with oil palm playing an important role in its regional 
development plans. Presently, the expansion of oil palm plantations is occurring across a 
diverse socio-economic and politico-cultural landscape that has historically involved 
competing and conflicting claims over land and productive resources. 
Prior to the arrival of oil palm in the 1980s, all upland groups farmed rice on a swidden 
basis and smallholding rubber gardens were the main source of cash, with the rubber 
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system being prone to accumulation and monopoly by rubber traders {tokay) who were 
mostly Chinese in the past, but today include growing numbers of Dayak (Li 2010b). 
Thus, earlier village economies based on the rubber trade witnessed tokays playing a 
critical role as sources of credit and goods, but also as a potential source of conflict given 
84 As of January 2011, the existing oil palm as was noted as being 9,522,926 hectares with a projected 
expansion area of 28,994,400 by 2020 (Tarigan 2010). 
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the monopoly exerted by the tokays. As rubber prices declined in the 1960s and '70s, 
various oil palm schemes were implemented that give rise to conflicts, not only between 
transmigrants and local residents, but also within local communities, as well as between 
the latter and representatives of the government and the oil palm companies who were 
driving the development projects. The major ethnic groups, comprised of Dayak (33.8 
percent), Melayu (33.8 percent), Chinese (10 percent), Madurese (3.5 percent), Bugis (3.3 
percent), and a mix of others (15.7 percent) (Sirait 2009, 13) which included 
transmigrants primarily from Java, Bali, Nusa Tengarra Timur (NTT), and Sumatra, have 
thus experienced conflict in various forms, related either to oil palm development or to 
other outstanding sources of tension. Historically, the western districts of West 
Kalimantan have witnessed acute racialised social tension and violence, be it the more 
recent communal violence between Dayaks and Madurese in 1996-97, or the state-
sponsored violence against the Chinese by Dayaks, Madurese, and Melayu in 1967-8 that 
left tens of thousands of Chinese permanently evicted from their homes (Peluso 2008, 
48).85 Though somewhat muted today, the undercurrents of these earlier conflicts 
resonate to this day and meld with the present-day tensions and conflicts linked to the 
expanding oil palm sector in Sanggau District, West Kalimantan. 
In the 1996-97 conflict between Dayaks and Madurese, many Dayaks lost their lives and property, 
though most of the victims were Madurese. Human Rights Watch (1997) reported that some 25,000 
Madurese were displaced, and further violence and evictions two years later prevented most of them from 
returning to live in the West Kalimantan's rural areas. See Peluso (2008) for a political ecology analysis 
that examines the processes by which ethnic categories are constructed through violence. 
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Sanggau District, as one of eight districts in the province, is set to become the centre of 
agribusiness and agro-industry given its strategic location of having direct access to 
transportation networks linking it by road to Malaysia and wider international markets, or 
by water through the port capital city of Pontianak (Colchester et al, 2006: 93-94). The 
district has the largest extent of oil palm plantations in West Kalimantan, and since 2002, 
it has granted 12 new concessions of up to 20,000 hectares each under various kemitraan 
schemes (Zen et al. 2008, 2). Through the decentralisation process initiated in 2000, 
Sanggau District retains authority over extensive land banks and now controls the process 
of land acquisition for oil palm plantation, which it aims to make 'faster, cheaper, and 
easier' in order to attract local, national, and international investors. As a result, local 
government officials, party elites, and entrepreneurial allies are able to take advantage of 
easily accessible plantation permits, can accrue large profits from selling the timber 
obtained through forest conversion, and finally sell the plantation permits to national or 
foreign oil palm conglomerates (Sirait 2009, 6-7). The district's overall development 
strategy is, therefore, to expand and diversify oil palm plantations and other commodities 
such as cocoa, pepper, and coconuts (see Table 7), as well as withdrawing inactive 
location permits, and converting forest areas into agricultural land for plantation 
development (Colchester et al. 2006, 95). The district government deemed plantations, 
not only a crucial means of improving the welfare of its constituents, of which over 80 
percent are involved in agriculture (BPS 2008, 58), but also as a key to generating district 
revenue. As of 2010, Sanggau District has 41,688 hectares of oil palm plantation under 
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foreign private control (PMA), 38,112 hectares under domestic private control (PBSN), 
and 32,622 hectares classified as state-owned (PTP) for a total of 122,422 hectares of 
which 50,506 hectares (41 percent) are under plasma smallholdings (BPS 2010) (see 
Table 8). And of the 15 sub-districts {kecamatan) within the Sanggau regency, Meliau 
has the most area dedicated to oil palm plantations (41,862 hectares) (BPS 2009a) and it 
is the site for the field research that was undertaken by our team in June 2010. 
Table 7: Agricultural Crops, Land Use, Households, and Output in Sanggau (2009) 
Crop Hectares Farmer Households Output (tonnes) 
Palm Oil 1MMM) 
R U M K I KM (( 
"™™13cao 41^4 
Pep pi i 4 I 4 
Coffee 260 
Coconut 779 
Note. Adapted from Statistik Perkebunana Kapubaten Sanggau Menurut Kecamatan Tahun 2006-2009, 
Biro Pusat Statistik, Sanggau 78512,2010. 
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4.1 Field Research Site in the Subdistrict of Meliau 
The sub-district of Meliau covers an area of 149,574 hectares, has a total population of 
41,793 inhabitants that make up its 11,384 families dispersed throughout the 18 villages 
(desas) located on either side of the Kapuas River and which fall under its jurisdiction 
(BPS 2009b). Each desa is divided into varying numbers of residential areas, Rukun 
Warga (RW), which are further sub'-divided into neigbourhoods, Rukun Tetangga (RT), 
comprised of locally residing families, Kepala Keluarga (KK). This system of 
governance was introduced during the New Order regime under the 1979 Village Act 
which imposed a Javanese model of governance that overrode existing customary 
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systems of organisation as a means of asserting centralised control over the area and to 
undermine adat claims over land and resources. Each respective level of governance had 
a corresponding head that reported back along a distinct chain of authority leading up to 
the sub-district head (Camat) located in the capital of Meliau, who in turn reported to the 
regent/governor (Bupati) in the city of Sanggau. Local governance laws have since been 
introduced during the Reformasi period that have made some allowances for village 
indigenous institutions to be re-instated (Sirait 2009, 39), though in practical terms, the 
existing Javanese model remains the seat of administrative and executive authority. The 
town of Meliau and its surrounding area has a total population of over 10,000 people, and 
the main oil palm processing plant for the state-owned plantation is located on the 
outskirts of town in Meliau Hulu. 
As noted in the first chapter, our field research was undertaken in twenty sites in the sub-
district of Meliau across five villages (desas) located on either side of the Kapuas River. 
It involved gathering information through participatory observation and through formal 
and informal interviews while living with local families for a duration of one month. 
Local livelihoods within the research site ranged from complete dependence on oil palm, 
to mixed economies of oil palm and rubber, and in the more remote upriver areas, mixed 
economies based on rubber and rice only with no income being generated from oil palm. 
As of 2009, Meliau had 41,862 hectares dedicated to oil palm concessions (BPS 2010). 
The desas in question are Melobok, Kuala Buayan, Bakhti Jaya, Sei Kembayau, and 
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Pampang Dua which are located in enclaves within large state- or private-owned oil palm 
concessions (see Figure 7). Desa Melobok was situated north of the Kapuas River where 
the large state-owned plantation PTPN XIII {Perusahan Terbatas Perkebunan Nusantara 
XIII) has been in operation since 1979. The four other desas were located south of the 
Kapuas River in an oil palm concession area that was awarded to a domestic private 
plantation company, BHD (Bintang Harapan Desa), in 1990. I stayed with a family of 
oil palm smallholders living in Cempaka, RT 5, in desa Kuala Buayan on the south side 
of the Kapuas River. Each research site had unique and parallel issues linked to land 
involving, for example, dispossession, alienation, allocation, and accumulation, as well as 
issues associated with labour, as in the case of the distribution of oil palm profits, distinct 
labour regimes, and adverse incorporation into the oil palm sector. In the section below, 
an overview of these and other issues will be reviewed across the research site as revealed 
by the field data, which will then be followed by an analysis of the this data in relation to 
the analytical framework outlined in the second chapter. 
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Figure 7: Oil Palm Concessions in Subdistrict Meliau, district of Sanggau. Courtesy of Pak Kacuk 
Fitrianto from the Dinas Kehutanan Dan Perkebunan Kabupaten Office in Sanggau, 14 July, 2010. Note: 
the Melaboh area is under the control of the state-owned PTPN XIII. 
4.2 The State-owned Plantation PTPN XITI in Melobok north of the Kapuas Paver 
Since the 1920s, the Dutch company Agris controlled and operated approximately 500 
hectares of rubber plantations on each side of the Kapuas Paver, and it imported primarily 
Javanese workers to supply the labour force on its estates. Much of its rubber concession 
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area was not planted, however, and local forest dwellers continued to use the land for 
various mixed agroforestry that also included local rubber gardens. In 1959, the 
plantation was nationalised and managed under private Indonesian ownership until 1979, 
at which time rubber prices had sharply declined and oil palm was being developed as an 
alternative plantation crop. The Sei Dekan site in Melobok was incorporated into the 
national plantation system as PTPN VII and was later expanded to 5,626 hectares and 
renamed PTPN XIII which currently has a total concession area of 32,380 hectares in 
Sanggau district alone (BPS 2010).86 PTPN XIII is one of the oldest plantations in the 
district and was one of the country's first Nucleus-Estate Smallholder (NES) schemes 
that adopted a PIR-TRANS model which involved a redesigning of the physical 
landscape and a social transformation through the introduction of large numbers of 
transmigrant labour. Presently, the state plantation has entered a replanting cycle now 
that the original palm trees have reached their peak after more than 25 years of producing 
fresh fruit bunches (FFBs). This process requires injecting the palm trees with a poison 
that will slowly kill them, while new seedlings, which are imported from the state 
plantation system in Sumatra, are planted alongside the dying ones. 
When the PIR-TRANS plantation project was first introduced in the area in the late 
1970s, government officials, parastatal companies, and the military relied on intimidation 
86 PTPN XIII is a merged company that has consolidated and re-structured previously separate para-statal 
plantation companies into a single state-owned company. In 1999, it controlled an area of 149,429 hectares 
in Kalimantan with an estimated value of DDR 100 billion (approx. US $ 11 million) (Colchester et al. 
2006,161). 
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tactics, coercion, and force in order to accelerate the appropriation of adat land from 
existing indigenous communities. The 'socialisation' process generally involved 
members of the military threatening to accuse community members of being affiliated 
with the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) should they consider resisting the 
development project. In addition, village leaders who were coerced into signing 
'agreements' were illiterate, didn't understand the terms of the scheme, and were led to 
believe that the land transfer was temporary when in fact it was permanent. Pak Donatus 
Djaman, who was Camat of Meliau in 1978, admitted that it was difficult, and even 
dangerous, to resist transmigration initiatives related to oil palm development because 
false accusations could readily made with the most serious of consequences.87 He noted 
that before oil palm, hak uluyat was recognised, and government officials would meet 
with local people to get permission to build roads, as was the case, for example, with the 
road from Bodok to Meliau that did not involve any compensation and was undertaken by 
mutual agreement. Once oil palm came to the district, he added, the land now became 
'State' land, and the local people started thinking more about compensation and about 
private land claims. In the case of the PTPN XIII PIR-TRANS scheme, the local 
population did receive compensation for rubber gardens and fruit tress, though not for the 
land itself. Pak Willem Amat, a customary chief of the Pompang Dayak, stated that when 
the company finally did put forward a settlement for land, the money did not end up with 
See 'Dayak Leaders' Memories and Dreams' by Colchester (2005) on oil palm development in West 
Kalimantan. 
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the local people but went instead to outsiders.88 Having realised that the Dayak were 
being treated as a labour force and not as landowners, and he tried to reject the scheme, 
which resulted in accusations and formal charges of being a subversive working for the 
PKI and fighting for Dayak independence. Though Pak Willem and his co-accused were 
eventually acquitted, initial promises of employment, training, and plasma holdings have 
yet to be fulfilled in a large number of cases where adat land was surrendered to 
plantation development schemes. 
The PTPN XIII plantation in Sei Dekan, Melobok has been in a long-standing conflict 
with the local population for land acquisition and compensation that dates back to the 
initial PIR-TRANS scheme of 1979, and also includes the more recent KKPA schemes 
that were introduced following intense protests in the late 1990s. The villagers, who had 
witnessed their rubber trees and fields bulldozed by the state-owned company while the 
army stifled any attempts at resistance, and who had ultimately been forced to move off 
their land to make way for transmigrants engaged in inti-plasma oil palm projects, 
reached a critical stage and culminated in the November 3rd Declaration of 1999.89 The 
local population tended to view the transmigrants (mostly Javanese) as colonisers who 
were prospering from the land that was taken from them; therefore, in early 1999, more 
than 1,000 protesters blockaded the main Afdeling road, as well as the road to the factory, 
and issued a list of demands under threat of violence. The conflict between the Dayak 
88 See footnote 81. 
89 This section is based on an interview with researcher Ali from UGM who was based in Dekan Putih. 
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and the Madurese referred to earlier, and which had taken place primarily in Bodok and 
Ensunak in 1997, remained vivid in the minds of the Dayak in Dekan Putih, and the 
plantation managers (mostly Muslims and migrants) were intimidated into making 
concessions. The demands centered on granting plasma land for locals, obtaining 
employment on inti lands, and receiving compensation of money and rice to account for 
plantation earnings over the past 19 years on adat land. The company responded by 
offering a short-term compensation for families (DDR 250,00090 for 3 months, though an 
entire year had been expected), by allocating employment opportunities on the state for 
designated individuals, and devising a new plasma scheme, KKPA, as a company-
controlled credit cooperative that would enable smallholders to take part in oil palm 
production. The scheme required that each household release an additional 2 hectares of 
land to the company that would in turn act a credit broker for the smallholder and provide 
the inputs and expertise needed to covert the plot into a productive parcel of land. 
Plasma holders would be responsible for all the expenses associated with the plot, in 
addition to a share of infrastructure and transportation costs and the like, and repayment 
would start in the fifth year once the trees had started to bear fruit. The KKPA scheme 
and the larger November Declaration, however, was fraught with irregularities from the 
beginning, and have further compounded outstanding points of conflict and tension that 
stand between the local community of Dekan Putih and PTPN XIII. 
In 2010 exchange rates, US$1 is equivalent to 8,930.00 Indonesian Rupiahs (TDR) according to the 
Universal Currency Converter at www.xe.com. 
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Discord originated on a number of fronts in relation to the KKPA scheme and in 
reference to the promises of employment initially made by PTPN managers. To begin 
with, there were extensive delays in the development of plasma plots that eventually led 
some KKPA participants to sell their plot to third parties, who came to accumulate 
considerable holdings only to have these sales rendered invalid by the desa authorities 
and the PTPN once the plots came into production (Li 2010b). Moreover, there was 
some manipulation of the list of names of entitled participants, whereby some who 
genuinely were entitled to plasma did not receive them, while others who were not 
entitled, including some government officials, received KKPA plots. In some cases, 
families in positions of authority, such as the adat village leader, received three or even 
four plasma plots of two hectares each {kaplings)?1 The influence of social class and 
power also came into play when employment opportunities were granted along lines that 
left some 'connected' families having two or more sons employed on the estate, while 
others had none. In addition, the KKPA repayment scheme lacked transparency from 
the beginning, and smallholder farmers have seen the percentage of their harvest 
allocated to debt repayment go from 10 percent in 2005, to 30 percent in 2009 without 
any documentation from the company-run cooperative that outlines credits, deductions, 
and balances. This has incited some smallholders to band together and deliver an 
ultimatum to the company that if no documentation is forthcoming by the summer, a 
91 A kapling is used to designate a two hectare parcel that has been planted with oil palm. Each kapling is 
required to have a minimum of 240 trees in order to meet the fruit (FFBs) capacity of the plot. 
92 According to researcher Ali, there is much resentment in the village over the favoratism that was 
bestowed upon certain individuals. The resulting conflict is thus both horizontal and vertical in nature. 
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blockade will be put into effect. The monopsonitic trade agreement that forces producers 
to sell to PTPN XIII exclusively is also a source of conflict, and especially so when the 
company makes use of the mobile police brigade (BRIMOP) to prevent smallholders 
from to selling their fruit to a third party buyer. 
Now, more than ten years later, Sei Dekan households with KKPA claims have yet to be 
settled, and as these and other outstanding issues remain unresolved, tension amplifies as 
PTPN XTJI expands into new areas for oil palm development. The state-owned company 
is presently acquiring land in other villages to increase its KKPA area, not only to satisfy 
open plasma claims, but also in anticipation of greater demand from oil palm that is 
linked to its plans to double the processing capacity of its factory at PTPN Gunung Mas 
(Li 2010b). An outstanding critical point of contention between Sei Dekan and PTPN 
XIII centers on the issue of its HGU license that was granted in 1979 once the Agris 
rubber plantation was taken over. According to the villagers, 25 years have now passed, 
the license is over and the land should be returned to Sei Dekan. The PTPN counters that 
it only received its HGU in 1985 and that it was for a duration of 35 years. This leads to 
a reply by the villagers that the company then owes the village the oil palm earnings that 
were acquired between 1979 and 1985 because according to PTPN XIII, the land was not 
under company control during that time. That the oil palm company extends its holdings 
by cutting down trees all the way down to the river bank contrary to erosion policies set 
forth by the government, does not go unnoticed either and is criticised by locals on both 
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sides of the river who have traditionally used for swidden agriculture. And for the 
residents living in Kuala Buayan across the river from the large state-run plantation, 
outstanding land claims are also pending for the families that had agricultural fields 
{ladang) taken over by PTPN XIII over 20 years ago. According to the village head 
(kades) for Kuala Buayan, of the 91 families that have a KKPA land claim, only 15 have 
settled to date. To these claims, can be added the issues and claims that involve the 
private oil palm concession on the south side of the Kapuas River that is run by BHD and 
is at the center of conflict and disputes in the four other desas within our research site. 
4.3 The BHD Oil Palm Concession south of the Kapuas River 
When the formerly Dutch-owned Agris rubber plantation was nationalized in 1959, the 
locals of Kuala Buayan and other neigbouring desas repossessed the land, took control of 
the rubber gardens, and planted new trees to expand the smallholder rubber production in 
the area. In the late 1980s, a private national company by the name of Bintang Harapan 
Desa (BHD) was granted a 20,000 hectare oil palm plantation concession in the area, in 
addition to concessions awarded to its subsidiary companies, Duta Surya Pratama (DSP) 
and Sawit Desa Kapuas (SDK), which received 22,500 hectares and 20,000 hectares 
respectively (Fitnanto, 2010). As is the case with all oil palm concessions, certain areas 
are deemed enclave land that include private houses, government buildings and the land 
associated with these and other structures (i.e. vegetable gardens, school yards, etc.), in 
See Appendix B, Figure 4. 
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addition to the roads outside of and within plantation concessions, all of which are 
excluded from the effective area dedicated to oil palm production. As a result, according 
to BHD officials, the company retains approximately 2,000 hectares as inti and 8,000 
hectares as plasma that was developed according to a PIR-BUN-TRANS scheme along a 
7.5:2.5 ratio. Under this model, local landowners would surrender 7.5 hectares of land 
which would then be apportioned as follows: 2.5 hectares would be allocated to inti, 
roads, public facilities, and the company office and mill; 2.5 hectares would be given to 
transmigrants from Java, NTT, and NTB {Nusa Tengarra Baraff4 that comprised a two-
hectare kapling and a half-hectare house lot (pekarangan); and a 2.5 hectare parcel 
returned to the original owner on the same basis as with the transmigrants (Li 2010b). 
This oil palm development scheme thus involved a complete redesign of the physical 
landscape, and it aimed to transform existing social, economic, and political systems by 
importing new people who were to show the locals better ways of farming and living. 
The PIR-BUN-TRANS development scheme, however, was riddled with problems and 
irregularities from the outset which have led to uneven outcomes and continue to be a 
source of conflict to this day. 
To begin with, the processes by which many local villagers were alienated from their land 
remains a divisive issue that has yet to be fully resolved. Though in theory locals could 
accept or reject the oil palm scheme, in practice, many faced intimidation by BHD 
NTT and NTB refer to the East and West sections of the island of Nusa Tengarra, respectively. 
188 
The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
representatives, and government and local officials, and they confronted mechanisms of 
the state that were difficult to oppose. According to the company, much of the land it 
acquired was in fact state land {tanah Negara), therefore the HGU is received from 
Jakarta provided it with effective control over the land and the rights to develop it. The 
locals who rejected the scheme, in contrast, claimed that much of the land was already 
planted with rubber and was managed by smallholders who did not consent to the oil 
palm plantation scheme as required by the 'socialisation' process outlined by the 
government, and also did not receive proper compensation for their trees (Pak Bimo* 
2010).95 Moreover, a method of deception was also used when participants signed an 
attendance form at an information meeting that was held in the early 1990s, only to have 
their signatures attached to a document that attested to their having consented to 
surrendering their land to BHD. The locals who refused to have their rubber gardens 
destroyed and who attempted to resist the oil palm expansion, also received no support 
from the governing head of the desa {kepala desa) at the time. It was commonly known 
that the kepala desa was receiving IDR 500,000 per month from BHD, and witnesses had 
reported seeing him riding at night on the company bulldozer to mark out which land was 
to be cleared (Ibid.). Also, a suspicious fire that burned down much of the rubber trees in 
1990 added further doubts as to the legitimacy and fairness of the development project, 
and by 1993, the company had essentially cut down all the remaining rubber trees on the 
Informants with an '*' refer to a pseudonym that is used to keep their identity confidential. In this 
instance, Pak Bimo* estimated that only about ten percent of the villagers were compensated for their 
rubber trees. 
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disputed land. After years of protests, BHD eventually paid off a number of claimants in 
2006 through a settlement of IDR 1.5 million (approximately US$ 168) for each of the 77 
households which had outstanding claims (Li 2010c). The households had asked for 
compensation in the form of kaplings, and though some did receive a two-hectare plot, 
the company did not have enough to redistribute and negotiated for a cash pay out with 
the remaining 77 families. BHD is also currently in negotiations with the present local 
government office for state land that had been illegitimately awarded to its company by 
the former hepala desa, in addition to the major outstanding claims associated with the 
allocation of land under the designated oil palm scheme. 
The PIR-BUN-TRANS process of land reallocation that involved removing land from a 
customary system of ownership and transferring it to transmigrants and others under an 
inti-plasma plantation corporation model was inherently prone to misallocation through 
several mechanisms. To begin with, BHD resorted to a "global system" of redistribution 
through the dusun, who was then responsible to allocate house lots and kaplings to 
respective households in accordance with the amount of land they had surrendered to the 
scheme. A major problem, however, was that some households gave up less than 7.5 
hectares, while others gave up more, and as the sole keeper of records,96 the dusun is 
thought of having either allocated land to family members who had not contributed to the 
According to the current kepala desa (hades) in Kuala Buayan, these records have been destroyed from 
the archives by the kades. He estimates that about 20 percent did not receive their kaplings and that 50 
percent of the familes are landless (Li 2010c). 
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scheme, and/or sold land to outsiders which has left legitimate contributors without their 
entitlement (Li 2010b). For BHD, the allocation period is officially over, though many 
villagers are still reclaiming their owed kaplings. A second problem is related to the 
uneven quality, location, and stage of development of the kaplings themselves. Prime 
plasma plots are fully planted, have been properly fertilized, and are close to the main 
roads, while sub-standard ones have been poorly maintained, are far removed from the 
main transportation networks, and have less than the required 240 to 260 palm trees 
(many have only 100 trees) to be fully productive (Li 2010c). Under the skewed system 
of land allocation, the prime plots are already accounted for, while only substandard ones 
remain; BHD acknowledges that it currently has 700 kaplings to hand over, yet local 
villagers refuse to accept them given that they will be expected to assume the full debt 
associated with the parcel. And finally, the confusion created by the transmigration 
program itself gave rise to opportunities for land accumulation and misallocations of 
land. As transmigrants moved in and out of the area during the PIR-BUN-TRANS 
period, plasma plots were bought and sold contrary to the development scheme 
regulations that stipulated that name changes on land certificates could not occur in the 
first 15 years. In some cases, locals simply resumed control over parcels that had been 
allocated to transmigrants who left the area (or never arrived), while in other cases, the 
transmigrants who stayed on bought or occupied 'vacant' parcels which played into the 
Quality oil palm seedlings are worth between IDR 25,000 to 30,000, and a large number have been stolen 
from kaplings in the early stages of inti-plasma development which has resulted in many substandard plots 
with only marginal production of oil palm. 
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uneven accumulation of land that was associated with the scheme. As will be outlined 
below, the transmigration scheme in this area failed on number of fronts, was rejected 
outright by many local communities, and became a source of much confusion regarding 
existing landholdings as noted in the candidate registries {capes - colon peserta). 
As originally conceived, the PIR-BUN-TRANS model was intended to replace existing 
systems with new ones along the lines of new desas with mixed populations that were to 
be led by more professional leadership, though it fell short of achieving its goals as a 
major social transformation project for a host of reasons. Under the development 
scheme, existing farms, settlements, and road networks were to be replaced by new ones 
laid out on a grid, and local economic systems based on labour exchange (royong) and 
the tokay system of trade and credit, were to be replaced by an inti-plasma production 
model that was regulated by the KUD. The scheme called for the formation of nine 
newly constructed residential units (SP- satuan pemukimari) made up of 250 transmigrant 
households and 250 local participants (APTD), all engaged in smallholder oil palm 
production destined for the BHD mill in Kuala Buayan. Of the nine SPs, however, three 
rejected the transmigrant scheme altogether (SP VII, VIII, and DC), and of the remaining 
residential units, only a fraction of the transmigrants stayed on, while the majority of the 
local APDT never took up residence in the new site or remained for a short stay before 
returning to their original hamlets (Li 2010b). One important reason that led to the out-
migration of the transmigrants was that the kaplings had not yet been planted as 
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promised, and they lacked the resources needed to wait out five years for the plots to 
come into production. There were some transmigrants that also had no intention of 
staying, had already sold the equipment and goods provided by the program before 
leaving Java, and had only registered in the program to realize a profit. It is also possible, 
that upon returning to Java, these 'candidates' simply reregistered for transmigration to 
repeat the cycle elsewhere (Ibid.). Certainly, an important factor that may have also led 
many transmigrants to abandon the PIR-BUN-TRANS scheme was the hostility directed 
to them from the local villagers who largely resented having their land allocated to 
outsiders, and also for only being allocated an equal parcel of land, despite having 
originally contributed their own land to the inti-plasma scheme. When transmigrants 
made the decision to leave the area, they were oftentimes prevented from selling their 
kaplings to other transmigrants, and sold them instead to locals. SP II, which became the 
desa of Bhakti Jaya, stands out as an exception to the transmigration program having 
retained 258 transmigrant households from the original 500, whereby some households 
have up to ten oil palm kaplings accumulated since their arrival in the early 1990s. The 
PIR-BUN-TRANS model has thus made possible, for a variety of reasons, patterns of 
land accumulation that reflect more the dynamic nature of land relations, rather than the 
development assumption that the scheme will create stable smallholder oil palm 
producers who will have equal allocations of land (Li 2010b). 
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The accumulation of land throughout the PIR-BUN-TRANS oil palm scheme that took 
place amidst much confusion and complexity, nonetheless, continues to play a critical 
role in shaping current patterns of land accumulation, and also in determining patterns of 
conflict and resistance tied to land. During the period of high mobility among 
transmigrants, and in particular before 1997 when oil palm prices were low, defacto 
transfers of land occurred that allowed transmigrants, local villagers, government 
officials and plantation workers to purchase kaplings for between EDR 500,000 to IDR 
1.5 million, which at current market prices, sell for IDR 60 million in the case of prime 
plasma land. Though the defacto land owners lack official title to the parcel, the kapling 
remains a productive parcel of land that generates important revenue to accumulate 
additional parcels, to increase consumption, or to simply sell on the market. However, 
having access to official land titles does remain a valuable asset, because unless the name 
on the land certificate matches the 'owner's' name on the citizenship registration card 
(KTP), no credit is available through the bank. It is also important to note that in the case 
of smallholders who actually retain legitimate title of their kapling, a particular feature of 
the PIR-BUN-TRANS scheme poses an important hurdle that prevents or delays then-
access to credit. The model organises smallholders into groups of about 30 producers in 
a single block (amparan), and until every farmer has paid off the debt owing on his 
kapling, the entire group is denied access to credit, which, can prevent smallholders from 
expanding their holdings indefinitely. As the current blockades in Meliau Hulu (PTPN 
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XIII) and in Singuan Daok (BHD)98 attest, the pressures linked to plantation expansion 
and land accumulation are further enflaming tensions between villagers and oil palm 
companies over plasma allocations, and the concentration of land holdings in the area, in 
general, have occurred through a variety of means and mechanisms. 
Though it may be difficult to clearly determine the means by which land was 
accumulated in the past and how it continues to be accumulated in the present, there are a 
number of observations that can be made based on interviews with local villagers and 
desa officials. Pak Nurman*, a major landowner in the area, who also acts as the 
treasurer for the KUD associated with the PTPN XIII KKPA schemes and is quietly 
dubbed the new tokay in oil palm, inherited an undisclosed amount of land from his 
father and has in the past sold parcels of land to local villagers in the form of cleared or 
uncleared forest land, as well as rubber gardens (Pak Juni* 2010). Most of his available 
land today, however, is being sold as partially or fully developed kaplings or as 
productive rubber gardens that could eventually be converted to oil palm for smallholders 
interested in private oil palm production. It is interesting to note that though the BHD 
has approached Pak Nurman* (and other landowners) to purchase existing rubber gardens 
for plasma development, landowners are refusing to sell to the company opting instead to 
According to the kades of Kuala Buayan, the month-long blockade is currently at a standoff. The fifteen 
people who were taken to court and fined for the blockade have since refused to pay the fine, and when the 
police came to arrest them, the villagers prevented the arrest from taking place. 
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reap the benefits of rubber production" with the intention of engaging in private oil pahn 
production in the future that will avoid plasma credit schemes (Pak Bimo* 2010). 
Another major landowner from Meliau, Pak Surip*, who claims to have more than 200 
hectares of land, has also accumulated large tracts of land in the area, though there is 
considerable debate regarding the legitimacy of some of these acquisitions. In one 
instance, he is reported to have borrowed land from locals to pasture his cattle (a common 
practice in customary holdings), only to later claim official title to the land which resulted 
in a court decision to divide the land between him and the villagers to settle the dispute 
(Li 2010c). According to the hades of Kuala Buayan, Pak Surip* also acquired 39 KKPA 
entitlements {capes) through the former kades of the desa who had persuaded villagers to 
sell their parcels by saying they would not amount to much, and which today remain in 
dispute with PTPN XIII that does not recognize these transactions because they 
contravene the regulations that allocate plots only to the original registrants. With respect 
to the BHD, Pak Surip* is also claiming the land where the factory is located, and his 
name is added to the list of outstanding land conflicts south of the Kapuas River. For 
local famers like Pak Yudi* who claims to have had 32 hectares of land taken by BHD, 
but has yet to receive any kaplings in return, the dispute with the company has been long 
and tiresome, and though he chooses to mostly 'protest in his heart,' he vows to get his 
due one day (Pak Bimo* 2010). Conflicts with the company, however, do not 
99 Beginning in 2000, and especially since 2005, rubber prices have climbed considerably which has 
resulted in formerly untapped rubber gardens being brought back into production to a point where many 
people stopped swidden agriculture. The recent global food crisis has since caused farmers to maintain 
swidden production alongside their rubber tapping (Li 2010b). 
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exclusively involve issues related to land, and smallholders find common ground with 
local officials regarding the upkeep of infrastructure and the sharing of benefits derived 
from oil palm. 
There are two additional major points of contestation between oil palm companies and 
local communities: the first involves the maintenance of roads in plasma areas, and the 
second is related to the mandatory allocation of oil palm revenue to the desas. Within 
regular harvest cycles of one to two times per month, smallholders are required to have 
their FFBs reach the processing mill within 48 hours, otherwise the fruit begins to rapidly 
decay and loses its potential to produce quality CPO. The livelihoods of smallholder 
producers, therefore, remain highly dependent on properly maintained roadways and 
reliable transport systems to ensure a timely delivery of their crops that will yield proper 
earnings in return. Most of the plasma roads, however, are in extremely poor condition, 
and in particular during the rainy season (October to March), they lead to protracted 
delays in the transport of the fruit to the processing mill where as much as 50 percent or 
more of a harvest can be rejected by the company due to spoiling (Pak Artin* 2010). 
Though smallholders make a per kg contribution to the plasma road maintenance budget 
under the control of the KUD, and they engage in monthly royong projects to work on 
areas badly in need of repair, more capital is required to ensure properly functioning 
roadways. Smallholders and the local government offices in Kuala Buayan say that the 
responsibility lies with the BHD, while the company, in turn states that it has already 
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committed the financial support for roads as required by the original PIR-BUN-TRANS 
scheme and that it is for PEMDA, the local government, to look after the plasma roads. 
Smallholders acknowledge, on the one hand, that KUD road funds are not necessarily 
being used properly for infrastructure maintenance due to corruption (Pak Guntur* 2010), 
yet they are adamant that BHD is shirking its responsibility and needs to commit 
additional capital to roads. They argue that such an investment will ultimately be 
beneficial for smallholders who will deliver their FFBs on time, and the company that 
will produce more CPO in the short and long run. The current Kuala Buayan kades notes 
that BHD is only really interested in the inti area, adding the company deliberately 
ignores laws and regulations and sends its public relations people as go-betweens without 
ever responding directly to the local government (Li 2010c). In addition, as kadus Pak 
Maharani points out, regional regulation (PERDA 2004) stipulates that five percent of net 
company profits are to go directly to the desa, and in light of this act, PTPN XIII recently 
responded favourably to a request for funds,100 while BHD and its subsidiary DSP had 
yet to reply (Ibid.). At this point, a closer look at how these issues and those related to 
the changing relations to land are being played out in a localized setting will provide 
valuable insight into how the oil palm industry is impacting a small community located 
on the south side of the Kapuas River. Discussion will now turn to the field data I 
Pak Mahrani qualified that Kuala Buayan did not ask for 5 percent of the oil palm profits, but rather for 
funding (IDR 15 million) to rebuild the three bridges that were in a serious state of disrepair. I later met 
one of the construction workers for the project who informed me that the Australian firm Pusan PPIP was 
awarded the IDR 2.5 million project that would take 6 months to complete. I could not account for the 
discrepancy in the project cost. 
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gathered while staying in the neighbourhood of Cempaka, RT 5, on the most easterly 
edge of desa Kuala Buayan and located within the BHD plantation concession. 
4.4 Oil Palm Smallholders in Cempaka, RT 5 under the BHD Concession 
Cempaka has 64 households and a total population of 240 residents which live primarily 
along the river bank, with a few families nestled further inland into the forested area on 
the edge of smallholder oil palm plots that make up the plasma area tied to BHD. Land 
that was formerly used for rice cultivation has all been taken up by oil palm, and there 
remain only isolated pockets of rubber gardens with the occasional plots dedicated to 
grow vegetables and some fruits. The community is nearly exclusively Muslim with 
many residents having emigrated from Java and married locally either in Pontianak, 
Meliau, Sanggau, or elsewhere, and have taken up residence in Cempaka either decades 
ago or as recently as over the past 5 years. Children attend primary school (SD) located 
across the river on the PTPN XIJJ concession, and the junior and high schools (SMP and 
SMA) are located in Kuala Buayan closer toward the main centre. Some of the children 
in the village have not completed their primary schooling, are too old to enter SD, and as 
such, are unable to pursue higher levels of education. For the families with sufficient 
resources, children are sent away to public or private religious schools in West 
Kalimantan, and they visit their families during the school breaks. There are also 
children and recent high school graduates in the village who are not interested in 
furthering their education, nor are they willing to work in agriculture, and prefer to 
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remain dependent on their families that have grown relatively prosperous from palm oil 
and have accumulated multiple kaplings in the surrounding areas. 
As is the case with all the neighbourhoods in the desa, the roads leading in and out, as 
well as those within the community are more like mud trails that quickly deteriorate to a 
point of near impassibility once it rains. The local villagers travel on foot or by 
motorcycle for the slightly more affluent, and the river access offers multiple 
opportunities to travel to neighbouring communities or to larger towns and cities like 
Meliau or Sanggau where supplies are purchased. The narrow footbridges that link 
communities along the river prevent the use of cars or trucks for transport, and in 
Cempaka, there are two one-ton trucks (Hiline) which are used exclusively to transport 
FFBs from the kaplings to the river for shipment to the BHD dock down river. The 
houses are mainly wooden structures, and some are run-down, even abandoned, while 
others are painted and tiled on the outside which is one of the more visible signs of the 
prosperity that has entered the community with the introduction of oil palm. It is also 
possible to find homes with new motorcycles, expensive stereo and entertainment 
equipment, and speedboats as part of more recent consumer economy tied to oil palm. In 
this regard, there is a distinct division of wealth that can readily be discerned in Cempaka 
that distinguishes families with oil palm plasma plots from those who do not, even 
though there is a general sense of increased prosperity for the community, and in 
particular since the rise in CPO prices from 2006 onward. It is important to note, 
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however, that in this community, as in many others located within oil palm concessions, 
general infrastructure, social benefits such as health and education, and public facilities 
remain severely underfunded, which is a reflection of the current funding scheme that 
requires companies to pay a 3 percent CPO export tax, most of which stays in Jakarta. 
A wealth ranking assessment based on kapling and land ownership conducted on site with 
the dusun of RT 5 identified four groups of villagers in Cempaka (see Table 8). Group 1 
had two or more kaplings, with other possible land assets;101 Group 2 had one kapling, 
with other possible land assets; Group 3 did not own any kaplings, but had some land 
either as rubber gardens, mixed-cropped gardens, or unused cleared land; and Group 4 
did not own any kaplings, nor did they have any assets in land. The wealth ranking 
revealed that more than half of the households do not own any kaplings, and 35 percent 
do not own any land at all. For the latter group that is landless, household members work 
either as day labourers on local plasma plots or as rubber tappers on local gardens. Many 
in this group are labelled pas pasan meaning they make sufficient income to just get by, 
but no more, and they have no means of accumulation that will enable them to advance 
economically or socially. In the dry season, rubber tapping can be a steady source of 
work, and throughout the year, the oil palm sector opens up labour opportunities along 
monthly / bi-monthly harvest cycles, as well as for general weeding, fertilizing, and plot 
maintenance. The assessment also revealed that 13 households (20 percent) owned a 
101 Other land assets might include rubber gardens (kebun karei), land dedicted to mixed-crop {ladang), or 
cleared forest land for future generations (bawas). 
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single kapling, while 16 (25 percent) had two or more kaplings which placed them in the 
highest wealth ranking in Cempaka. At the top of this group is one household that has six 
kaplings, followed by another that has four kaplings, with subsets of four and five 
families which own three and two kaplings respectively. The largest number of oil palm 
assets is associated with one of the village elders, Haj Praman*, who was born in 
Cempaka in 1932, grew up in family that started producing rubber in 1952 after having 
purchased 28 hectares of land from a Chinese land owner, and engaged in private oil 
palm production in 1998. 













° 1 family has 6 ka, 1 family has 4 ka 
° 4 families have 3 ka 
° 5 families have 2 ka. 
° ?? families also have rubber gardens 
° ?? families also have cleared parcels 
° 5 families also have rubber gardens 
° 2 families also have cleared parcels 
c 4 families have rubber gardens 
° 10 families also have cleared parcels 
c Many work as labourers in oil palm or 
rubber production 
° Many srepaspasan meaning they just 












Note: Information derived from interviews with the kapela dusun of RT5, as well as with the kapela dusun 
of Kuala Buayan, 10 July, 2010. 
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It was unclear if any of the villagers had any outstanding land claims with BHD, but it 
was evident that some households had either been awarded more kaplings by the 
company as a result of their surrendered landholdings in the PIR-BUN-TRANS scheme, 
or they were able to accumulate additional kaplings from earnings generated from 
existing plasma plots, in combination with income stemming from rubber production. 
Moreover, smallholders who had been successful in paying off their plasma debts 
through a monthly payment to the KUD of 30 percent of their harvest, were thus able to 
use their additional income to acquire new kaplings, and if their titles were officially 
returned to them by the company, credit from the bank was accessible to allow for new 
purchases as well. In the case of the landless households that have no assets in land, 
either due to their more recent arrival in the Cempaka or as result of land taken over by 
the BHD inti-plasma scheme without proper compensation, they faced fewer alternatives 
to access land than in the past where land was generally available for subsistence 
agriculture with permission from the customary holder of the land in exchange for a 
nominal return (ten percent) of the harvest. Within this group of landless households, as 
well, there are those who were obligated to sell their rubber gardens or other land assets 
due to economic hardship, and as a result, needed to rely exclusively on wage labour to 
secure their livelihoods. During my stay in Cempaka, one individual, a father of six 
children who had lost his wife due to illness five years ago, recently sold his remaining 
rubber garden of approximately two hectares because of financial needs to support his 
family (Pak Fajar* 2010). Currently, he works as a harvester for four oil palm 
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smallholders in the area and is able to work an average of six or even seven days a week 
as a result of particular cycles associated with the maturation of the oil palm fruit. As an 
agricultural crop, oil palm remains highly labour intensive in the harvest cycle, and 
because labour demands decrease significantly in between these cycles, smallholders 
generally try to stagger their harvests so as to avoid labour shortages during critical 
periods. A closer look at smallholder oil palm production will help shed some light on 
the processes involved, the divisions of labour that are associated with it, and the income 
that is generated under the current boom cycle in the industry. 
Pak Guntur*, who is originally from East Java, married Ibu Aini* in 1994 at the age of 18 
and moved to Cempaka after being given a small parcel of land (50m x 20m) by his 
father-in-law upon which to build a house. A similar arrangement was made with respect 
to Ibu's two other sisters, and all three families now live as neighbours and they are all 
engaged in oil palm production. In the same year, while working as a bulldozer operator, 
Pak Guntur* purchased his first kapling for JDR 4 million from Pak Nurman*, identified 
earlier as a major landowner in the area and who also happened to be related to his wife, 
and in 1997, he purchased a second kapling from another individual, but this time for 
IDR 45 million. Since 1997, he has no longer worked as a bulldozer operator, and he is 
able to provide for his family solely through his oil palm earnings. His plasma plots are 
both within walking distance from his house, about 20 minutes, and they each have a 
complement of 240 trees which together yield an average of 3.5 tons of FFBs per month. 
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Pak Guntur* is a member of KUD SP2 in Bhakti Jaya that is responsible for all financial 
transactions between him and BHD, and at the end of each month, he receives a slip as a 
record of his harvest, the amounts that were deducted from his harvest, and the final 
amount owing to him (see Figure 8). In early 2009, he was able to clear his debt for the 
first kapling which meant that he no longer had to pay a 30 percent deduction from his 
harvest to cover the credit owing to BHD as part of the inti-plasma scheme, and he 
expects that by late 2011, he will have also paid off his second plot as well. Within his 
smallholder block (amparari), there are 19 other farmers who have paid off their credit to 
BHD, to the best of his knowledge. He has yet to receive the official title for his first 
kapling, though he is unsure as to why there is a delay in getting it to him, though he 
anticipates that once his second kapling paid off, he will receive both titles at the same 
time. 
Once Pak Guntur* has determined that oil palm fruit is ready for harvest, the proper 
transportation and labour arrangements are made and the full-day event takes place 
within a day or two of the field inspection. On the day of the harvest, his wife gets up at 
3 am and prepares lunch for the eight workers, so that by 7 am, everyone sets out on foot 
with the necessary tools which include a wheelbarrow, handle hooks, and curved blades 
set on the end of long poles (egrek). The oil palm trees are between 8 and 10 years old, 
and because of their height, longer cutting tools are needed to reach the FFBs which can 
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Figure 8: KUD statement for FFBs harvest on a single kapling dated June 13,2010. 
weigh between 15 to 30 kgs. The labour force is mainly comprised of direct family 
members or distant relatives, though two individuals are unrelated local villagers. The 
two women who join the harvest, Ibu Aini* and her older sister, are responsible for 
gathering the individual fruit that breaks away from the larger bunches (berondol) into 
large baskets that are later weighed in the field along with the FFBs at the end of the day. 
The harvesting process is labour intensive and involves cutting the FFBs from the tree, 
hauling them by hand or wheelbarrow up to the scale by the main plasma road, and 
clearing away all the cut branches that will be hauled away at a later date. By late 
afternoon, the fruit from both kaplings has been collected by the roadside and has been 
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weighed using a makeshift lever and scale system {timbangan) that has a capacity of 200 
kg. Pak Guntur* then calls the driver of the one-ton truck {Hiline) to notify him that the 
FFBs are ready, and the harvest is hauled down to the river bank in four loads to await the 
boat {kapal) that will transport the fruit to the BHD dock the next morning. The workers 
are paid EDR 125 per kg which is then divided among the six harvesters, and based on the 
day's harvest of approximately 3.5 tons, each will receive about IDR 73,000, while the 
driver will receive slightly more. The women are working under a shared labour system 
(royong), and as a result, they will not receive a direct wage. The following day the 
kapal is loaded, the FFBS are transported to the BHD dock, and are then loaded onto a 
larger 5-ton truck and delivered to the mill for processing. At the end of each month, Pak 
Guntur* visits the KUD in Bhakti Jaya, and based on his harvest slips provided by the 
company, he receives his payment, after which he then pays his labourers. Based on the 
current CPO prices, his net monthly income is estimated at IDR 4.1 million once he has 
covered all transportation, labour, input, and KUD expenses (see Table 10).102 
In October of 2009, Pak Guntur* and eight other oil palm smallholders in Kuala Buayan 
attended a week-long course in agronomy in Parindu that was sponsored by the Ministry 
of Agriculture. It was here that he learned about the value of high input farming using 
fertilizers and herbicides, and how to maintain his kaplings so as to achieve the best yield 
In comparative terms, the average wage for a public school teacher is about IDR 2 million per month, 
and Pak Guntur's* earnings for the month of July equates to approximately US$ 482 which is a substantial 
sum. 
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for his parcels. Following this course, he began making more intensive use of fertilizers 
by combining the standard method of spreading it by hand (tabur) with a method called 
lobang that involves digging four holes (50cm x 50cm x 30 cm) around each tree and 
filling each hole with fertilizer and water every three months. He is thus able to harvest 
FFBs twice a month instead of the usual single harvest, which makes economic sense to 
him given that his investment of DDR 7.2 million in fertilizer allows him to practically 
double his yield and quickly recover his input costs. Pak Guntur* also makes use of 24 
litres of the herbicide Roundup each year at a cost of IDR 1.44 million to kill the grass 
around the trees, which reduces his cost of labour in weeders, though he does still hire a 
weeder for two days a month to maintain the kaplings. In his opinion, being an oil palm 
smallholder has enabled him to secure important earnings that would not have been 
possible had he simply tapped rubber, for instance, yet he is also aware that CPO prices 
can fluctuate greatly from year to year, as well as the cost of inputs, and for this reason he 
also maintains 18 heads of cattle for security should prices drop as they have in the past. 
His biggest issue lies with the BHD not maintaining the roads properly which costs him 
significant losses in the rainy season, and he is also mistrustful of the KUD that manages 
his accounts. He feels the cooperative is not giving him the best price on his FFBs, is 
charging him too much for fertilizer which is purchased in bulk for the smallholders, and 
it is also squandering the funds allocated for road repairs and maintenance. Every year 
there is an opportunity to elect new KUD representatives, though he does not have much 
faith in being able to change the problems within the larger system. Despite these 
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outstanding issues, he is optimistic about the future of oil palm, hopes his son (10 years 
old) will follow in his footsteps, and expects to acquire more kaplings when his finances 
permit him to do so. 







FFBs are transported first by Hiline (1-ton) to the river, 
then by Kapal (4-ton) to the BHD dock, and finally by 
Truk (5-ton) to the mill for processing into CPO. 
Includes harvesters (pemanen), FFBs handlers 
(pemuat), Hiline driver (supir), weeders (pembersih), 
and fertlizers {pembuat lobang) 
Herbicides used twice a year (24 litres of Roundup) 











Final Net Yearly Income (IDR) 
49.402 
a. Estimated yearly income based on average total harvest of 3.5 tons per month sold at the current price 
of IDR 1,302 per kg. 
b. The smallholder's spouse and her sibling do not factor into labour costs. A royong (exchange) system 
of labour is used where they are part of the labour force for each husband's respective kaplings that do 
not receive payment in the form of wages. 
c. The net amount is based on first kapling having the credit paid off and the second kapling having the 
monthly 30 percent deduction as is currently the case with Pak Guntur*. His net annual earnings will 
increase by an average of IDR 16.405 million once the second kapling is paid off in full. 
Note: Information derives from an interview with smallholder Pak Guntur*, 2 July 2010. 
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4.5 Labour Regimes, Gender Issues, and Resistance 
The oil palm industry that has developed on the state-run PTPN XIII plantation in Sei 
Dekan on the north side of the Kapuas River and the privately-held BHD on the south 
shore has given rise to distinct labour regimes and working conditions on the respective 
estates and factories. Both companies are in direct competition with each other for 
labour, as well as with plasma smallholders that hire casual labour on a regular basis. 
While PTPN XIII offers casual workers a daily wage of IDR 20,000, BHD sets the wage 
at IDR 30,000, while plasma smallholders offer between IDR 30,000 to 50,000 for 
general labour. Working on either inti or plasma land, harvesters can earn IDR 60,000 or 
more depending on the total fruit harvested, and both companies tend to lose out in 
competition with smallholders and face regular labour shortages, especially during peak 
harvest cycles. According to a foreman from PTPN XIII, up to 30 percent of the estate 
FFBs is not harvested on time due to the chronic labour shortfalls, and as such, labour 
remains a limiting factor of production (Li 2010b). BHD has sent out recruiters to NTB 
to find labourers for the estate land; PTPN XIII, on the other hand, is looking to bring in 
contract labour through a new policy (Kalla) introduced by Indonesian President SBY 
that involves a two-year would for labourers without any of the benefits formerly offered 
to plantation workers such as housing and pensions. In some cases as well, estate 
workers are subcontracting harvesting work to other workers that may include family, 
relatives, or friends. Within the management of both companies there is a distinct 
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impression that local labour is only available in a limited supply, and that local labour 
also tends to be lazy, is unwilling to work, is unreliable and more difficult to manage. 
The labour shortage, however, can in part be seen as a simple matter of economics, in that 
if the companies were to offer better wages, there would be a corresponding decrease in 
the labour shortage (Li 2010b). Also relevant is the fact that the longstanding, and as of 
yet, unresolved claims for plasma plots and compensation for land taken by the oil palm 
companies at their inception and which have continued throughout periods of expansion, 
remain a sore point within communities and may render potential workers less inclined to 
provide labour for the state-run or private company. 
An important distinction also needs to be made as to how labour and housing issues for 
estate and mill workers have developed quite differently on either side of the Kapuas 
River which is largely a reflection as to how the state-run plantation is run in comparison 
the national private company BHD. Estate employees currently working for PTPN XIII 
have been provided with housing that includes water, electricity, sanitation, and schools, 
and the structures are generally well-maintained, newly painted, and give the overall 
impression of a comfortable rural community, despite being hemmed in by a mono-
cropped landscape on all sides. The BHD housing complex, however, known as Barrack 
20, is in very poor condition. Its wooden structures are run-down and have not been 
painted in years, and more importantly, the units lack running water and proper 
sanitation, despite having been promised access to clean water two decades ago. 
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According to an employee who has worked for more than 10 years with BHD, the 
company is poorly run, employs managers on a two year rotation from either Sumatra or 
Java, and the owner Pak Jamili, maintains a hands-off to management, preferring to stay 
in Jakarta and to fly in by helicopter periodically for just a few hours (Pak Artin* 2010). 
He added that when the factory employees formed the SPSI (Serikat Pekerja Seluru 
Indonesia) worker's union in 2005, the manager at the time responded favourably to 
demands for higher pay and better working conditions, though he was promptly replaced 
by a new manager who disbanded the union, fired the union leader, and maintained 
wages at the existing district rate district, the UMK {Upa Minimum Kabupaten), of JJDR 
17,5000 per day. It was not until a labour boycott in 2006-7 that BHD increased daily 
wages to JJDR 33,000, though requests for health benefits and changes to the 12-hour shift 
rotation were ignored. As it stands today, relations between BHD and the surrounding 
communities continue to be highly conflicted over issues of land and plasma roads, while 
those involving its factory workers and estate labour force also remain contentious on the 
basis of working conditions and the sharing of benefits generated by the oil palm 
industry. 
Gender issues inherent within the oil palm sector also need to be considered regarding the 
gendered division of labour, as well as the role of state mechanisms in reinforcing 
patriarchal systems that undermine women's autonomy and rights to access and own 
land. In the sub-district of Meliau, women (and men) have traditionally been engaged in 
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rubber tapping as a cash crop, and the harvesting of resin has long-time been an 
accessible source of income that did not require extreme physical exertion. In the areas 
where research was undertaken, much of the rubber gardens have disappeared and have 
since been replaced by monocrop oil palm holdings, thus depriving many women (and 
households in general) of access to an alternative source of revenue. In addition, women 
generally lack the physical strength required to harvest the oil palm FFBs, and as noted in 
the case of some women in Cempaka who take part in the harvest cycle by collecting the 
individual fruit {berondol), the compensation for their labour takes the forms of 
collectively shared labour (royong) that does not involve remuneration in rupiahs. 
Though these women voluntarily consent to provide labour compensated in this form as a 
means of contributing to their respective husbands' earnings, and as a result to the general 
well-being of the household, they unwittingly surrender access to a level of independence 
and autonomy that is derived from earning a direct income. Moreover, it is expected that 
women will continue to perform their regular domestic duties in the house, in addition to 
the harvest work, which also includes preparing meals for the workers in the early hours 
of the morning before heading to the fields. It can also be noted that women do 
undertake tasks in the maintenance of the oil palm kaplings that presents additional health 
hazards for them, such as the application of herbicides and the regular spreading of 
fertilizers by hand in the case of the tabur method. These tasks are not performed 
exclusively by women, in particular with respect to the company inti holdings, however, 
women figure prominently within this division of labour. Concerning the issue of 
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holding title to land, the state mechanisms allow only for the male head of the household 
to appear on the title, which in turn, prevents women from accessing credit at a financial 
institution by depriving them of access to the collateral that comes with title. It is ironic 
that some men in Cempaka became owners of land through marriage to women who were 
granted land by their fathers, yet the women are denied the full privileges of land 
ownership themselves. 
Altogether, oil palm smallholders who have been incorporated into inti-plasma under a 
variety of contract farming schemes are a characteristic feature of labour regimes 
associated with the industry, and peasants, indigenous people, and local farmers resort to 
various forms of resistance in pursuit of economic and social justice. As noted earlier, 
much of the conflict over land stems from the government having failed to engage in 
proper consultation with communities in a clear violation of its own 'socialisasi' process 
(Tarigan 2010). In addition, whether smallholders received plasma parcels as 
transmigrants or as local villagers who had contributed land to the oil palm development 
project, they were invariably drawn into relations of production with a system that lacked 
transparency, as in the case of the KKPA and KUD cooperatives that were established by 
oil palm companies and were largely working in their favour. In the BHD and PTPN 
XIII concessions, a large number of plasma producers lack important details regarding 
their outstanding credit owed to the companies, and they are unaware of the risks 
involved and obligations that bind them to the company. Oftentimes, many are caught in 
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a protracted debt cycle caused in part by monopsonistic trade relations with the oil palm 
companies that set the FFB prices and also control the selling of inputs to the farmers, as 
well as subjecting them to incidental costs linked to plot development and infrastructure 
maintenance. Every one of these items creates an opportunity for capital accumulation 
from smallholders that may or may not be warranted, fair or legitimate. For this reason, 
smallholders in Sei Dekan have delivered an ultimatum to PTPN XIII that a blockade will 
be in place this summer should the company fail to produce accounting documents on 
their plasma holdings (Ali 2010). Some smallholders in Kuala Buayan embark on a form 
of resistance categorised as a 'weapon of the weak' by mixing in significant amounts of 
lower grade FFBs to their harvest that generally goes undetected by the BHD, as a way to 
recover some of the losses attributed to spoiled fruit due to poor road conditions (Semedi 
2010). This type of action could be considered a by-product of and reaction to a system 
of agricultural production that favours the corporate entity over the individual, and is an 
attempt to redress some of the economic and power imbalances between the respective 
actors. 
The next generation of pola kemitraan schemes currently underway in the Meliau sub-
district are expected to significantly alter labour regimes and relations to land, and it is 
uncertain if such development will lead to more authentic socialisation processes. BFID 
has presently halted the expansion of its estate in desa Kuala Buayan, as well as that of its 
subsidiary DSP in the neighbouring Kecamatan Sanggau Kapuas, and is now 
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concentrating its growth in a new subsidiary, AAC (Agro Abadi Cemerlang). It has been 
granted a concession of 8,100 hectares, will have a processing capacity of 60 ton of FFBs 
per hour, and is expected to come into production in 2011. According to the secretary to 
the Camat in Meliau, Pak Untung, the company will employ a 80:20 inti-plasma 
kemitraan scheme that will see all the land developed as an estate holding with 
contributing villagers receiving their share of 20 percent of the profits; he added, 
however, that there are talks emerging about adopting an inti-plasma scheme, and 
thought he believes that including smallholders is better for villagers in the long run, he is 
concerned that the same problems arising with BHD as they have in the past, namely 
smallholders being allocated only the worst land, kaplings will be poorly developed, and 
the substandard roads will continue to be a source of conflict (Li 2010c). 
Abetnego Tarigan from Sawit Watch pointed out that companies prefer to develop strictly 
along inti lines because it is less complicated for them, and they can engage in economies 
of scale with oil palm production. He added, however, that when locals protest and 
demand to be included in plasma schemes, the company generally agrees to avoid 
conflict, yet it maintains its high ratio of 80 percent of the land dedicated to estate land. 
In his opinion, the estates should remain small in keeping with the meaning of the word 
inti, and the majority of land should be developed as plasma plots to help secure 
smallholder livelihoods in the present and into the future (Tarigan 2010). In light of these 
two options currently being debated, locals face challenges on both fronts. The 
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kemitraan model opens the door for absentee landlords and land accumulation, and 
results in a complete loss in sovereignty over land access, ownership and use by locals. 
The second plasma-inti scheme holds more promise for smallholders, though as has been 
noted earlier, irregularities over land allocations, inadequate infrastructure support, and 
issues related to consent and compensation can all be sources of conflict and dispute that 
can remain unresolved for decades. 
With regards to RSPO criteria and guidelines, participation ultimately remains voluntary, 
and to date neither the state-run PTPN XIII, nor the privately held BHD (or its 
subsidiaries) has applied for membership or certification. The Indonesian government 
has stated in the past that it was difficult to implement RSPO standards, especially 
concerning carbon emissions and biodiversity (IPOB 2007). In the summer of 2010, the 
national government announced that it would develop its owns Indonesian Sustainable 
Palm Oil (ISPO) standards, though, as Marcus Colchester pointed out, "how will ISPO 
differ from the RSPO, and more importantly, will ISPO promote a 'business as usual' 
approach, or will there be tangible environmental and social gains?" (Colchester 2010). 
Certainly the issue of FPIC is a critical one which entails the rights of community to 
accept or reject oil palm development, or any other project for that matter that involves 
surrendering control over communally-held or private land. In the field research site that 
covered five desas in the sub-district of Meliau, oil palm smallholders gave no indication 
that they were aware of RSPO, and many did not seem to have a full understanding of 
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what the process of socialisation involved and what was implied by being required to 
give consent to accept or reject development initiatives. Given that no land has been 
acquired by FPIC, current Indonesian laws are in direct conflict with RSPO criteria 
(Colchester 2006, 185). Until laws change and processes promote greater social justice, 
individuals will continue to take matters into their own hands, as in the case of Pak 
Idham*, a former rubber tapper who gave up 32 hectares of land to the BF£D, but has yet 
to receive any plasma in return. The local villager, who was awarded a kapling on what 
was Pak Idham's* land, is being prevented by the former owner from harvesting his fruit 
until such a time as a he receives his due kaplings (Pak Bimo* 2010). In this case vertical 
conflict between the company and villagers, also creates horizontal conflicts amongst 
villagers themselves that are long waiting for a resolution over land claims. 
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Chapter 5: A Political Economy Analysis and Links to the Analytical Framework 
This next chapter will comprise of a critical analysis of the research data acquired in the 
sub-district of Meliau, Sanggau which will also entail a review of the analytical 
framework presented in Chapter 2 in light of this field research. By adopting an agrarian 
political economy lens of analysis, the fundamental questions as elaborated by Henry 
Bernstein (2010) of who owns what? who does what? who gets what? and what do they 
do with the created surplus? will be addressed in reference to land and labour issues in 
the research site. The first section will examine the processes and mechanisms of 
agrarian change associated with the oil palm industry, in addition to their linkages with 
political and economic forces at the local, national and global levels. The next section 
will present a review of the differentiation of the peasantry witnessed in this area with 
particular emphasis on how contract farming in oil palm outgrower schemes are 
facilitating the process of rural differentiation. Labour regimes will also be analysed in 
tandem with contract farming schemes, and both aspects will be examined in the context 
of adverse incorporation. The following section will consist of a review of neoliberal 
land policies in reference to peasant dispossession with particular attention to a 'Code of 
Conduct' and the principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) that are 
currently being promoted by the World Bank and mainstream development agencies. An 
overview of biofuels and the oil palm industry will be explored in the subsequent section, 
looking at industry drivers and the impact of the oil palm expansion on rural livelihoods 
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in the Borneo forests of West Kalimantan. A critical review of the RSPO initiative will 
be also included under this topic heading. The following section will cover the issues of 
rural politics and resistance in reference the oil palm industry with emphasis on the 
diversity of perspectives and agendas inherent within the expanding sector. The final 
section will provide an overview of the main issues addressed in the research project that 
will include a critical response to the question of opportunity or threat regarding biofuels 
and land grabbing. 
5.1 Processes and Mechanisms of Agrarian Change in Meliau, West Kalimantan 
This section of analysis will identify the processes and mechanisms of agrarian change in 
the subdistrict of Meliau that will also require identifying the various aspects associated 
with changing social relations with respect to land and labour as a result of the rapidly 
expanding oil palm industry in the area. As noted by Ben White, rural differentiation 
involves a cumulative and permanent (i.e. non-cyclical, though not irreversible) process 
of change, and that it is useful to make a distinction between the process of differentiation 
itself, and the various aspects of that process: the mechanisms and causes, the symptoms 
and indicators, as well as the context and constraints within which it is occurring (1989, 
20 & 24). While the symptoms and indicators of rural differentiation may include 
features of rural social-economic structures that reveal the distribution of owned and 
operated land or the uneven distribution of wealth within a community, a critical analysis 
of agrarian change involves examining the changing relations between social groups and 
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individuals in the context of the development of commodity relations in a rural economy 
(Ibid., 27 & 20). This analysis will therefore entail exploring the various internal and 
external causes behind the current patterns of differentiation, in addition to the context 
(e.g. regional, national, and political) in which it is unfolding, and the constraints that 
may be affecting the pace and form of differentiation. Only once these various aspects 
are considered, is it possible to more clearly understand the processes underlying agrarian 
transformation in this particular setting, and how distinct patterns of development are 
resulting in uneven distributional outcomes, increased rural differentiation, and a 
widening gap between those engaged in the oil palm industry and those excluded from it. 
A critical mechanism that has helped determine the nature and scope of agrarian change 
linked to oil palm in the five research desas in the subdistrict of Meliau is the system of 
forest classification, as defined under the Basic Forestry Law of 1967, that is employed 
by the state as a means of asserting control over upland territories and its resources. The 
'official' maps, censuses, and documentation produced by the state armed with a self-
appointed mandate of eminent domain over 'forested' areas resulted in competing and 
overlapping claims, the drawing up of inaccurate village boundaries, the omission of 
long-established forest settlement, and the appropriation of large areas of uluyat land 
from adat indigenous peoples. These mechanisms, and the processes inherent in their 
production as part of an implementation scheme for oil palm plantation development, can 
be traced to a central problem of statecraft, that of legibility, whereby state 
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simplifications are employed to render society legible in such a way as to facilitate state 
functions and the transformation of peripheral areas into 'developed' state spaces (Scott 
1998). The cadastral map, as an instrument of control that both reflects and consolidates 
the power of those who commission it (Kain and Baigent 1992), is a mechanism that 
facilitates the process of rural differentiation process, with its real value lying in its 
abstraction and universality (Scott 1998, 44) for the state, represented by the Ministry of 
Forests, that claims legal rights to all land it has designated as 'forest'. Theses state 
mechanisms can also be viewed as being a part of larger state territorialisation processes 
through which modern states exert their power in an attempt to order and control upland 
resources and populations (Li 1999a, xviii). Territorialisation, as defined by Vandergeest 
and Peluso (1995, 387) is the process through which "all modern states divide their 
territories into complex and overlapping political and economic zones...and create 
regulations delineating how and by whom these areas can be used," noting also that the 
process was undertaken by colonial and post-colonial regimes in pursuit of profit 
favourable to elites. The processes and mechanisms associated with state simplification 
and the territorialisation of forest land in West Kalimantan, have thus played a key role in 
the agrarian changes that have occurred both on the state-owned PTPN XIII concession, 
as well as on the private BHD concession on the south side of the Kapuas River. 
Characteristic of modernisation projects, the administrative and coercive machinery of 
the state was brought into play on both oil palm concessions, as PTPN XIII and BHD 
222 
The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
claimed development rights on forests classified as 'state forestry land' regardless of 
vegetation or current use of the land (Li 1999a, 15-17). Villagers living in Sei Dekan 
were coerced by government officials, local police, and the military to 'temporarily' 
surrender their land to PTPN XIII in order to allow for oil palm plantation development 
on land that was in essentially declared as being state property and not adat land. 
Communities that had once relied on diversified livelihoods which included rubber 
gardens and fruit trees, as well as mixed agro-forestry practices that complemented 
earnings derived from cash crops, witnessed their lands converted into monocrop oil palm 
plantations as part of a large-scale agricultural development project, that may or may not 
include the village members in the desa. When the 25 year HGU was subsequently 
renewed by Sanggau district, the villagers realised they had been deceived into believing 
the transaction only involved a short-term leasing of the land, yet at this stage, the 
plantation concession was now unequivocally declared state property in perpetuity, thus 
rendering the adat claim to the land more difficult to pursue. In the case of the BHD oil 
palm project, local informants in Kuala Buayan revealed that the company had simply 
flown over the area by helicopter, had produced aerial photos that 'confirmed' the area 
was largely state forest land with the exception of enclaved settlements, and acquired a 
HGU that authorized it to clear the forest area and develop a plantation. Such 'official' 
mechanisms enabled the BHD to overlook existing rubber gardens and mixed-agro 
forestry areas, and with the cooperation and support of the current desa and dusun leaders 
at the time, the 'state forest land' was transformed into oil palm production, with 
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inclusion into the development scheme oftentimes depending on political and economic 
ties to corrupt systems of local and regional government. The designation of 'state forest 
land' over the majority of the Kalimantan area, 97 percent of the existing land mass 
(Peluso 1992, 5), thus provided the state with a key mechanism with which to dictate the 
nature of rural differentiation through oil palm development. 
A second critical mechanism that is central to the agrarian changes connected to the oil 
palm sector, are the various inti-plasma schemes introduced in the upland regions as a 
model for agricultural development and a source of economic growth in rural areas. The 
PIR-TRANS scheme in particular was designed as a means to appropriate land from 
locals for oil palm concessions through a multitude of estate-smallholder ratio models, 
while at the same time providing an imported work force that could supply the labour 
needs of the estate plantation, the company processing mill, and the plasma holdings 
awarded to individual households. This development model sought to completely 
restructure existing rural societies and involved taking the land from one social group, 
namely indigenous people or mixed local populations, and redistributing it to another 
group, the transmigrants, that would eventually come to include local villagers as well in 
the inti-plasma schemes. As the field research in the PTPN XIII and BHD concessions 
revealed, rural differentiation occurred along distinct trajectories determined by who 
received one or more kaplings, the quality and location of the plasma plots, and the 
ability of a smallholder to wait out the five or more years needed before the oil palm trees 
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began producing FFBs. In part, as a result of the delay in productivity, a large number of 
transmigrants in the BHD PIR-TRANS project abandoned the oil palm site early on, 
which resulted in the illegitimate transacting of local land that has yet to be resolved to 
this day. In addition, this particular mechanism of agrarian change was marked by 
numerous irregularities in the implementation process as noted earlier, whereby in many 
cases, legitimate recipients failed to obtain kaplings, while others who were not entitled 
to plasma parcels, acquired land as result of personal ties to local government or adat 
heads who also benefitted disproportionately from the oil palm scheme. Existing large 
landholders who had acquired land in the past through a variety of means that were at 
times difficult to track, could lay claim to multiple kaplings that, in time, would provide a 
means of sizeable accumulation either through the production of oil palm or as a result of 
the increasing value of plasma plots that increased more than ten-fold over the past 
decade. Rural differentiation through the inti-plasma mechanism has thus followed a 
diversity of complex paths that have allowed some smallholders to successfully 
accumulate capital and expand their production, while others have experienced 
dispossession without compensation, nor have they received direct benefits of the 
industry and continue to press for plasma allotments. 
A third key mechanism that is contributing to rural differentiation in the oil palm industry 
is the use of contract farming out-grower schemes that are an integral element of the 
plasma-inti, Nucleus and Smallholder Estates (NES) model. Transmigrant smallholders, 
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as well as local peasants, farmers, and indigenous people who received kaplings 
following a transfer of land to an oil palm company that involved either a typical plasma-
inti scheme or a KKPA model, were locked into a long-term business relationship with a 
company that could take anywhere from eight to eighteen years to repay depending on a 
variety of factors particular to each contract. One feature that is most striking about this 
aspect of the plasma-inti model is that smallholders rarely, if ever, have in their 
possession a detailed contract outlining responsibilities and obligations of both parties 
involved, and also rarely do they receive an updated summary of their outstanding debt 
with the company, nor the credits that have been paid out to date. In addition 
smallholders are subjected to multiple deductions from their regular harvests without 
understanding the reason or legitimacy of expenses they are required to pay under 
conditions that lack transparency or accountability. In a 7.5:2.5 plasma-inti scheme, for 
example, where a local villager surrenders 7.5 hectares of land to a company and receives 
in return a 2 hectare kapling developed by the company, the smallholder is still expected 
assume the entire cost of developing the plot, in addition to a number of ongoing 
incidental costs including infrastructure, processing, and KUD operating expenses to 
name a few. Under this version of 'partnership' between corporate agribusiness and 
smallholders producers, the latter are essentially subjected to institutionalised monopoly 
and monopsony relations (Mackintosh 1990), and they are left vulnerable to surplus 
accumulation by oil palm companies that, not only regulate the upstream of the 
production industry and set the FFB purchasing price, they are also are able to 
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accumulate capital through the farmer cooperatives which they helped establish and that 
are funded by the industry. As noted by Henry Bernstein (1996), the setting of prices at 
various points along food commodity chains is not a matter of 'real' value or supply an 
demand interactions, but rather reflects the social and political bargaining strengths of 
parties involved. This point and other issues pertaining to the imbalances of power and 
surplus accumulation with respect to contract farming will be examined in greater detail 
in the following section that addresses peasant differentiation and adverse incorporation. 
When considering the rural differentiation that is unfolding in Meliau subdistrict, it is 
essential to also identify the key external and internal causes that are driving the process. 
The current fiscal, food, and environmental crises are critical external causes spurring on 
agrarian change in the Indonesian uplands. More specifically, with the present oil palm 
expansion directly linked to the recent biofuel boom that is dramatically increasing the 
demand for food and non-food agricultural products, it is clear that biofuel blending 
mandates and associated subsidies established by the EU, OECD countries, and others, 
are spurring on a frenzy of domestic and transnational investment in the sector and are 
resulting in significant rural transformation in the area. The 'palm oil industrial 
complex', that is part of an emerging global 'biofuel complex' (Borras et al 2010d) that 
brings together TNCs, state capital, and government agencies allied along new North-
South, South-South capitalist relations (Dauvergne and Neville, 2010), is at the centre of 
dynamic processes of rural differentiation. These processes are thus dominated by TNCs 
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located within the conglomerate corporate food regime (McMichael 2009) operating 
within national policies and local power relations that are yielding distinct distributional 
outcomes and changing social relations of production in the local rural economy (Pye 
2010). Another important external cause that is closely associated with the expansion of 
a corporate agricultural model is the World Bank's 'emerging vision of agriculture for 
development' founded on new public-private partnerships involving the state and the 
agribusiness sector that includes greater support and inclusion of smallholders and rural 
workers (WB 2008, 8). At the national level, the Indonesian government is asking that 
oil palm companies simply pay a 3 percent export tax on CPO as a way to further 
encourage corporate investment in the sector, and they are seeking to establish their own 
ISPO (instead of endorsing current RSPO standards) that is likely to shift the burden of 
'responsible and sustainable' palm oil development away from the corporations. To these 
internal causes can be added regional oil palm plantation policies in Sanggau district that 
are creating favourable conditions for investment, such as the pola kemitraan profit-
sharing model, whereby the entire area is managed by the company under an 80:20 inti-
plasma scheme. The combined effect of theses external and internal causes driving the 
rapid expansion in the sector is the proliferation of new, local companies with no 
background in the industry and who promise prosperity to local communities, that in 
reality, yield highly uneven outcomes (Sirait 2009, 7). 
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In order to understand the processes of rural differentiation in the Meliau-subdistrict from 
an analytical perspective, it is equally important to identify the context within which they 
are occurring. As a starting point, it is evident that palm oil was introduced into an 
already highly differentiated terrain on either side of the Kapuas River where larger 
landholders (former and present-day tokays, adat chiefs, and political heads, etc.) 
coexisted alongside smallholders engaged in mixed agro-forestry practices, in addition to 
landless workers who accessed land through communal systems to meet their subsistence 
needs. The large landowners and those with close ties to political and economic centres 
of local power stood to the gain the most from oil palm development, both in terms of 
acquiring kaplings in the inti-plasma schemes and with respect to accessing employment 
opportunities on the plantations and in the processing plants. As noted earlier, in the 
PTPN XIII and the BHD concessions, there are a large number of outstanding land claims 
for properly developed kaplings and compensation for lost rubber and fruits gardens that 
have yet to be resolved. Oftentimes, it is the poorer segments of rural society that more 
readily find themselves on the margins of being able to profit from agricultural 
development schemes, and given the social structures that were already in place prior to 
the arrival of oil palm, this process of marginalisation has deepened for certain segments 
of the rural population. In addition, the current stage of decentralisation in the post-
Reformasi era has further empowered local actors who are allying themselves with local 
elites and business investors funded by domestic and international capital, and which are 
working together to facilitate and accelerate the pace and extent of plantation expansion 
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in the area. Remarkably, though the Net Present Value (NPV) of large scale oil palm 
plantations is currently set at US$ 72.62 million per 10,000 hectares (Sirait 2009, 9)103 
surprisingly little of this wealth actually trickles down to the local communities where the 
oil palm fruit is grown and harvested, in large part due to permissive laws and 
discretionary enforcement of regulations that allows surplus capital to circulate within 
limited circles that exclude the majority of the population. The current expansion frenzy 
is serving to amplify the existing levels of rural differentiation, all the while giving rise to 
new social classes in oil palm production. Alongside a class of poor and highly indebted 
smallholders are emerging classes of successful smallholders, middle farmers, and 
wealthy 'armchair' NES farmers (Pye 2010) who are able to engage in surplus 
accumulation and go on to acquire more productive resources like land over time, in the 
classic capitalist form of expansion. It was clear that in the desas where field research 
was conducted, lines of economic and social differentiation were increasingly contingent 
on those participating in the oil palm industry, those excluded from it, and those 
incorporated under adverse terms and conditions. 
In addition to being shaped by the context in which the processes of agrarian change 
occur with respect to the oil palm industry, the constraints to differentiation are also 
critical and may affect the pace and form of these changes. A key constraint centers on 
This value is based on an average CPO price of US$ 531 per tonne. Also, should a company convert a 
natural forest to oil palm instead of simply making use of degraded forest land, the NPV of the same area 
increases by approximately US$21 million (Sirait 2009, 9). 
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the large number of outstanding entitlements to properly developed kaplings that have yet 
to be distributed by PTPN XIII and BHD, which in turn, is severely impairing local 
peasants, farmers, and indigenous people from engaging productively in this agricultural 
sector that will enable them to sustain diversified rural livelihoods. Another important 
constraint that is critical to plasma smallholders in the inadequate infrastructure support 
from the oil palm companies that drastically reduces earnings from FFB harvests in 
where up to 50 percent of their crops are rejected by the processing mills as a result of 
protracted delays related to poor road conditions. These outstanding major issues, in 
addition to the problems associated with lack of transparency regarding credit, expenses, 
and debt management that is handled by the company sponsored KKPA and local KUDs, 
lead to various forms of protest and resistance in the form of blockades that can lead to 
violent confrontations, all of which become a significant constraint in rural differentiation 
in the area. As noted by Idham Arsyad (2010), the current KPA General Director, the 
government "prefers to the security approach (BRTMOP) to resolve issues related to 
agrarian reform." Moreover, the limited amount of oil palm earnings that actually make 
their way back to the local communities greatly impacts on a rural community's ability to 
develop proper infrastructure and provide adequate service to the residents also acts as a 
major constraint to agrarian change in the subdistrict of Meliau. The 3 percent CPO 
export tax is paid directly to Jakarta, while the oil palm development models currently in 
place rely solely on multiplier effects such as employment on inti-plasma areas and 
monthly earnings from FFBs for smallholders to bring wealth back into the desas. 
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Decentralised policy-making that has allowed for the issuance of HGUs by the district 
regents (bupati) has meant that a high percentage of concessions are classified as illegal, 
and thus companies are exempt (state-run or private) from paying local land and building 
taxes, which acts as an incentive for investors, yet also acts as an important constraint.104 
And finally, many of the HGUs have been issued as a means of extracting timber 
resources without ever developing into oil palm, which leave local land idle and 
inaccessible to locals who could make productive use of the land (Bachriadi 2010). 
Within the framework of rural differentiation that is occurring in this area in relation to 
oil palm development, there are a number of key symptoms and indicators that can be 
identified within the current rural social-economic structures. With the state acting as 
primarily landlord over forest areas, the PTPN XIII and BHD concessions have witnessed 
the appropriation of either adat, communally held, or private land that was in turn 
redistributed to transmigrants and local smallholders, as well as to a number of 
individuals (desa and adat heads, including family members and associated social circle), 
many of whom were not legitimately entitled to kaplings. Existing large landholders in 
the area were able to benefit greatly from oil palm development in the form of properly 
developed and productive kaplings, though, as noted earlier, some holders of larger 
parcels of land have yet to receive any plasma entitlements, as in the case of a villager in 
Research undertaken by Sawit Watch have determined that in Kalimantan province, more than 50 
percent of the HGU concessions had been by a bupati, when only the BPN is legally authorised to do so 
(Tarigan2010). 
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Kuala Buayan who originally 'surrendered' 32 hectares of land to the PIR-TRANS 
scheme. In the PTPN XIII concession, a significant number of smallholders who were in 
possession of substandard plasma plots ended up selling their parcels to plantation 
managers, inti workers, or others after being unable to maintain credit payments or turn a 
profit, and in particular during a protracted cycle of low CPO prices. This phenomenon 
also transpired on the BHD concession that also included an extensive period of 
illegitimate selling of plasma plots during the largely failed transmigrant phase. As a 
result, individuals on both side of the Kapuas River were, on the one hand, able to 
accumulate additional parcels of land, while others lost their kaplings through these 
processes, in addition to having been dispossessed of their original land holdings that 
included rubber gardens and mix-agroforestry cultivation. In terms of labour, rural 
workers have been able to procure work on either inti or plasma land according to harvest 
cycles or to fulfill general maintenance needs, and a system of exchange labour (royong), 
generally along lines of kinship, in addition to hired labour are characteristic indicators of 
agrarian change associated with oil palm in the area. Successful smallholders have also 
been able to acquire credit to purchase additional kaplings over time, which has allowed 
for the emergence of a new class of palm oil farmers that have, in some cases 
accumulated up to ten or more plasma plots. In contrast, local villagers who are landless 
or near landless, have also lost access to communal land and alternative means of 
livelihoods formerly found in local rubber garden, and as such, have become 
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progressively dependent on oil palm labour opportunities, with a good number never been 
able to go beyond mere pas pasan (getting by) rural livelihoods. 
An overview of the main processes of rural differentiation characteristic in this heartland 
area of oil palm development will provide a snapshot of how uneven outcomes attributed 
to this sector has unfolded over time since its arrival in the arrival in the late 1970s. The 
PTPN XIII and BHD concessions have incorporated transmigrants and local populations 
into large-scale agricultural development projects through various inti-plasma schemes, 
which oftentimes required the repressive machinery of the state working with local 
leaders, to quell opposition and ensure that local resistance would not stand in the way of 
the oil palm expansion. The process of 'socialisation' that was required when plantation 
development projects on 'government-owned forest land' was impacting rural 
communities living there was only superficially done and generally involved deception, 
coercion, and force to obtain 'the required consent' of the local community to give up 
use, access, and control over their communal land. HGU concessions were initially 
issued by the central government through the Ministry of Forests, and later shifted to the 
provincial governor and eventually to the district regent {bupati) through a process of 
decentralisation that created new opportunities for local elites to profit from oil palm 
development projects while maintaining an inadequate implementation of the 
'socialisation' process. The district task force established to resolve community conflicts 
related to land and made up of local desa and adat leaders, government representatives, 
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members of the police and military, as well as company representatives, meant that local 
claims and interests would remain secondary to those of the industry and its selected 
main beneficiaries. In Sanggau district, where new plantation development policies 
aimed at creating favourable conditions for domestic and foreign investment, are taking 
the form of various kemitraan schemes under the larger 'one-roof management' model' 5 
recently adopted by the government that allocates the entire plantation as inti, with 
former landholders participating as shareholders and as wage labour, but no longer as 
independent and autonomous peasant farmers. Agribusiness investment in the oil palm 
sector is increasing significantly in the area. As a result, the processes underlying 
plantation expansion are greatly accelerating rural differentiation along distinct patterns 
of accumulation and marginalisation where issues of poverty, powerless, and exclusion 
from valuable resources remain integrally related (Li 1999b, 30). 
5.2 The Differentiation of the Peasantry and Adverse Incorporation 
The present-day expansion of oil palm plantations in Meliau are taking place in 'frontier' 
regions that include logged, degraded forest areas, and agricultural land, which is having 
a differential impact on the local peasantry shaped by national policies, local power 
relations, and transnational influences that are determining the nature of this expansion 
(Pye 2010, 854-55). Peasants and indigenous people in this upland region have for 
105 In 2007, the national government launched its 'Revitalisation Project' for oil palm to address the issue of 
low productivity on plasma holdings, and it offered the 'one-roof management' model of 100 percent inti 
plantations as a solution. It is important to note, however, that low smallholder productivity can be 
attributed to a multitude of factors such as receiving substandard plots, marginal land, poor roads, and 
minimal extension services (Tarigan 2010). 
235 
The Biofuel Boom and Indonesia's Oil Palm Industry: 
The Twin Processes of Peasant Dispossession and Adverse Incorporation in West Kalimantan 
generations been involved in a combination of market- and subsistence-oriented 
agricultural practices (Dove 1996), as well as managed forest gardens and community 
forests to sustain diversified rural livelihoods (Peluso and Padoch 1996). The current oil 
palm expansion is, therefore, occurring in areas where peasant smallholder mixed 
farming practices still prevail, and also where tens of millions of people are estimated to 
be living on and around forests and who are witnessing the rapid erosion of customary 
land and agro-forestry systems. In Sanggau district, the differentiation of the peasantry, 
which essentially involves shifts in patterns of control over the means of production 
(White 1989, 26), is resulting in distinct class formations arising from capitalist 
accumulation from above and from below that is driven by an expanding oil palm sector. 
According to Marxist theory, the forces of capitalist agricultural production would 
progressively transform subsistence modes of production into commodity producers, 
eventually leading to the full subordination of the peasantry to commodity markets, and 
resulting in the elimination of the peasantry over time through processes of 
industrialisation. Within the framework of the agrarian question first posed by Kautsky, 
the Lenin-Chayanov debate that followed centered on the issue of depeasantisation and 
the degree to which the peasantry could simultaneously persist in engaging in simple 
production, while at the same time resist in being transformed into a class of wage labour 
that has surrendered control over the means of production. Yet as Ben White noted, 
when speaking of the proletarianisation of the peasantry, neither Lenin nor Kautsky 
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insisted that this process required the complete dispossession from land, but rather 
required 
a sufficient degree of inequality in access to land and other productive resources 
to leave large numbers of 'peasant' households in possession of farms incapable 
of providing a livelihood and therefore propelling one of more household 
members partly or completely into the agricultural or wage-labour markets. 
(1989,18-19). 
The field research undertaken in the subdistrict of Meliau did reveal a continuum of 
dispossession and proletarianisation along these lines that also included a complete loss 
of control over productive resources and the full subordination of the peasantry in areas 
that were overridden by oil palm plantation concessions. 
With respect the differentiation of the peasantry on the state-led PTPN XIII plantation in 
desa Melobok, there are a number of distinct, yet also similar, features that the 
differentiation that occurred on the south side of the Kapuas River. PTPN XIII had been 
in operation since the late 1970s, and the area was entirely dominated by inti-plasma oil 
palm production that no longer included any land dedicated to subsistence agriculture or 
mixed agro-forestry production. The original Dayak villages had been fully absorbed 
into the oil palm concession, with the exception of a few enclaved hamlets, while the 
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transmigrant population living in dispersed settlements (afdeling) provided the labour 
force for the estate and/or engaged in smallholder production on their own plasma plots 
or on other kaplings in the area. For the Dayak, the agrarian transformation that followed 
in the wake of oil palm development involved the complete elimination of pre-existing 
forms of mixed subsistence and commodity (rubber) production that severed them from 
access to and control over adat land and rendered them population fully dependent on 
agricultural monocropping controlled by PTPN XIII. Those who came to engage in 
smallholder production under the KKPA scheme, regained in part, control over a parcel 
of land, though via an out-grower contract farming model of production that offered 
varying degrees of control over the production process, yet largely subordinated 
producers to the dictates of market capitalism controlled by large agribusiness interests. 
In this regard, the original Dayak experienced first complete dispossession, followed by 
varying degrees of proletarianisation in the form of plasma production under a contract 
farming that returned partial control over land, in addition to the wage labour provided on 
inti land to pursue rural livelihoods that excluded subsistence farming in any appreciable 
way. For the transmigrants who came to the area from Java, Bali, NTT, and elsewhere, 
the PIR-TRANS scheme provided them with access to a parcel of land that gave them 
partial control over land and varying degrees of control over the production processes, 
though, as in the case of the local indigenous people, left them subordinated to markets 
and unable to partake in subsistence farming given that the area was fully converted to 
palm oil production. 
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In the case of the privately-held BHD concession that was developed a decade later, 
differentiation of the peasantry evolved along distinct lines according to the degree of 
insertion in the industry: some areas were completely overtaken by oil palm, others 
combined oil palm production with traditional mixed agroforestry practices, while a third 
frontier area to the south rejected oil palm altogether and maintained subsistence farming 
coupled with traditional rubber tapping. In the areas of Kuala Buayan leading from the 
river's edge and extending beyond the transmigrant settlement of Bhakti Jaya and 
including the BHD inti land, the larger majority of the peasant farmers and indigenous 
people were absorbed into oil palm production and no longer engaged in subsistence 
agricultural production or rubber tapping to any significant degree. The BHD concession 
had led to the transformation of local villagers, formerly engaged in mixed-farming and 
rubber production, into either smallholder plasma producers, land holding or less 
labourers linked to the inti-plasma work force, or landless villagers earning meagre 
wages as pas pasan (getting by) through rubber tapping and minor wage labour 
opportunities. Much of the locals lost access to and use of land under the oil palm 
scheme, and with over 700 kaplings yet to be distributed to locals entitled to the plots for 
the reasons mentioned earlier, a significant portion of the villagers found themselves 
dispossessed with little means of securing a sustainable livelihood now that most of the 
land was under oil palm production. For the desas that undertook some oil palm 
production, while maintaining mixed agro-forestry practices and rubber tapping, the 
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diversification of livelihoods meant that peasant farmers retained some degree of 
autonomy over their means of production and were able to benefit also from currently 
high CPO and rubber prices. And in the case of the hamlets located in the frontier areas 
that had rejected oil palm, peasants engaged entirely in a subsistence economy that also 
included earnings from rubber and retained control over village land. 
On both the PTPN XIII and BHD concessions, a significant number of plasma producers 
and peasant farmers had faced a form of 'reproduction squeeze' for a variety of reasons, 
which, in turn, allowed for the accumulation of land to occur by successful oil palm 
farmers and local owners of kaplings, as well as the loss of land by others. As noted 
earlier, many peasants and indigenous people had been given substandard smallholder 
plots, had to contend with lower quality parcels, and lost significant earning due to poor 
plasma infrastructure, to name a few, but were also saddled with large debts that became 
difficult to service, in particular during the extended slump in CPO prices that only 
started turning around from 2000 onward. Many of these highly indebted smallholders 
sold their kaplings and resorted to becoming wage labourers on inti-plasma land, with 
many of the parcels being purchased by plantation managers, mill workers, and 
successful oil palm farmers (small, medium, and large) that were able to make the 
necessary investments in the failed kaplings in order to transform them into more 
productive parcels of land. In this particular scenario, the differentiation of the peasantry 
first involved partial or complete dispossession to the industry, followed by incorporation 
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into oil palm modes of production through inti-plasma schemes, and ending with a 
surrendering of smallholder plots under adverse terms as final stage of proletarianisation, 
where land held under contract farming was lost and wage labour became the only means 
of securing a livelihood. Within the framework of peasantry differentiation, agrarian 
change, and capital accumulation associated with oil palm in its present rate of expansion 
in West Kalimantan, local livelihood strategies can be viewed as being either enabled or 
constrained by economic, social, and political relations (Hickey and du Toit 2007). The 
emergence of oil palm as a leading commodity is transforming agrarian structures and 
giving rise to particular patterns of inclusion/exclusion and adverse incorporation 
characterised by "an irreversible shift in ownership of agricultural assets away from [the] 
poor" and "a distribution of social power in the countryside that is likely to be long 
enduring" (McCarthy 2010, 845). In addition to the processes and outcomes of inclusion 
and exclusion cited earlier, the concept of adverse incorporation offers an important 
analytical lens through which the social relations between the state, market, community, 
and households lead to particular forms of interactions that produce wealth and prosperity 
for some, and chronic poverty for others in the subdistrict of Meliau. 
With the understanding that "poverty and disadvantages can flow, not from exclusion, but 
from inclusion on disadvantageous terms" (du Toit 2007), adverse incorporation 
examines how poverty is derived from processes of integration into broader economic 
and social networks with emphasis on power relations, social dynamics and political 
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economy. One of the more critical aspects of adverse incorporation involves plasma 
smallholders who lacked a clear understanding of the obligations, risks, and opportunities 
when they accepted a contract farming agreement with oil palm companies that 
essentially reduced to relations of monopoly and monopsony with the company. Not 
only did they lack a written contract outlining the details, smallholders lacked the ability 
to negotiate FFB prices, were obligated to sell their harvest to the company mill at 
uncompetitive rates, and lacked verifiable records that tracked their outstanding debt and 
credit balances. Moreover, through the farmer KUD in the various inti-plasma schemes 
including KKPA, multiple deductions were made at each harvest that lacked 
transparency, and smallholders were left thinking a number of them were simply ways to 
extract surplus from them for no justifiable reason. An important aspect of having 
smallholders enter into contract farming under unfavourable terms had to do with the 
poor conditions of plasma roads, especially on the BHD concession, which meant 
farmers experienced significant losses during the rainy season and had to face extended 
debts cycles and impoverishment as a result. Roads on the inti land were well-
maintained, in contrast. Another aspect of adverse incorporation relates to smallholders 
on the PTPN XIII concession who received substandard plasma plots that either lacked 
the minimum number of oil palm trees as per industry standard, were located on poor 
soil, or were far removed from the village, which in turn led to a significant number of 
them selling their 'failed' plots to locals who had the capital to accumulate kaplings and 
restore the plots to proper productive capacity. 
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The labour markets associated with the oil palm industry also carries elements of adverse 
incorporation for the local population working either on inti land or as part of the labour 
force for the processing mill. Many of the workers on the oil palm estate were hired as 
casual labour, lacked the security of regular and reliable earnings, and received a 
minimum wage (UMK) based on the general standard set by the government. The 
employees at the BHD mill initially tried to unionize (SPSI) in an effort to negotiate a 
fairer wage with the company and argued that the UMK rate was not sector specific, but 
rather represented an average rate across all sectors. The union organisers were fired, the 
organisation disallowed, and it was not until subsequent job action that resulted in work 
stoppage did the company agree to increase wages, though retained the 12-hour shift 
rotation that workers had asked been trying to have changed. Abetnego Tarigan (2010) 
from Sawit Watch commented on how oil palm companies who operate in Malaysia and 
in Indonesia were unable to adequately answer a question posed at an international 
meeting last year as to why workers in Indonesia earned significantly less than those in 
Malaysia even though the CPO was sold at the same international rate in both countries. 
The lower wages in Indonesia can be viewed as another incentive offered to industry by 
the government that seeks to maintain a favourable climate for investment at the expense 
of offering, what Tarigan calls a decent and fair living wage. It was noted earlier that 
PTPN XIII and BHD compete with each other for labour and generally lose out to the 
higher paying plasma farmers during harvest cycles. Instead of raising the daily rate of 
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pay to address the labour shortages, they will tend to hire labour brokers who will make 
arrangements to bring in new labour from other areas under casual labour contracts. With 
the exception of company workers at PTPN XIII, new employees are not offered housing 
benefits, nor are they entitled to any health or pension benefits either, which lowers the 
bar considerably for potential workers brought in from outside West Kalimantan. The 
BHD workers housed at Barrack 20 who presently live in dismal conditions and continue 
to wait for well water promised decades ago, have been incorporated into the industry 
under adverse conditions and retain no bargaining power with the company. On both oil 
palm concession sites, the adverse incorporation of labour and smallholders is maintained 
and reinforced by power relations and social dynamics that are grounded historically and 
have essentially become entrenched within regional and national institutions. 
In order to understand the relationship between poverty and adverse incorporation, it 
therefore becomes necessary to "explore not only the relational basis of poverty, but also 
how such relations become institutionalized in ways that ensure their effects are 
reproduced over time" (Hickey and du Toit 2007, 19). The introduction of large-scale oil 
palm plantations in the area starting with the state-led PTPN XIII came with the coercive 
elements of the military, the local police, and village leaders {adat and desa) which 
ensured that socialisation processes could be effectively by-passed and inti-plasma 
schemes could be implemented through the adverse incorporation of transmigrant and 
later local villagers. The overt use of social and political power to undertake 
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development initiatives was characteristic of the New Order era under Suharto and 
became entrenched within regional and local political systems that sought to maintain its 
authority and control over resources for personal or private gain to the detriment of the 
local population. In other words, the political power that allowed for the appropriation of 
large expanses of adat land in the initial stages of oil palm development, is also in step 
with how, under decentralisation, the regional government head {bupati) is able to issue 
HGUs without legal authority within a system that consents and condones the by-passing 
of the rule of law to maintain the status quo as directed by central national government. 
It is this same political power structure, supported locally by various groups of elites, that 
resorts to the use of force to prevent or dismantle legitimate protests and acts of resistance 
as in the case of residents of Kuala Buayan who are seeking a resolution to the 700 
kaplings that have yet to be redistributed by BHD. These social relations that support the 
interests of private (domestic or transnational) and state-led agribusiness ensure that 
smallholders and workers are adversely incorporated into the industry, and that only 
minimal taxation is paid in the form of a three percent CPO export tax that goes directly 
to the central government with no direct benefit to local communities. These same 
institutionalised political, economic, and social relations are also at work in Sanggau 
district through the promotion of 80:20 inti-plasma kemitraan schemes that will 
transform peasant farmers into a wage labour force that has lost complete control over 
private and communal village land. If we consider that more than half of all Indonesians 
confront poverty, which includes in addition to daily earnings, lack of access to basic 
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services, adequate infrastructure, and access to social and political processes, it is 
possible to see how rural chronic poverty is perpetuated in the Meliau subdistrict in light 
of how inclusion/exclusion and adverse incorporation are fundamental attributes of the 
expanding oil palm sector. 
5.3 Neoliberal Land Policies and Accumulation by Dispossession in Meliau 
Neoliberal land policies are centered on the privatisation of land and the securing of clear 
and individualised property rights as a means of increasing agricultural productivity and 
reducing rural poverty by providing the poor with greater tenure security and enabling 
them to access credit needed to make productivity-enhancing investments in land. These 
policies have been a part of neoliberal and mainstream development initiatives for 
decades, and they provide the ideological foundation upon which the Commission on the 
Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP 2008) is established which identifies the 
formalisation of property rights as one of its fours pillars that are essential to the 
reduction of poverty in developing countries. In its more recent publication, Indonesia 
Rising: Policy Priorities for 2010 and Beyond, the World Bank (2010, 3) states that in 
order to move ahead, the country needs to "substantially accelerate the titling of 
agricultural parcels to increase land security and help farmers participate in land 
markets." The Bank adds that by accelerating titling of agricultural land, farmers will be 
able to access credit, make productive investments in technology, and engage in the 
106 Cited from the Asian Development Bank's Indonesia: Strategic Vision for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (2006, 56-57). 
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production of high-value commodities attractive to domestic and export markets (Ibid., 
1). Since 1994, the World Bank has been actively supporting land privatisation in 
Indonesia through two main initiatives: the first, known as the Land Administration 
Program (LAP) and administered through BPN, was funded from 1994 to 2000, and the 
second, LNVPDP coordinated through BAPPENAS, was funded from 2000-2009 
(Arsyad 2010). In response to the recent outcry over large-scale investments in land 
(land grabbing), the World Bank and proponents of mainstream development have 
proposed a Code of Conduct (CoC) that could effectively mitigate risks to the poor and 
the environment, while ensuring that transnational investments in land still occur. 
Though this CoC has yet to be formalised or implemented, it is possible to gauge its 
potential impact within the context of the field research site in the subdistrict of Meliau. 
In addition, the land alienation, appropriation, and dispossession that followed in the 
wake of state-owned and private oil palm plantations can also be analysed in reference to 
neoliberal land policies to determine their 'pro-poor' effectiveness when applied in a real 
world setting marked by striking imbalances in social, economic, and political power. 
With the Indonesian government acting as proprietor of all forest land through the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forests, it was able to claim the right to develop 'public 
land' through oil palm development schemes that overrode all customary rights to uluyat 
lands and dismissing the encumbered rights attributed to communities who were living on 
the land and had been making productive use of it for generations. PTPN XIIPs initial 
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PIR-TRANS scheme resulted in the dispossession of the local Dayak population and led 
to the privatisation of land through an inti-plasma model that granted ownership of 
kaplings to transmigrants and other beneficiaries of oil palm development. Through a 
superficially implemented socialisation process, private and communal Dayak land was 
appropriated with the support of the state machinery that was able to selectively invoke 
legal authority over the 'public' forest land, while at the same time disregarding its legal 
obligation to obtain genuine consent from the occupants and users of the land. Though 
the principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAT) promoted by the World 
Bank and mainstream development agencies state that the "existing use or ownership 
rights to land, whether statutory or customary, primary, or secondary, formal or informal, 
group or individual, should be respected" (FAO et al. 2010, 2), in practice, this principle 
was not adhered to in the past, and there is little indication that it will be respected in the 
near future given the current frenzy over oil palm expansion and increased investment in 
land in West Kalimantan. It was only after mounting protests and growing resistance that 
PTPN XIII agreed to offer plasma land to the local Dayak through the KKPA scheme that 
involved a further surrendering of adat land that would then be included in a privatisation 
process. In this case as well, numerous irregularities surrounding the allotment of 
kaplings allowed for parcels to be disproportionately accumulated by adat and desa 
village leaders, as well as others linked to the oil palm company and various local elites. 
The privatisation of communal land thus led to land grabbing, that was further 
compounded when a number of recipients of substandard 'failed' plasma lots eventually 
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sold their holdings under the weight of non-serviceable debts. In the context where a 
development initiative of this nature occurred in a rural environment characterised by 
highly unequal class structures, the privatisation of land does not necessarily provide 
security for smallholders who are adversely incorporated into the oil palm sector, and 
more than likely further incites accumulation of land through land transfers that are 
oftentimes permanent and work against the poorer segments of rural society. 
The BHD concession proved to be even more problematic regarding the privatisation of 
land through the PIR-TRANS scheme that included a largely failed transmigrant program 
that precipitated multiple illegal land transfers, in addition to the misallocation of 
kaplings through a flawed mechanism that facilitated land grabbing by the existing 
village desa/dusun and other beneficiaries associated with them. Similar to the 
development processes of PTPN XIII, a superficial socialisation stage was used to obtain 
'consent' from the local communities, which was supplemented by the use of 
intimidation, coercion, deception, and force to ensure that the concession granted to BHD 
would be converted to oil palm. Land that was held either privately or communally was 
transformed into inti-plasma land, and the accumulation of privatised kaplings initially 
occurred along several distinct strands that left some individuals in possession of multiple 
parcels that had been sold illegitimately by transmigrants who left the area, while some 
received kaplings without entitlement, and others still obtained one ore more parcels 
according to the land they had surrendered to the scheme. The end result at present is 
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that some 700 kaplings have yet to be distributed due to the many flaws and irregularities 
in the process, and that land currently sits unproductive and largely idle as undeveloped 
or partially developed plasma parcels. The assertion by promoters of a CoC such as 
Klaus Deininger (2009) that transactions undertaken by local government are more 
1 07 
transparent in that they bypass corrupt national governments overlooks the fact that 
local governments and their capitalised allies oftentimes have more to gain personally 
from such ventures, and that the rural poor are just as vulnerable, if not more, through 
local social structures that keep them marginalised. Moreover, the assumption that 
transactions among 'multi-stakeholders' is a solution to land grabbing through a 
voluntary CoC evades the issue of genuine representation and political power as revealed 
by the field data, and the concept of 'partnerships' between agribusiness and smallholders 
embodied within CoC model remains depoliticised and unrealistic where the poor 
generally lose out and the processes favour TNCs and their local allies (Borras and 
Franco 2010b, 519-20). The BHD oil palm concession left a significant number of local 
villagers dispossessed from their land and who are still waiting for a kapling through a 
land privatisation development scheme that has yet to bring them any benefits and has 
further compromised their ability to pursue a more secure livelihood. 
Transparency International rates Indonesia 2.3 out of 10 on a corruption scale that places it 37 from 
the bottom of listed countries. A study conducted by the World Bank determined that companies spend the 
equivalent of 40 percent or more of their paid taxes in bribes (Marti 2008,21). 
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When considering the issue of clearly defined property rights allowing rural landholders 
the ability of transforming 'dead' capital into productive land through access to credit, the 
findings in Meliau subdistrict are mixed and reveal uneven outcomes that point to the 
need for a more textualised analysis than the individualisation thesis advanced by 
neoliberal land policies (Fortin 2005). There are certainly oil palm smallholders that 
were able to obtain credit through formal financial institutions that enabled them in turn 
to purchase additional kaplings and invest in intensive fertilizer use to boost production 
and accumulate greater surplus. In Cempaka, as in other research sites, however, many 
peasant farmers had yet to receive their titles, and because of the amparan system that 
tied farmers into a plasma block that released titles only once all the farmers had paid 
their debts to the company, many smallholders are likely never to receive their titles 
given that a large number of parcels fall below industry standards for optimal production. 
This block system becomes another mechanism employed by the oil palm companies that 
adversely incorporates plasma smallholders into the oil palm sector. There is also the 
complicated issue of land titles on the BHD concession where the actual 'owners' of the 
land have titles issued in the names of transmigrants as a result of complex, illegitimate 
selling of parcels as transmigrants left soon after arriving in the area, or trading of 
kaplings amongst transmigrants and local villagers, or even the reclaiming of land by 
locals once the transmigrants left. The actual holders and users of there parcels would be 
unable to access credit due to the mismatched names on the titles and do not fit the neat 
and tidy neoliberal land model. Another important point to consider is that women are 
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generally denied the opportunities that come with access to credit through titling schemes 
given that land is typically only registered in the name of the male head of the household. 
In this context women are unable to secure a better livelihood that could be derived from 
credit access, in addition to having lost access to that was informally used through 
communal systems, which places them at a disadvantage on two counts under the 
narrowly defined mainstream model. And finally, a fundamental flaw in viewing land 
and property rights strictly in terms of commodity and land markets is that in reality, 
landed property rights are not things, but are in fact social relations that are linked to 
dynamic processes of wealth creation that sustain diversified rural livelihoods (Borras 
and Franco 2010a, 9). Neoliberal land policies fail to capture this essential feature of 
rural communities in the developing world by labelling 'dead' capital, real and tangible 
assets that allow for households to maintain sustainable livelihoods and avoid falling into 
precarious states of impoverishment. 
Proponents of neoliberal land policies point to the four pillar CLEP model for poverty 
reduction strategies, hail a voluntary CoC as a means of managing problematic 
governance issues associated with large-scale land deals, and offer principles of RAI as a 
guideline for investments, yet all fail to genuinely protect the interests of the poor for a 
host of reasons. CLEP represents neoliberal ideology that celebrates markets, 
entrepreneurs, private property rights, and the rule of law, while ignoring existing power 
relations that maintain rural poverty and the capacity of those who wield power to by-
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pass the rule of law or selectively implement judicial outcomes that favour the interests of 
the ruling class (Banik 2009). In Sanggau district, the bupati regularly issues illegal 
HGUs without following the legally required socialisation process, and in a recent case, 
had authorised a concession to SJAL in an area neighbouring our research site which the 
camat in Meliau had refused to authorise. The oil palm company had nonetheless cleared 
the land, started plantation development, and had dispossessed the local villagers of then-
land without proper consultation or negotiations (Li 2010c). In a similar vein, the CoC is 
being promoted in tandem with the notion of developing 'reserve agricultural land' that is 
expected to lead to more dispossession in the name of transforming 'marginal land,' and 
even if FPIC is obtained on paper, it is rarely observed in practice, and the privatisation 
of land in no way guarantees protection against dispossession (Borras and Franco 2010b, 
519-20). The privatisation of land on the BHD concession is a case in point where a 
decade later, villagers are still waiting for their kapling entitlements. The recently 
published World Bank document, Rising Global Interests in Farmland, on the one hand, 
acknowledges that the failure to recognize local land rights is a major social issue and 
that the risks associated with large-scale investments are immense, yet, on the other hand, 
points to how these risks correspond with equally large opportunities while calling upon 
investors to proactively engage in adequate farming arrangements that also recognise 
local land rights (2010b, 102-103). Herein lays a fundamental aberration within the 
mainstream neoliberal development model: capital interests in pursuit of profit in 
investment climates where weak governance prevails will voluntarily and proactively 
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consider the interests of the rural poor that may in fact compromise the year-end balance 
sheet. As noted in the principles outlined in RAI, "increases in company and shareholder 
value will always be the main concern in any for-profit endeavour," (FAO et al. 2010, 
13), meaning that the poor will continue to lose out in a highly skewed capitalist system 
of production and trade that single-mindedly attends to ever-growing capital 
accumulation that includes, as a sideshow, an inadequate trickle-down approach to 
address the needs of the rural poor. 
The current oil palm boom that is driving the current 'land rush' in West Kalimantan and 
in other parts of Indonesia is serving to rescue capitalism from its inherent bust and boom 
cycles linked to the deeper problem of over accumulation, and is helping fuel an 
expansion into new areas along the lines of what amounts to accumulation by 
dispossession. Though Marx argued that primitive accumulation was a pre-cursor to 
capitalist modes of production which involved a violent process of enclosing the 
commons and expropriating agrarian producers from the soil, David Harvey (2005, 2006) 
has argued that the twin processes of exploitation and dispossession have in essence 
become internalised within the present-day predatory variant of neoliberal capitalism that 
continues to rely on force, fraud, or predation in pursuit of new sources of wealth and 
capital accumulation. This process includes the commodification and privatisation of 
land, the forceful expulsion of peasant populations, the conversion of various property 
rights into exclusive property rights, the suppression of rights, and through the "sheer 
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exhaustion of possibilities", the seeking out of fresh sources of labour power. In the 
subdistrict of Meliau, local peasants and indigenous people formerly engaged in mixed 
farming practices that included producing rubber for commodity markets have 
subsequently been transformed, oftentimes by force and without informed consent, into 
smallholders and wage labourers that largely serve the interests of state-owned or private 
oil palm companies. The development of the plantations has in the past, and continues to 
do so today in the context of regional policies aimed at attracting domestic and foreign 
investors, incorporated each of these elements outlined by Harvey under the framework 
of a neoliberal model of capitalist development that claims to be centered on smallholders 
and the reduction of rural poverty. In a glaring contradiction of principles noted in the 
World Bank's recent five pillar 'Action Plan' for investment in the oil palm sector that 
places smallholder farmers at the centre of each pillar (WB 2010b)108, the current 
kemitraan 80:20 inti-plasma model that is being promoted in Sanggau at the request of 
the industry has all the land managed by the estate with local villagers, who have 
surrendered their land to the scheme, working as wage labourers exclusively. In this 
regard, resistance to neoliberal capitalism is of a dual nature that involves struggles 
against dispossession and class struggles characteristic of the labour process (Harvey 
2006). 
The five pillars are: l)Raising productivity; 2) Linking farmers to markets; 3) Facilitating agricultural 
entry and exit; 4) Enhancing environmental services; and 5) Sustainability (WB 2010b, 7). 
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5.4 Rural Politics, Conflict, and Resistance in Meliau 
Meliau subdistrict was the site of all three forms of politics referred to by Kervliet (2009), 
namely official, advocacy, and everyday which took a specific form depending on the 
setting and the issue or issues that formed the point of contention for a particular group. 
The outstanding land conflicts that revolved around kaplings that had not been 
distributed to the local villagers was an overarching major area of contention on the 
PTPNXIII and BHD concessions, and active blockades were ongoing in Meliau Hulu and 
Singkuan Daok each respectively located on either side of the Kapuas River. This form 
of advocacy politics that involved "direct and concerted efforts to...criticise and oppose 
authorities" (Ibid., 232) was directed at both the state-owned and private oil palm 
companies with the protesters arguing that since the companies had yet to provide them 
with their entitled plasma parcel, they, in turn, were not entitled to access their inti (Li 
2010c). In this instance, 15 people were arrested and fined, though they refused to pay, 
and when the police came to arrest them, the villagers blocked their way and prevented 
the arrest from being executed resulting in a standoff. Advocacy politics in the form of a 
threat also came into play when smallholders on the PTPN XIII issued an impending 
threat of a blockade to the company managers if a detailed accounting of their 
outstanding plasma debt and accumulated credits was not forthcoming from the KKPA 
(Ali 2010). The company said they would look into to the matter, which is a response 
that local villagers are quite accustomed to, though it is clear that their patience is 
wearing thin. A form of advocacy politics of a more horizontal nature has been ongoing 
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for a number of years and involves Pak Yudi* in Kuala Buayan who claims to have lost 
32 hectares to BHD, has not received any plasma plots to date, and is therefore 
preventing the recipient of kaplings located on his former land from harvesting the FFBs 
(Pak Bimo* 2010). This particular conflict has occurred with both parties mutually 
agreeing to the temporary solution, but the underlying land conflict remains, and so far 
neither the BHD, nor the local kades has been able or willing to resolve the issue. 
A number of instances of everyday forms of resistance also took place on both plantation 
sites that could be described as "weapons of the weak" first defined by Scott and which 
take "the form of passive non-compliance, subtle sabotage, evasion, and deception" 
(1985, 31). In these instances, the point of conflict centered on the nature of the 
agreement between smallholders and the oil palm company whereby "the contract 
functions simultaneously as a means of subordination and a point of resistance" (Watts 
1994, 65). Smallholders in one area of Kuala Buayan were including significant 
quantities of lower grade oil palm fruit with their regular harvest which generally went 
undetected by the company and earned them a much higher return at the end of the month 
where their weigh slips from the KUD indicated only payment by gross weight. In this 
manner, smallholders felt they were getting even with the BHD that was, in their 
assessments, cheating them of a fair return on their harvests and had cost them 
considerable lost earnings over the years because of the poor road conditions that they 
refused to address (Semedi 2010). On the PTPN XIII concession, some smallholders felt 
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they were exploited by the company, so for a time they sold their FFBs to a third party 
broker who paid them slightly less per kg, but gave them cash on the spot (Ali 2010). 
However, to prevent this from happening, the company resorted to hiring the local police 
force to patrol the plantation are to ensure that the plasma fruit was making it the 
processing mill without the use of intermediaries. Michael Watts termed this form of 
everyday resistance 'tactical resistance' that could include the adulteration of produce, 
such as adding stones to the harvest to increase weight, or involve the selling of produce 
in a parallel or in spot markets that he labelled as leakage (1994, 66). 
An interesting aspect of official politics that was occurring in Meliau subdistrict had to do 
with power struggles within government institutions themselves, and also between the 
government and the oil palm companies, that adds some texture to the often-made 
assumption that the state represents a cohesive part of the social elite that scratches each 
others backs. Pak Untong, secretary to the camat in Meliau shared how his office 
recently refused to sign a new HGU concession granted by the bupati in Sanggau to the 
domestic private company SJAL {Sumatra Jaya Agro Lestari) because the company had 
not made any commitments to the farmers and there had been no socialisasi process 
witnessed by representatives from the subdistrict (Li 2010c). SJAL argued that it already 
had the agreement of the KUD, though Pak Untong pointed out that the KUD was the 
company's own instrument and that it carried no weight with the government of Meliau. 
In this scenario, the power struggle had little impact from the perspective of the local 
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villagers given that the company had already cleared the land and simply ignored posted 
signs warning them to keep out. In another case, the kades in Kuala Buayan, Pak 
Seysukardi, revealed that a legal case against the BHD had been prepared by the Bupati 's 
office in Sanggau, the National Land Agency (BPN), and the Estate Crops Department 
which attested to the legitimacy of the villagers' claim against the company, though the 
courts had still ruled in favour of BHD (Li 2010c). This incident lends credence to a 
statement made in 2002 by the UN Special Rapporteur regarding the judicial system in 
Indonesia where he made reference to endemic corruption that "seeps right from the 
police, the prosecutors, and to the courts" (Marti 2008, 21). Abetnego Tarigan from 
Sawit Watch mentioned in an interview that the Ministry of Water in Sanggau district had 
to deal with serious issue of contamination of the local water due to effluents from CPO 
processing mills, yet it was having difficulty getting the necessary funds from PTPN XIII 
and the central government to deal with the problem (Tarigan.2010). These internal 
struggles related to official politics within the Indonesian political and judiciary system 
point to the high degree of influence held by the oil palm industry that engages in money 
politics with political allies to support oil palm projects that place capital accumulation 
and profit-seeking ahead of community needs and rural livelihoods. 
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5.5 Oil Palm in Meliau, West Kalimantan: Opportunity or Threat? 
In order to determine the opportunities and threats associated with the rapidly expanding 
oil palm sector in the area, examining the beneficiaries of the current industry serves an 
appropriate starting point in this assessment. Clearly, the largest winners in the 
development of oil palm plantations are the state-owned and private companies, domestic 
and transnational. Through various inti-plasma schemes they are able to appropriate 
massive forest areas formerly held under customary tenure and benefit, not only from the 
valuable timber resources that are extracted in the development process, but also from the 
credit they are able to secure through the privatisation of plasma parcels and the 
smallholder titles they hold in trust until amparan debts are paid in full. The oil palm 
companies are also able to extract surplus accumulation on the labour working on the 
estate land on a minimum wage established by the government, as well as on plasma 
production through monopsonistic and monopoly relations, in addition to the 
accumulation that occurs via the KUD and KKPA mechanisms. Given the permissive 
regulatory climate that promotes the systematic circumvention of Indonesian laws 
favourable to the industry, a large number of benefits accrue to the oil palm companies. 
The socialisation processes and environmental impact assessments are avoided or only 
superficially undertaken, which allows for large-scale development to take place with a 
complete disregard for the local population and the environment in which they live. In 
addition, the required five percent of profit that is to return to the regional government 
and local communities according to PERDA 2004 is not paid, which represents a sizeable 
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savings for the company and results in severely underfunded infrastructure and public 
services for villagers and urban centres in the concession area. Moreover, as a result of 
more than half the HGUs being issued illegally through the bupati, companies are exempt 
from paying land and building taxes to the regional government, representing another 
savings and incentive for investors. The oil palm industry is a highly profitable one and 
presently yields the best return on land investment according to Karl Deininger at the 
World Bank, yet companies are only required to pay a three percent CPO export tax that 
goes directly to Jakarta which also figures as one of the main beneficiaries of the 
booming sector. At an oil palm producer meeting held in East Kalimantan, it was 
reported that last year's national upstream and downstream earnings derived from CPO 
production was estimated to be US$ 50 billion with the lion's share of the profits being 
funnelled to domestic and foreign investors (Tarigan 2010). 
The oil palm sector also presents opportunities for select government and local elites who 
benefit directly from their positions of authority and are able to extend those benefits to 
family members and associated allies. It is common knowledge that government 
officials, specifically the bupati, is able to exact an unofficial issuance fee for HGUs 
licenses.1 9 As revealed in the BHD oil palm concession, the local desa and dusun in 
Kuala Buayan, as well as individuals linked to them, were able to profit directly from the 
development scheme by supporting the initiative that lacked village consent and which 
109 According to the Director General of Sawit Watch this fee is in the range of about IDR 1 billion per 
1000 hectares (Tarigan 2010). 
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netted them undisclosed amounts of money and control over the kapling land bank that 
was in part distributed to unentitled individuals. On the PTPN XIII concession, village 
and adat leaders also benefitted from a disproportionate number of plasma parcels, in 
addition to employment guarantees with the company and on the plantation for members 
of their families that villagers in general did not have access to (Ali 2010). Company 
managers, local government officials, and members of the police were also able to benefit 
from the many 'failed' substandard haplings that were issued in the KKPA scheme at the 
PTPN XIII site, by accumulating parcels at a low price that now, once restored to 
industry standard, are yielding high returns. There is also the issue of a skewed taxation 
system in Indonesia that further benefits the central government at the expense of 
regional budgets and which involves upper and middle management at the PTPN Xffl 
and the BHD. According to national tax laws, these upper bracket income earners in the 
oil palm sector are able to register in Jakarta for income tax purposes, which means their 
tax dollars stay in Jakarta and are not redistributed to the regions where their salaries are 
actually earned (Tarigan 2010). The process of decentralisation in Indonesia has not 
rectified this loop-hole which places greater pressure on regional governments to attract 
investors and enact policies favourable to business as in the case of the latest kemitraan 
schemes. The AAC (BHD subsidiary) concession and other neighbouring plantations in 
the Ensunak area, for example, are currently in a phase of rapid expansion under this 
'partnership' scheme that has triggered land grabbing by outsiders who are purchasing 
parcels of 50 to 200 hectares as an oil palm investment (Li 2010c). An elite class of local 
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and external capitalised individuals and groups fall within the beneficiaries that are the 
'winners' of the oil palm boom. 
Other social classes that have been able to benefit from oil palm opportunities comprise 
large and small local landowners, transmigrant and local plasma farmers, full time and 
casual inti-plasma workers, as well as company employees at PTPN XIII and BHD. In 
the Kuala Buayan desas original holders of large parcels of land and who received a 
proportional number of kaplings according the inti-plasma scheme benefitted greatly 
from the introduction of oil palm and witnessed a ten-fold or more increase in land value 
when selling parcels to individuals. Successful plasma farmers that included 
transmigrants and local villagers who also received properly developed kaplings were 
also able to obtain good earnings, and in many cases, they went on to acquire additional 
parcels based on accumulated capital or credit from the bank once they received clear 
title for their land. There were smallholders, as well, as noted in the research undertaken 
in Cempaka, who benefitted from extension services and training offered in Parindu that 
enabled them to make use of high input agricultural techniques which resulted in better 
net earnings in present high CPO markets. The development of oil palm presented an 
opportunity for casual and full-time work for local villagers, many of whom were in 
possession of disposable income for the first time and who invested in consumer goods 
like motorcycles, cell phones, and other goods. The current labour markets in the area 
positioned harvesters in a favourable bargaining position, and many workers involved in 
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the industry reported having better standards of living that exceeded those when they 
relied on rubber tapping for cash earnings. Plantation workers and processing mill 
employees were generally able to benefit from regular earnings, which over time, made it 
possible for them to purchase their own kaplings and engage in oil palm production as a 
smallholder. In addition to these beneficiaries, multiplier effects could also be identified 
with the increased income that came into communities as local stores (warung) attested to 
higher sales since the arrival of oil palm. 
In contrast to the spectrum of opportunities that reach across a wide range of social 
classes, the oil palm industry has brought with it major threats and devastating outcomes 
for the poorer segments of rural society that face uncertain livelihoods and prospects for 
the generations that will follow. The most devastating impact has been the outright 
dispossession of Dayak communities on the PTPN XIII concessions that find themselves 
completely hemmed in by oil palm and have lost the ability to engage in mixed farming 
and traditional land use practices. From an economic and cultural standpoint, many 
households are experiencing a tragic loss that cannot be recovered through wage labour 
on a plantation or smallholder oil palm farming on a single kapling. The reality for a 
number of households is that they no longer have a plasma holding, they must seek out 
low paying casual work on inti or plasma land, and they are unsure of their children's 
future on land completely transformed by industrial oil palm production. According to 
data from Bappeda, the Regional Development Planning Board, adat land in West 
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Kalimantan has gone from 6.9 million hectares in 2003 to 60,000 hectares in 2006 (Sirait 
2009, 26), meaning that the privatisation of land through plasma-inti schemes is 
dramatically altering landscapes and livelihoods for indigenous communities across the 
province. As with the Dayak who did not provide FPIC for the development of the PTPN 
XIII concession, similarly, many of the villagers living in the BHD concession did not 
provide informed consent with a large number experiencing outright dispossession, 
though of a slight different nature. As a result of poorly managed and corrupt processes 
that were inherent in the implementation of this project, some 700 substandard, 
inadequately, and oftentimes remote kaplings have yet to be allotted to villagers who are 
entitled to plasma plots and have waited for more than a decade for their allotment. A 
number of villagers, as well, are waiting for their due kaplings from the PTPN XITI 
company in compensation for ladang land that they owned on the north side of the river. 
On both plantations, local communities experienced a complete, or near complete, loss of 
access and control over land, and as a result lost the security that came with a once 
diversified rural livelihood that included mixed agro-forestry practices. 
Another significant 'threat' associated with the booming oil palm sector is the manner in 
which locals and transmigrants were adversely incorporated into relations of production 
characterised by the PIR-TRANS and KKPA schemes. First, a considerable number of 
transmigrants who arrived to the BHD site were soon forced to leave the area because 
they were misled into believing the kaplings were already developed and were unable to 
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wait out the five years or so required to start receiving earnings from their harvested fruit. 
The transmigrants that provided the labour force for BHD's inti land were provided the 
barest of living conditions, and today they continue to reside in largely dilapidated and 
neglected housing units that still lack access to fresh water and remains a testimony of the 
company's lack of concern for its workers. Second, plasma smallholders were 
incorporated in contract farming scheme that lacked transparency and left them 
vulnerable to exploitation and surplus accumulation at the hands of the oil palm 
companies that managed their accounts through the KKPA and KUD. Smallholders 
remained ignorant of the balance owing on their debt, were unclear as to the multiple 
deductions that were taken from their regular harvests, and were also purchasing their 
inputs through the KUD that opened up an opportunity for additional graft taken from 
their earnings. In the end, many smallholders who had expected to complete their 
payment cycle in about 8 years had not done so 18 years later which left them in a debt 
cycle they could not break given that replanting would be required by the 25th year 
bringing in a new series of debt. Moreover, the amparan system ensured that even when 
smallholders had paid off their debts and were entitled to their land certificate, their 
waiting period for clear title could be protracted indefinitely. And third and major factor 
in the adverse incorporation of smallholders was in the lack of infrastructure support from 
the BHD that seriously compromised the kapling farmers' ability to maintain productive 
oil palm parcels as poor road conditions could lead to 50 percent or more of their harvest 
being rejected by the processing mill. As noted by the kades in Kuala Buayan, the BHD 
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only attend to inti roads and provide no roads or services for the plasma smallholders. 
This problem in turn only protracted the debt cycle and resulted in some farmers needing 
to sell their kaplings and seek out livelihood alternatives. 
The opportunities and threats linked to the oil palm industry in Meliau should not be 
viewed in isolation either given that there are important relations between the two that 
work at a great disadvantage rural communities, and in particular, for the poorer social 
classes. The vastly disproportionate opportunities for agribusiness in the oil palm sector 
far outweigh those that accrue to the local elites, yet both these groups conspire to extract 
the maximum of surplus capital and benefits at the expense of rural communities and 
those incorporated into the industry, even the successful ones. In this regard, when the 
positive outcomes for smallholders, local workers, and local communities are considered 
in relation to the missed opportunity for the development of local infrastructure and 
public services that are desperately needed in these areas, they become losers as well 
alongside the rest of the rural population has not been able to directly benefit from the 
growing industry. The major difference is that villagers, who are not engaged in any way 
with oil palm production and no longer have access to alternative livelihood strategies of 
mixed farming and rubber tapping, are the most vulnerable in rural society and are the 
first to suffer from economic shocks in a system that offers minimal public support to 
those most in need. This social group is made up of women, children, the elderly and 
others who are within an excluded segment of the rural community that is progressively 
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dominated by a single industry that is deepening the divide between the included and the 
excluded. So while proponents of a "new agriculture" led by agribusiness that forges 
'win'win' partnerships with smallholders and rural communities under a mainstream 
development model, the situation in Meliau speaks of another reality, one in which 
money politics and the corporate imperative of accumulation team up to deprive large 
segments of society from their entitlement to the benefits of 'development.' In the 
context of the most recent investment frenzy that is bearing down hard on the forested 
areas of West Kalimantan, it is likely that the next wave of 'development' will have an 
even greater fallout that in previous years in light of new regional policies that are 
opening the door wide open for agribusiness and oil palm expansion. 
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Chapter 6: Summary Findings, Implications for Development, and Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have examined the political economy of agrarian change in West 
Kalimantan, Indonesia in relation to the expanding oil palm industry that is linked to the 
current biofuel boom and global land grabbing. As a process of inquiry, I have sought to 
determine the impact of the growing oil palm sector on rural livelihoods in Sanggau 
district where the most extensive expansion is currently underway, in addition to 
determine how the industry is affecting access to and control over productive resources 
like land. Specifically, I have examined the social relations through which rural people 
gain access to, or are excluded from the benefits of high growth agriculture with the 
intention of understanding the processes and mechanisms that underlie present-day rural 
differention in the subdistrict of Meliau. The analysis for this research project has been 
framed within a political economy framework guided by four key aspects of inquiry, 
namely who owns what?, who does what?, who gets what?, and what do they do with it 
and how? as first proposed by Henry Bernstein (2010). I have endeavoured to situate my 
analysis within the current debate surrounding biofuels and land grabbing that places the 
recent phenomena either as being one of 'opportunity' or of 'threat' with respect to rural 
communities in developing countries. This research project will thus entail contrasting a 
political economy perspective with a mainstream neoliberal development model that 
adopts a 'win-win' approach regarding the latest rise in demand for biofuels and 
agricultural land. 
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By undertaking field work in Meliau subdistrict, I have attempted to understand the twin 
processes of dispossession and incorporation that are associated with the Indonesian oil 
palm industry and have been sought to answer four central questions. The main research 
questions are, how and to what extent are oil palm expansion and land grabbing affecting 
livelihoods and levels of poverty in rural Indonesia?; how, to what extent, and under what 
terms is peasant dispossession taking place?; how, to what extent and under what terms is 
the incorporation of peasants into the oil palm sector taking place?; and what are the 
implications of peasant dispossession and incorporation for rural social differentiation in 
particular, and for development, more generally? My hypothesis is that the oil palm 
boom is leading to highly uneven outcomes in rural Indonesia: alongside the wealth that 
is created, a significant number of peasants and indigenous people are subjected to 
dispossession and are being adversely incorporated into the industry, both of which are 
undermining rural livelihoods and are leading to greater incidences of poverty, in 
particular within marginalised segments of rural society. In the following section, I will 
provide detailed answers to these key research questions, and in the final section, I will 
review the main implications for development based on my research findings. I will first 
being with an overview of the main concepts and theoretical considerations addressed in 
the thesis before proceeding to the summary findings. 
6.1 Overview and Summary Findings 
The sharp rise in demand for biofuels, largely stemming from incentives and policy 
initiatives from OECD countries and elsewhere, is closely linked to the current food, 
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financial, and environmental crises, all of which are driving a rapid increase in large-scale 
investments in agricultural land. Mainstream development agencies like the World Bank, 
IFPRI, the FAO, and others are drawing attention to the opportunities offered by the 
surge in interest in increasing global agricultural production. They point to agribusiness 
as leading the way in a 'new agriculture' that will include 'partnerships' between 
entrepreneurial smallholders who will play an integral part in increasing the productivity 
of land and supplying the growing demand for food and biofuel feedstocks. Various civil 
society groups, social movements, and NGOs warn, in contrast, that agriculturally-based 
biofuels will only drive up global hunger, will not offer a solution to growing energy 
needs, nor will it address pressing long-term environmental issues. They add that it will 
ultimately incite a land rush that will displace and dispossess countless rural poor who 
rely on access to public land, as well as 'marginal' and 'idle' land for their livelihoods 
which are now all being targeted for potential development. In the case of Indonesia, the 
oil palm sector is being spurred on by the increase in the global demand for biodiesel and 
agricultural food products made from palm oil, which has prompted a projected three-fold 
increase in plantation area across the country over the next decade. West Kalimantan is 
the site of greatest expansion in the country, 5 million hectares, and the land use changes 
associated with this increase involve converting existing forest land, as well as land 
deemed 'marginal' or 'degraded', into monocrop oil plantations under various estate-
smallholder schemes. Field research undertaken in Meliau subdistrict across 20 sites that 
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included five desas situated in the heartland of state-owned and private oil palm 
plantations has provided the empirical data upon which this thesis is based. 
In the analytical framework, I have presented the main underlying principles of 
capitalism and primitive accumulation as outlined by Marx, and I have argued that 
primitive accumulation has become an embedded process within neoliberal capitalism, 
and that the term 'accumulation by dispossession' better describes present-day capitalist 
expansion as noted by David Harvey. The implication is that economic development 
along neoliberal principles rests upon the use of force, fraud, and predation in the process 
of appropriation of productive assets. The resistance to neoliberal capitalism therefore 
becomes a struggle against dispossession, in addition to the class struggles that are 
characteristics of the labour process outlined by Marx. I have also argued that, though 
the current global economic crisis is in part linked to Marx's three theories of crisis that 
describe the characteristic boom and bust cycles of capitalist modes of production, it is 
ultimately rooted in a crisis of over accumulation (Bello 2007), that in turn, is directly 
related to the recent interest in agricultural land. The current biofuel boom and surge in 
large-scale land investments is in essence an attempt to save capitalism from itself and to 
rectify this crisis of accumulation by extending capitalist modes of production into new 
areas and new markets. In addition, I have outlined how peasant differentiation plays an 
integral part of capitalist expansion into subsistence or mixed economies. This process, 
often violent, involves rendering peasants 'free' from the means of production, namely 
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dispossessing them from their land, whereby they become 'free' in the dual sense to sell 
their labour power as a commodity. The development of oil palm plantations has 
unfolded along similar lines, with the added variant of outgrower schemes, or contract 
farming, that keeps smallholders subordinated to commodity markets, while at the same 
institutionalising monopoly and monopsony relations (Mackintosh 1990) thus creating 
conditions for adverse incorporation. This latter term is used to describe processes of 
integration into economic and social networks that give rise to poverty, and contract 
farming under inti-plasma schemes in Indonesia, embody the adverse terms of 
incorporation that lead to exploitation and greater poverty. 
The theoretical framework also included an analysis of neoliberal land policies and the 
land component of the CLEP approach as a model for reducing poverty, both of which 
are inherently flawed for a number of reasons. The single-minded focus of land 
privatisation and the need for individualised property rights as a means of reducing rural 
poverty fail to capture the complexity of social relations embedded within land in a 
diversity of rural settings, and do not offer a guarantee against dispossession, nor do they 
necessarily translate into access to credit and investments in land to increase productivity. 
Similarly, the CLEP model equally misrepresents the causes of poverty as being excluded 
from the rule of law, when in fact poverty can derive from adverse incorporation into 
dynamic economies governed by the rule of law (Cousins 2009), and the approach 
remains 'anaemic' in its analysis of power relations that underlie chronic poverty (Banik 
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2009). I illustrate, as well how neoliberal land policies fail to consider the impact of their 
policies on women in rural settings who are often denied holding legal titles to land, yet 
access land informally and communally which would be lost to them once land became 
privatised. In this section, I also argue that the voluntary Code of Conduct proposed by 
the advocates of the neoliberal development model is woefully inadequate in protecting 
the interests of the poor given the uneven playing field and the imbalances of power that 
exist between the various actors involved in these transactions. The lack of political 
analysis by the World Bank on how the Code of Conduct is expected to succeed (Scoones 
2010) remains the most critical shortcoming of this proposed solution, and as a result, is 
most likely to fail in safeguarding against the threats and risks associate with land 
grabbing. And finally, I underlined how neoliberal globalisation is increasingly 
becoming a catalyst for growing resistance in the countryside. The oil palm expansion 
currently underway in Indonesia, which is driven by corporate agribusiness working in 
tandem with national and local government, is a focal point of escalating conflict as rural 
resistance manifests as either official or advocacy politics, or forms of everyday 
resistance. 
When considering the research question of how and to what extent the oil palm expansion 
and land grabbing are affecting livelihoods and levels of poverty in Indonesia, the field 
work in Meliau has revealed uneven outcomes depending on the degree of participation 
and insertion in the industry. Successful plasma smallholders and larger land owners in 
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possession of multiple kaplings are able to secure significant monthly earnings based on 
the current high market value of CPO, whether these parcels were obtain through 
legitimate entitlement or were acquired by illegitimate or coercive means. These peasant 
farmers and indigenous people who once relied on more meagre earnings derived from 
mixed agroforestry practices that included rubber tapping have been able to increase their 
incomes substantially, which has also allowed a number of successful producers to 
accumulate additional kaplings over time. Wealth ranking conducted in the village of 
Cempaka revealed that 45 percent of the households had one or more plasma parcels, and 
20 percent owned two or more kaplings with some having six or more productive two 
hectare land holdings, which placed them in the wealthiest social strata of the village. A 
transmigrant from NTT who came to the area 17 years ago had shared in an interview 
that by owning a single kapling their family was much better off than when they lived in 
their place of origin as subsistence farmers, adding that they could now afford to send 
their children to school (Ibu Marianne* 2010). Local villagers were also able to benefit 
from work opportunities that came with the oil palm industry, be it as casual labourers on 
inti or plasma land, or as part of the regular employees at the processing mills in both 
plantation concessions. The harvesters in particular that were able to perform the more 
difficult task of cutting the FFBs down and transporting them to the mill were able to 
gain significant earnings given that their wages was based on the total weight harvested. 
In additional, the local warungs and stores in Meliau where most villagers purchased 
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their monthly supplies also benefited from the increased earnings that circulated in the 
area stemming from the oil palm industry. 
There were, however, a significant number of villagers who did not own kaplings for 
many of the reasons cited earlier and who were not directly or indirectly involved in the 
oil palm industry, which left them pursuing more precarious livelihoods and experienced 
varying degrees of impoverishment. On the PTPN XIII concession alternatives to oil 
palm as a livelihood strategy had all but disappeared, and those excluded from the sector 
faced out migration or lived with family members as in the case of the elderly who were 
too old to take part in labour-intensive agricultural farming. For the desas located on the 
BHD concession, villages furthest away from the Kapuas River remained on the fringes 
of the plantation and had retained mixed agroforesty practices and rubber tapping, while 
other villages were only partially involved in oil palm production and kept up traditional 
practices as well, and a third segment of villages had been completely overtaken by oil 
palm and lacked access to alternative livelihood strategies. This particular group of 
villagers were oftentimes among the most vulnerable given that they were excluded from 
the booming sector and were hard pressed to access land that could provide them with a 
means of subsistence. They fell into a category of villagers considered to be pas pasan 
meaning they were just getting by, had no means of accumulation, and could make up 20 
to 30 percent of a local population. One elderly villager living along the Kuala Buayan 
River had noted that oil palm was suitable for the young, but was too difficult for the 
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older generations that preferred rubber tapping as a livelihood strategy that could 
provided a steady source of income now that rubber prices were high (Semedi 2010). 
Unfortunately, a large segment of the rubber gardens had been destroyed in the initial 
development of the BHD concession, and villagers excluded from the sector had to rely 
on support from family members (moral economy) or on irregular local casual work. 
Given the poorly funded public services in the area, this group did not have much of a 
social net upon which to rely, which kept them in a highly vulnerable state of existence. 
The second research question related to how, to what extent, and under what terms is 
peasant dispossession taking place addresses a critical issue because access to and control 
over land remains the most crucial factor of production when constructing sustainable 
rural livelihoods. In the process of development of both PTPN XIII and BHD through 
the PIR-TRANS inti-plasma scheme, oil palm plantations came to Meliau with the full 
support of the state machinery that included coercion, manipulation, and force, which 
allowed for the appropriation of adat customary land and locally-held land that amounted 
to wide-spread dispossession of a large group of local communities living in the area. 
Armed with the Basic Forestry Law of 1967, the state was able to claim 'eminent 
domain' over all forest land regardless of vegetation or current use, which initiated a 
cumulative and permanent process of agrarian change (White 1989) that reconfigured 
existing social structures characteristic of state simplifications (Scott 1985) and processes 
of territorialisation to control resources and local populations (Li 1999). Indigenous 
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people and local peasants also faced dispossession through a series of processes and 
mechanisms reflective of corrupt power relations controlled by local elites and the state, 
embodied in the TP3K task force charged with resolving land disputes and that continues 
to leave a large number of kaplings in the hands of the oil palm companies and out of the 
hands of entitled local villagers. Within the context of the current kemitraan scheme in 
Sanggau that has reversed the inti-plasma ratio in favour of oil palm investors under a 
new 'one-roof management' model that serves the interests of domestic and foreign 
capital, peasants and indigenous people face even greater pressures of dispossession. 
Whether oil palm development takes place under the repressive New Order Suharto 
regime or in the present decentralised model of governance, villagers inevitably are 
subjected to the twin hazards of more pervasive state control and reduced bargaining 
power in relation to local elites (Li 2007). The outstanding issues related to land remain 
the most contentious in the area and stand out as a critical source of conflict and tension 
around which rural social movements, peasant movements, indigenous people 
movements, and civil society rally around in a variety of forms. 
Another important feature of this research project is captured by the third question that 
seeks to address how, to what extent and under what terms is the incorporation of 
peasants into the oil palm sector taking place. Through inti-plasma schemes, oil palm 
smallholders have been incorporated into the industry under highly adverse terms 
whereby farmer cooperatives like KKPA and KUD largely serve the interests of the 
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companies that fund the organisations. The processes and mechanisms inherent within 
this model of contract farming essentially subordinate smallholders through monopoly 
and monopsonistic relations with the oil palm company. In addition, plasma farmers are 
not only deprived of a written contract that outlines terms and obligations of the 
agreement, they also lack any form of transparent accounting on the part of the 
cooperatives in terms of their ongoing debt, balance of credits, an itemized list (and 
justification for the regular deductions that are taken from their monthly harvest earnings. 
As a result, many smallholders have been locked into a protracted debt cycle without 
understanding or being able to track their earnings through a process that lacks 
transparency and places them in a highly vulnerable to exploitation. For this reason, the 
SPKS in West Kalimantan, representing smallholder oil palm farmers and indigenous 
people are striving to gain control over the cooperatives as an important step in bringing 
in greater transparency and producer autonomy in the industry (Sirait 2009). A large 
number of kaplings were also not developed to industry standards, which greatly reduced 
the productive capacity of smallholders and drew them into further debt given that they 
were still expected to assume the full costs associated with plasma parcels and were 
subjected to regular deductions regardless of their harvest volume. Another critical 
element of the adverse terms of incorporation for smallholders is related to the poor 
conditions of the roads within the plasma that results in a loss of 50 percent or more in 
earnings, especially during the raining season, where the company mill rejects FFBs that 
have spoiled because they were delivered outside the 48 hour window from the time of 
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harvest. The company attends exclusively to the inti roads and transfers the 
responsibility of maintenance over to the local government which clearly lacks the 
funding to undertake such a project. Smallholders experience adverse incorporation into 
the oil palm industry, and the most vulnerable of plasma farmers who are unable to 
sustain these terms and the associated economic shocks that follow are then forced to sell 
their kaplings on oftentimes unfavourable terms that propels them into cycles of chronic 
poverty. 
The final research question refers to the implications of peasant dispossession and 
adverse incorporation with respect to social differentiation, and a number of key 
observations can be in the context of the oil palm industry in Meliau. One important 
implication of peasant and indigenous people dispossession is that a growing number of 
people who have depended on the access to and control over forest land through mixed 
farming practices for generations are being either summarily ejected from rural settings 
or are being transformed into a class of labour in service of capitalist modes of production 
that deprives them of any autonomy or sovereignty over the construction of a sustainable 
livelihood. For many who face the possibility outmigration and must exit the agricultural 
sector following dispossession and with no ability to obtain regular employment in the 
sector, usually do so under the most adverse of conditions with little prospect of being 
able to lift themselves out of poverty. These rural poor follow patterns of out migration 
that often takes them to "urban slums and continued poverty," which is part of the fallout 
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of World Bank development strategies that aim to "transfer land to the most productive 
users" that leads to a "migration out of agriculture" (World Bank 2007, 6-9) and which is 
treated as a reasonable outcome arising from the further penetration of capital-intensive 
agriculture in developing countries like Indonesia. The development and expansion of 
the oil palm sector in Meliau that is progressively dominated by agribusiness TNCs has 
resulted in "shifts in patterns of control over the means of production" (White 1989, 26) 
through processes of differentiation linked to social power that are widening and 
deepening the divide between rural social classes and driving increasing numbers into 
chronic poverty. In addition to the dispossessed peasants and indigenous people, oil palm 
smallholders who have been adversely incorporated into the industry are also vulnerable 
in that they become "potential prey for socio-political predators either within or outside 
of the agribusiness core" (White 1997, 106). These patterns of social differentiation are 
creating new vulnerabilities as well with respect to women who are excluded from land 
allocation in their own right, and no longer have access to land on which to pursue 
diversified livelihood strategies. 
6.2 Implications for Development 
Field research in Meliau has pointed to a number of key implications for development in 
reference to policies aimed at reducing rural poverty in the context of the current oil palm 
boom and the land grabbing that is occurring in the wake of high capital interest in 
expanding the industry. A first point to consider is that even though large-scale 
investments are being directed to increasing agricultural production under the rubric of 
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'rural development and poverty reduction,' it is necessary to examine the processes and 
mechanisms underlying these initiatives from a perspective of agrarian political economy 
in order to understand the class-based social, political, and economic dynamics that are 
transforming rural landscapes in developing countries. The assumption cannot be made 
that high capital investments in agriculture and in agricultural land will necessarily lead 
to favourable outcomes for the diversity of communities that depend on access to land for 
their livelihoods, and in particular the more marginalised and poorer classes of rural 
society. The steadfastly linear 'modernisation' narrative held by advocates of 
mainstream neoliberal policies such as the World Bank rests on "a narrow economistic 
conceptualisation" (Scoones 2010) of agricultural development and fails to acknowledge 
that the transformation of agriculture along capitalist lines systematically produces 
poverty alongside the wealth that it generates (Li and Semedi 2009). By adopting a 
purely economic frame of reference, neoliberal policies conveniently ignore the existing 
power differentials and the rural social dynamics through which their development 
initiatives articulate and which lead to widespread dispossession and the exploitation of 
labour. Ample evidence emerged in the field research conducted in Meliau that social 
elites working in support of domestic and transnational capital were able to circumvent 
the law and force through the development of oil palm plantations without the consent of 
local communities and succeeded in appropriating productive resources that brought little 
in return to the areas from which the wealth was generated. This approach to 
development constitutes a rationalisation of how right of ownership changes into the 
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appropriation of other people's property and how commodity exchange turns into 
exploitation (Luxemburg 2003). Another critical shortcoming of this neoliberal model is 
that it not only fails to recognise how such an approach to agricultural development can 
result in elite capture at the local level, it also justifies this process by pointing to the 
importance of supporting successful and productive farmers who stood to gain the most 
from the investment venture, yet who ultimately 'squeezed out' large segments of peasant 
producers and forced them into greater poverty. 
This leads to a second important implication for development based on the Meliau 
research project that relates to the root causes of poverty that are relational in nature and 
extend well beyond simplistic models of inclusion and exclusion according to the residual 
approach that is inherent in mainstream development models. There are a number of 
fault lines that can be traced in the neoliberal approach to poverty, the first being that it 
categorically ignores how the capitalist development model ejects large segments of the 
population as a natural course of events and that results in a reserve army of labour that 
serves the needs of capital. Even the residual model to poverty reduction fails to 
acknowledge the scope and magnitude of this by-product of capitalist production modes, 
and it resorts to strategic policies in an attempt to 'include' some of the fallout in the 
labour force that it helped create. There was certainly much data obtained in Meliau that 
pointed to the generation of rural poverty that fit patterns of inclusion and exclusion, but 
that were nonetheless rooted in the interactions between social classes and the power, or 
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the lack thereof, embedded within those interactions defined by imbalances characteristic 
of rural societies. The relational nature of poverty on the plantation concessions was 
abundantly evident: village leaders allotting kaplings to family members and friends, 
while villagers waited, and continue to wait, for their entitled plasma holding; district 
appointed task forces made up of local elites charged with resolving existing land 
conflicts, yet are themselves beneficiaries of oftentimes illegitimately acquired parcels; 
and oil palm companies being exempt from returning 5 percent of their earnings to the 
local communities where they are based that results in sustained chronic poverty for the 
entire area, to name a few. In addition, development policies often overlook how poverty 
is created through adverse incorporation into relations of production that can become 
institutionalised over time and become a root cause of chronic poverty. In this regard, the 
complex and multidimensional nature of rural poverty reaches well beyond simple 
models of inclusion or exclusion found within the residual approach of mainstream 
development policies. 
Finally, central to the current debates surrounding the issue of large-scale investments in 
agriculture and present-day land grabbing are neoliberal land policies, a voluntary Code 
of Conduct (CoC), and the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI), 
which also have important implications for development. I have already illustrated a 
number of important shortcomings in neoliberal land policies that uphold the privatisation 
of land and the individualisation of property rights as the solution to increasing 
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agricultural productivity and reducing rural poverty, though I would like to further 
examine the CoC that is one of the neoliberal cornerstones of addressing the threats and 
risks associated with land grabbing. What is utterly perplexing about the latest World 
Bank (2010b) publication on the topic of rising global interest in farmland is that it 
outlines a number of examples where rural communities have been dispossessed, unfairly 
compensated, and suffered a loss of assets as a result of issues related to weak 
governance and institutional shortfalls, yet it maintains that a voluntary CoC will 
effectively mitigate and prevent threats against the poor. As Ian Scoones (2010, 6) points 
out, the Bank's research shows clearly why such principles are unlikely to work, namely 
lack of capacity, failures of institutional authorities, and corrupt practices to name a few. 
Moreover, the World Bank need not look to problems of governance in developing 
countries to determine why a CoC would not work to protect the interests of the poor. In 
August of 2009, the Bank's own IFC branch was found guilty by the Compliance 
Advisory Ombudsman of having manipulated internal procedures relating to the social 
and environmental risks associated with a Wilmar Group oil palm development project 
Sumatra, which the IFC helped fund, despite it being in clear violation of IFC protocol 
(Colchester et al. 2009). Though the World Bank later announced that it would not issue 
any new funding for oil palm development until it had formulated a comprehensive 
strategy to effectively deal with the issue, it is apparent that only cosmetic changes were 
undertaken given its most recent CoC proposal. And when the RAI (FAO et al. 2010, 1) 
states that investments in agriculture must "do no harm to the environment," it becomes 
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clear that 'double-speak' abounds in mainstream approaches to development when 
considering that the oil palm industry in Indonesia involves widespread deforestation and 
the implementation of high input monocrop industrial agriculture. Such platitudes join a 
long list of development jargon such as 'sustainability' and 'green energy' biofuels that 
attempt to create public consent for development initiatives that largely serve to advance 
the interests of agribusiness TNCs set on extending neoliberal capitalist accumulation 
deeper into the rural heartland of the global South. 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
The emerging biofuel complex that is being driven by OECD government subsidies and 
supportive policies worldwide is giving rise to large-scale land grabbing by governments 
and powerful agribusiness conglomerates allied in new North-South-South partnerships. 
The current Indonesian palm oil complex, which is dominated by TNC giants such as 
Cargill, AMD-Kuck-Wilmar, and Synergy Drive, is poised to capitalise on the sharp rise 
in demand for biodiesel and food products derived from oil palm and is set to lead the 
plantation expansion that is expected to triple in area over the next decade. West 
Kalimantan is the province slated for the largest expansion, 5 million hectares, and new 
regional policies in the Sanggau district are aimed at attracting investors and creating a 
climate favourable to domestic and foreign agribusiness. Mainstream development 
agencies and neoliberal land policies are aiming to facilitate the process of agricultural 
development with important consequences for rural communities, and in particular for the 
poorer segments of rural society that are most vulnerable to capitalist incursions. Field 
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research undertaken in the subdistrict of Meliau in the summer of 2010 has revealed 
highly uneven outcomes whereby opportunities and wealth accrue to certain segments of 
the rural population, while a large number experience displacement, dispossession, and 
adverse incorporation along patterns of rural differentiation that are sharpening the divide 
between social classes that are characteristic of the oil palm industry. Sawit Watch 
reports a steady rise in conflicts related to plantation development across the archipelago, 
and these conflicts are only to set increase as the expansion of plantations continues at an 
unbridled pace. Rural social movements, allied with TAMs worldwide are actively 
engaged in resisting agrarian changes that further undermine rural livelihoods, and they 
continue to struggle for social and economic justice on behalf of the millions of 
Indonesians who depend on access to and control over land to sustain their livelihoods. 
As noted by Marcus Colchester from Forest Peoples Programme, today "communities are 
more aware of their rights and are prepared to confront those who abuse them" 
(Colchester et al. 2006, 182). It remains unclear how this next chapter will unfold, 
though it is likely to be marked by contestation and conflict as rural communities in 
Indonesia claim their right to a better standard of living and fairer share of the wealth 
being created in the oil palm industry. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Sample Questions Used for Interviews with Various Informants 
Sample Questions for smallholders: 
How many plots of land do you hold? 
What is the approximate size? 
What crops have you planted on your land? 
If you are not planting oil palm, what are the reasons? 
If you are planting oil palm - when did you begin to plant these crops? 
What are benefits, obstacles and risks have you encountered with these crops? 
Do you employ workers? If so, how many? 
What is the daily wage? 
From where do you recruit them? Do you pay them daily or under contract? 
What area your sources of credit for agriculture or personal needs? 
What are your other sources of income? 
Has your standard of living been increasing over the past ten years, or decreasing? Why? 
Sample questions for labourers (migrants, locals): 
Where were you born? 
(for migrants) How did you come to be in this place? 
Tell me about the jobs you have had, in different places, since you first began to work. 
How long have you been doing this job? 
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How did you get your current job? 
Do you work alone or in a group? 
Who supervises your work? 
Are you under a contract to someone, or are you free to move away/to a different job? 
Is the work easy or difficult? 
Do you think the pay is good, or not good, in view of the kind of work you are doing? 
How does it compare to other kinds of work you have done before? 
How does it compare to other jobs available in this area? 
Do you plan to move to a different kind of work in future? 
Sample questions for plantation managers: 
What is your job on the plantation? 
How long have you been doing this job? 
What qualifications and experience do you need for this job? 
What are the main difficulties you encounter in your job? 
What do you think are some of the benefits that oil palm has brought to this area? 
What are some of the costs or risks from oil palm, in your experience? 
What are some of the issues you face in recruiting and retaining workers? 
What are some of the points of tension inside the plantation at the moment? 
How are relations between the plantation and surrounding villages? 
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Sample questions for advocates and activists, and for government officials: 
What is the main area of work of your office/organization? 
What is your particular responsibility/expertise? 
What are the main areas of contention surrounding oil palm production? 
(e.g. land, labour, safety, health, environment) 
What parties are involved in helping to solve these problems? 
What are the blockages that prevent solutions? 
What is your current plan of action towards problem solving? 
What has been the impact of the new agriculture on poverty in this area? 
Which have been the main parties that have gained, or lost? 
What measures could be taken to mitigate losses and spread benefits more evenly? 
Who are the poorest/most vulnerable people in this district? 
What measures are currently taken to help them? 
How well are they working? 
What further measures would be needed to significantly improve their situation? 
Sample questions for village leaders/elders: 
When was this village founded? 
What was the landscape here when you were a child? 
What kinds of crops were grown? 
What have been the changes in the landscape over the years (make a timeline) 
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Are all the people who lived here in the past still here, or have some moved away? 
For those who left - where did they go? When? Why? 
When did this new kind of production (oil palm) start in this village? 
How did it start? 
What happened in the early stages? What happened next? 
Is everyone involved in it, or only some people? Why? 
Who are the people who have benefited most from this production? 
Who are the people who have lost out? 
What are the difficulties that villagers here are currently facing? 
What measures are the village leaders taking to try to solve these problems? 
Who are your allies/helpers in the government, advocacy organizations, among traders or 
business people, or others? 
Sample questions for traders: 
What is your line of business? 
Where do you get your supplies and/or your capital? 
Who are the people who buy from/sell to you? 
What kinds of terms do you use (cash, credit, formal agreement, informal)? 
Do you work through brokers or intermediaries? If so, who are these people? 
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